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Abstract 
The underperformance of Italy’s macroeconomy is common knowledge, yet 
empirical evidence has shown that a high quality segment of Italian export oriented firms 
has outperformed international competitors although the country lacks practically all 
attributes of a coordinated market economy. This thesis shows that the ability of firms to 
produce high quality goods in Italy is linked to the practice of "capital skill asset pooling" 
within a novel model of production organisation, "disintegrated hierarchy".  "Capital-skill 
asset pooling" follows from the vertical disintegration of production functions across firms 
and entails the sharing of production assets between firms governed by heterogeneous 
institutional frameworks. Through the comparisons of firm-level case studies across three 
industries, the thesis shows that two simultaneous conditions are necessary for "capital-
skill asset pooling" to develop: 1) the presence of lead firms endowed with patient capital, 
and 2) the presence  small suppliers endowed with firm-, industry- and product-specific 
skills. This finding complements the Varieties of Capitalism literature by showing that 
firms can produce high or diversified quality goods in the absence of the necessary 
institutional preconditions by developing functional substitutes to coordinated market 
economy assets through "capital-skill asset pooling".  
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I. ITALIAN AGGREGATE DECLINE AND MICRO SUCCESS: AN EXPLANATION OF 
THE MECHANISMS OF ITS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
The question of how firms organise production processes is of relevance to comparative 
political economists who study the nature and structure of models of capitalism. To this 
date, the main conclusion of this literature has been that firms’ product market strategies 
are determined by specific institutional preconditions, although such preconditions do not 
exist everywhere, suggesting that product market strategies differ in line with institutional 
structures. In contrast, this thesis argues that firms find different solutions to the same 
production problems by using institutions strategically.  
 
On the one hand, the literature on models of capitalism, driven by notions of institutional 
homogeneity and coherence, central institutional tendency and dominant behavioural 
logics (Fligstein 1990; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Hicks 
and Kenworthy 1998; Soskice 1999; Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001), contends that 
firms’ behaviour is determined and influenced by institutional frameworks.  Institutional 
complementarities determine the win set of possibilities that firms can pursue (Goyer and 
Hancké 2005; Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2007). Product market strategies become the outcome 
of interactions between firms, workers and, to a limited extent, the state (Streeck 1991a; 
Streeck 1991b; Hall and Soskice 2001 : 5, 28-32). 
 
On the other, this literature has treated hybrid cases as residual and unstable (Crouch, 
Streeck et al. 2005 : 365), although heterogeneity endows economic agents with the 
capacity to manoeuvre across multiple regulatory arrangements (Stark 1996 : 995) and to 
12 
 
avoid heavily reinforced characteristics (Crouch, Streeck et al. 2005 : 365)1. Yet, less 
homogeneous and incoherent institutional frameworks have been criticised for their 
inability to deliver positive economic performances (though exceptions exist, such as: 
Hancké 2002; Campbell and Pedersen 2007). This thesis therefore endeavours in the 
study of a hybrid case, Italy - historically characterised by the incoherence, inconsistency 
and polarisation of its institutional system (De Cecco 2007; Molina and Rhodes 2007; Hall 
and Gingerich 2009). By so doing, it takes up the challenge of exploring the unapparent 
advantages of institutional heterogeneity. 
 
This thesis builds on the institutional distance between a pure coordinated market 
economy and Italy to show that Italian firms can pursue high or diversified quality product 
market strategies (as classified by: Streeck 1991b; Herrmann 2008a) in the absence of 
necessary institutional preconditions. Typologies are in fact important as they represent 
stable points of departure without which deviant institutional conformations cannot be 
investigated (Emigh 1996). Beyond the specific issue addressed, this thesis is a valuable 
theoretical and empirical endeavour for three reasons. Firstly, it is theoretically and 
empirically relevant to investigate how high or diversified quality production develops 
within heterogeneous institutional settings2. As already mentioned, a great part of the 
literature on models of capitalism has been concerned with defining typological cases 
which underpin given institutional equilibria (Aoki 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable 
2003; Boyer 2005; Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2007). Since the study of political economies that 
fail to fit these categories has been neglected, this literature is incapable to account for 
deviant cases and outliers. Deviant case analysis instead allows producing a more 
complete mapping of the spectrum of capitalist economies. 
                                                             
1 “Mongrel” animals – or models of capitalism – are expected to prove stronger and more resilient against 
shocks. 
2 The thesis’ definition of success will be discussed in following sections 
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Secondly, the models of capitalism literature failed in its initial objective of maintaining a 
firm-centred perspective (Hall and Soskice 2001 : 5). Despite Varieties of Capitalism’s 
main claim was to investigate models of capitalism from the perspective of the firm, the 
research that this approach inspired has been more and more concerned with institutions, 
and institutional complementarities (Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Estevez-Abe, Iversen et 
al. 2001; Franzese 2001; Streeck and Thelen 2005). Studying firms directly (Crouch 2001) 
may therefore allow features of their behaviour, which had been overlooked, to resurface.  
Such had been the approach of the literature on social systems of production which led to 
the identification of industrial districts (Piore and Sabel 1984; Hollingsworth 1994; 
Herrigel 1996).  By studying firms directly, the current literature on models of production 
may be better placed to depart from existing understandings and identify functional 
substitutes to established mechanisms of production. Thirdly, investigating how firms 
export large amounts of quality goods, within a country characterised by prolonged 
aggregate decline is crucial to develop a contextualised understanding of what enables 
good economic performance.  This understanding can be used to inform the formulation of 
policy recommendations.  
 
A preview of the argument 
 
In Italy firms lack the preconditions to produce high or diversified quality goods, namely 
industry specific skills and patient capital; yet high3 quality goods are exported and 
produced. The empirical evidence collected from primary and secondary sources shows 
that Italian firms are capable of overcoming the constraints that originate from the 
detrimental institutions they are confronted with. Key to the puzzle investigated by this 
thesis is the introduction of capital-skill asset pooling between firms.   
                                                             
3 In what follows, the terms “high” and “diversified quality” goods are used interchangeably. 
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In general, the segmentation and modularisation of production, characterising 
contemporary production processes, has facilitated a shift from vertically integrated to 
vertically disintegrated systems of production. Consequently, manufacturing firms have 
come to allocate the production of a good across multiple firms under the assumption that 
external sub-contractors perform specific activities more efficiently (Kogut 1989; Gereffi 
and Korzeniewicz 1994; Sturgeon 2002). In the Italian case, the rationale for production 
segmentation is slightly more sophisticated4. Italian firms access the production inputs 
they lack for the production of high quality goods through inter-firm networks which 
proceed from segmented production systems. By pooling the assets of production 
individually held, firms solve the institutional problems encountered in the process of 
production.   
 
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, a clear cleavage exists in Italy between the 
assets which differently sized firms are institutionally endowed with. Since an effective 
vocational training system does not exist, firms cannot access a pool of skilled workers.  
Since financial and corporate governance systems are skewed towards larger firms, small 
firms cannot access patient-capital. Therefore, since small firm workers acquire technical 
capabilities by learning by doing and larger firms have access to patient sources of funding, 
heterogeneously sized firms coalesce in the manufacturing process via capital-skill asset 
pooling. By so doing they bridge the institutional divide which separates small from 
medium-to-large firms. 
 
                                                             
4 It is worth recalling that production disintegration in Italy was first triggered during the labour uproar of the 
late sixties, long before than the disintegration of production that followed the developments in the 
semiconductor and computer industry [Sturgeon, T. and J.-R. Lee (2001). Industry Co-Evolution and the Rise of a 
Shared Supply-Base for Electronics Manufacturing. Nelson and Winter Conference. Aalborg, Sturgeon, T. (2003). 
"What Really Goes on in Silicon Valley? Spatial Clustering and Dispersal in Production Networks." Journal of 
Economic Geography(3): 199-225.]. 
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Therefore, in order to produce high or diversified quality goods Italian firms obtain the 
missing institutional assets from other firms catered by different institutional 
conformations. A large firm (i.e. >50 employees: large by Italian standards) pools its own 
capital with the skill assets sourced from suppliers. Albeit it does not actively re-organise 
suppliers or surrounding institutions (as was instead the case for the French industrial 
restructuring reported by Hancké 2002); it becomes the leader of a hierarchical chain of 
production. As a result, inter-firm networks become the locus and the introduction of 
capital-skill asset pooling, the medium through which functional substitutes to a classical 
coordinated market economy framework develop.   
 
The case studies presented by this thesis show that two conditions must hold for high 
quality production to develop in Italy: the presence of a network of suppliers with 
industry, firm and product-specific skills and of a lead firm with access to patient-capital.  
The first two case studies on the leather goods and footwear, and yacht industry show that 
the combination of the two allows firms, through capital-skill asset pooling, to pursue a 
high quality product market strategy. The presence of these conditions allows a 
comparative advantage to develop or be preserved in these industries. The third case 
study on the Italian computer industry shows that, as a consequence of technological 
innovation, a mismatch emerges in Italy between the skills held by suppliers and the 
capital held by large firms. Whereas capital-skill asset pooling allows firms in the leather 
goods and footwear and yacht industry to maintain and develop a comparative advantage, 
capital-skill asset mismatch leads to the decline of Italy’s computer industry in the 
nineties.   
 
The argument set forward by this thesis is supported by primary and secondary empirical 
material collected over a period of 3 years.  Semi-structured interviews, publicly available 
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statistics and industry-specific reports are triangularised in order to strengthen the 
individual validity of each. Data on comparative advantage and unit values is used to select 
the case studies and corroborate the argument. Whilst the research strategy is discussed 
in depth in Section 1.3, the next section presents the empirical puzzle addressed by the 
thesis by comparing and contrasting Italy’s aggregate and disaggregate performance over 
time. Section 1.2 reviews the explanations set forward to explain the different macro-
micro performance. Lastly Section 1.3 summarizes the research methodology and plan of 
the thesis.   
 
1.1 The international standing of Italian firms 
 
Studies on the prolonged decline of the Italian model of capitalism are aplenty. They 
attribute Italy’s decline to the absence of productivity growth and innovation intrinsic in 
the product specialisation model in place and the size of Italian firms (Bugamelli 2001; 
Ciocca 2003; Faini 2004; Nardozzi 2004; Pagano and Schivardi 2004; Toniolo, Visco et al. 
2004; De Benedictis 2005; Faini and Gagliarducci 2005; Faini and Sapir 2005). 
Nonetheless, the decline of an economy, as heterogeneous and fragmented as Italy’s, 
should not be deduced from aggregate variables alone. It therefore becomes increasingly 
important to build such claims on the basis of systematic disaggregated data and analysis. 
The following sections, juxtapose Italy’s macroeconomic and microeconomic 
performances. 
 
 
 
 1.1.1 Prolonged aggregate decline
 
Over the last fifteen years Italy’s GDP growth rate has been lower than that of other major 
European economies and the US 
capita. Its labour productivity has fallen, whilst the level of GDP per hour worked in 
manufacturing has steadily 
been the case for either Italy or Spain 
labour productivity in Italy has reached a plateau and growth rates have approached zero.  
Statistics on the real unit labour cost reinforce the aggregate decline thesis. Again when 
compared to the major European economies and the US, Italy’s real unit labour costs has 
steadily increased, up until 2006 
 
Figure 
Source: Real unit labour costs: total economy (Ratio of compensation per employee to nominal GDP 
 
Furthermore this numerical fall in productivity is traced back to softer indicators of a 
country’s technological and innovative capacity. The number of Italian patents certified by 
the European Patent Office over the 1994
 
(OECDa 2010); as has been the growth rate of GDP per 
increased in France, Germany, the US and the UK, this has not 
(OECDb 2010). Instead, since the mid
(Figure I.1). 
I.1 Real Unit Labour Costs, Selected Countries
per person employed - QLCD) (AMECOa 2010) 
-2005 period is significantly lower
17 
-nineties 
 
 
 than the 
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European average (PATSTAT EPO Worldwide Statistical Database). Moreover, whereas in 
Italy only 74 patents are submitted to the EPO per million of inhabitants, 158 patents are 
submitted across Europe on average (Scellato 2006, based on 2002 statistics). Not 
surprisingly then, Italy only ranks twenty-sixth in the Global Creativity Index developed by 
Richard Florida and Irene Tinagli; an index which combines a number of measures which 
reinforce the innovative capacity of an economy (Florida 2005). Unfortunately Italy fares 
poorly with respect to many of these factors and one in particular: education. 
 
The OECD PISA 2006 report indicates that the quality of primary education in Italy is 
below average and has worsened since the beginning of the survey in 2000. With respect 
to tertiary education, Italian universities have limited international prestige; Italian 
university students tend to abandon their studies prior completion in much higher 
numbers than in any other OECD country (OECD Education at a Glance, 2009). Italy also 
suffers from a significant brain drain of talents, due to the large outflow of highly skilled 
migrants, thus suggesting that the probability of future innovation is limited (Docquier 
and Marfouk ongoing). 
 
This loss in aggregate and technological competitiveness is mirrored by the steady decline 
in Italy’s export market share5 (Figure I.2), an indicator which “measures the degree of 
importance of a country within the total exports of the region/world” (OECD). The rise of 
manufacturing powerhouses in East Asia and India, has subjected all European exporting 
economies to increased competitive pressures. Consequently, Italy’s export market share 
                                                             
5 “The export market share is calculated by dividing the exports of the country by the total exports of the 
region/world (expressed as percentage in the database). The indicator measures the degree of importance of a 
country within the total exports of the region/world. For the calculation at current prices, the market share 
refers to the world trade (world export market share), while it refers to the OECD total for the calculation at 
constant prices (OECD export market share)” 
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TRADEINDMACRO). Therefore, current prices were used to 
try and factor into the data the Chindia effect. 
 
 has exhibited consistent negative growth rates since 1997; whereas this has not been the 
case for Spain and Germany (although both countries show a recent contraction).  
 
Figure I.2 Export Market Share  Growth Rates (5 year moving average)
Source: OECD Macro Trade Indicators, Market share (goods and services). Current prices, current 
 
Especially when compared to Spain and Germany’s performance (
values in 1980 and 2008), Italy’s decreased share is of particular concern given the large 
weight of the manufacturing sector on
to GDP growth (AMECO(b) 20101
in absolute terms its market share is still larger than Italy’s (3.8% and 3.3% respectively in 
2008, from 6.4% and 4.2% in 1980).  
 
Many authors have emphasised that Italy’s lost competitiveness and aggregate decline is 
grounded in the sectoral specialisation of Italian firms 
Gagliarducci 2005; Faini and Sapir 2005
shifted their product specialisation to technologically competitive industries, Italy has 
exchange rates 
Table 
 GDP and the contribution of manufacturing exports 
). Moreover, although France has fared worse than Italy, 
 
(Bugamelli 2001
). Whereas other major European economies have 
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I.1 shows absolute 
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preserved its industrial specialisation in traditional sectors (Bugamelli 2001, where the 
empirical evidence concerns the 1988-1997 period; De Benedictis 2005, for the period 
1970-1998). By so doing, its comparative advantage is being eroded as emerging 
economies’ export shares in world trade increase faster in low rather than high technology 
sectors. In addition, Italy’s trade specialisation is argued to be correlated with the size 
composition of Italian firms.  
Table I.2 shows that when broken down by sector, only a small percentage of firms are as 
large as the EU15 average (for each given sector). The smaller size is argued to limit the 
ability of firms to invest in research and development, their capacity to move into high-
technology industries, and thus Italy’s ability to shield itself from the competitive 
pressures of low cost producers (Pagano and Schivardi 2004; Faini and Sapir 2005).   
 
Table I.1 Export Market Share and Growth Rates (5 year moving average) 
 1980 2008 
France 6.43 3.81 
Germany 8.23 8.72 
Italy 4.28 3.35 
Japan 6.40 4.32 
Spain 1.46 2.14 
United Kingdom 6.51 3.92 
United States 12.41 9.23 
Source: OECD Macro Trade Indicators, Market share (goods and services). Current prices, current 
exchange rates 
 
Trade specialisation and the size composition of firms are identified as the main 
contributors to Italy’s macroeconomic decline. In order to establish whether this 
explanation is accurate, this thesis performs a disaggregated analysis of Italy’s trade 
performance over time to assess whether the international competitive advantage of 
Italian firms has been eroded as well. The notions of across-product and within-product 
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specialisation6 are used to establish whether Italy’s productive structure is as susceptible 
to the competitive pressures of low-cost manufacturers as suggested.  
 
Table I.2 Firm size as a percentage of the average EU-15 firm size per sector7 
 EU15 Germany Spain France Italy UK 
Real estate 81.66 0.76 0.37 0.91   
Wood 103.96 1.90 0.34 0.68 0.21 0.93 
Leather/Footwear 105.10 0.48  2.05 0.51 2.21 
Construction 106.72 1.23 1.06 1.32 0.38 0.86 
Textile 175.35 1.86 0.65 0.95 0.48 1.96 
Hotel/Restaurants 182.68 0.83 0.33 0.84 0.43 3.56 
Other services 204.85 1.40 1.22 0.72 0.68 1.38 
Private services 254.28 1.14 0.63 1.40 0.30 1.23 
Paper 300.65 1.57 0.51 0.72 0.60 0.97 
Metal products 305.03 1.55 0.59 1.05 0.48 0.90 
Non-metal goods 319.66 1.84 0.50 1.35 0.44 1.38 
Food man. 338.66 0.91 0.58 0.84 0.75 2.46 
Retail 343.04 1.35 0.44 0.76 0.16 2.91 
Transport 347.03 1.57 0.60 1.32 0.70 1.35 
Plastics 394.55 1.65 0.77 1.29 0.44 0.72 
Mechanical goods 406.08 1.33 0.56 1.44 0.94 0.92 
Other man. 532.43 2.00 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.30 
Chemicals 728.99 1.72 0.43 0.87 0.70 1.07 
Electrical goods 780.51 1.49 0.46 0.79 0.52 0.62 
Financial activities 1163.84 0.94 1.15 1.03  1.55 
Petrol 1196.54 1.40  1.15 0.87  
Transport equip.t 1742.63 1.93 0.67 1.14 0.88 0.72 
Total 336.33 1.58 0.58 0.98 0.42 1.58 
Source: (Pagano and Schivardi 2004) 
 
The following section thus explains the empirics which ground the theoretical puzzle.  It 
shows that statements of a prolonged deterioration in Italy’s international trade position 
                                                             
6 The notion of across-product specialisation captures the extent to which a country is specialised in the 
production of, for example, apparel versus machinery; the notion of within-product specialisation instead 
captures the extent to which countries are specialised in the production of more or less technologically 
advanced varieties of a good - analog versus high-definition  television, for example  (Schott 2004 : 649).  In 
essence, within-product specialisation suggests that whereas Italy and China may produce goods pertaining to 
the same product category, the quality of such goods may be significantly varied, thus creating different 
demand and commanding different prices.  Italian firms may indeed be competing in the same industry as low 
cost manufacturers, yet the different product quality of the goods produced enables Italian firms to assert and 
hold a comparative trade advantage for that good. 
7 The table is constructed in such a way that a value equal to one implies that the average of employees per 
industry is the same as the EU15 average, a value below one implies that the country average is 0.x times 
smaller than the EU15 average. 
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are inaccurate. Though some product categories have lost a comparative advantage, others 
have preserved or developed one anew.   
 
1.1.2 Measuring success 
 
Indicators of comparative advantage and quality production 
 
This thesis performs a closer investigation of trade flows in order to better understand the 
details of Italy’s performance. This is done through a study of product trade flows of those 
countries8 for which the OECD’s ITCS (International Trade and Commodity Statistics) 
database reports data. The results of this exercise reveal that examples of successful 
export performance exist in Italy, where success is determined by the value of the 
revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) indicator.   
 
The trade data used is derived from the OECD International Trade and Commodity 
Statistics (Revision 2 and 3) dataset which includes trade (value and volume) data for all 
manufactured goods. The data is disaggregated at the three- and four-digit level of the 
SITC international product classification system. Though these are not the finest levels of 
disaggregation possible, they have been chosen as the five-digit level of disaggregation 
does not allow a matching between product category, actual firm and industry.  On the 
basis of this data each good’s revealed comparative advantage9 is computed, and reduced 
to its symmetric form (RCA and RSCA respectively). Since the RCA ranges between 0 : ∞, it 
is difficult to interpret. In order to overcome this problem, the indicator is forced to range 
                                                             
8 See Appendix 1 for details on country selection criteria and data availability. 
9 See Appendix 2 for details on how the Revealed Comparative Advantage is calculated. 
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between -1 : 1, thus allowing for a common benchmark to be drawn across all product 
categories analysed10 (Laursen 1998 : 1).  
 
The RSCA (and RCA) indicator contains a comparison between national export structures 
with those of the selected basket of countries against which we evaluate a specific 
country’s performance and it represents a measure of international specialisation. The 
indicator is constructed by weighting each country’s sectoral market share by the inverse 
of the weight of each country in foreign trade. By construction, the RCA (RSCA) indicator 
and the sectoral market share of each country are positively correlated. The indicator has 
been constructed with export data only whereas other versions of the indicator use the 
absolute sum of exports and imports. This is based on the idea that when comparing two 
(or more) countries’ international competitiveness, the thesis wants to establish how 
many goods Italian firms sell abroad, independently of domestic consumption (Balassa 
1965). 
    
As mentioned, the RSCA indicator ranges between -1 : 1.  The closer the indicator is to one 
the greater the advantage for a given good. Although, a RSCA value greater than zero 
shows that a country has a comparative advantage, the literature which has employed this 
indicator to identify successful export categories has converged to using 0.5 as a 
benchmark for export success (Allen 2005; Amador, Cabral et al. 2007). Resort to this 
indicator for investigations on the (un-)competitive position of a country is common 
because of the statistical wealth of data on traded goods, its fine disaggregation, and 
international comparability (de Nardis and Trau` 1999). Manufacturing data on 
                                                             
10 In the literature there is some disagreement to which extent the RCA/RCSA can be used for cross-country 
comparison [De Benedictis, L. and M. Tamberi (2004). "Overall Specialization Empirics: Techniques and 
Applications." Open Economies Review 15: 323-346. Hoen, A. R. and J. Oosterhaven (2006). "On the measurement 
of comparative advantage." Annals of Regional Science 40: 677-691.].  
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domestically traded goods is unfortunately less developed, less disintegrated and less 
accurate. 
 
The indicator therefore allows the identification of product classes in which Italian firms 
(or any of the twenty nine countries analysed) hold a comparative advantage and is 
computed for all available data observations (1988-2008). In what follows the analysis of 
the indicator for the year 2003 is presented, as this represents the latest data point where 
complete trade statistics, expressed in value and quantity measures, are available11.   
 
Figure I.3 Product categories where the RSCA is greater than 0.5 (2003) 
 
Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Own Calculations 
 
Figure I.3 outlines which product categories have been successful: namely, the product 
categories for which the RSCA indicator held values greater than 0.5 in 2003 (for Italy 
these were 16 out of 170 categories, i.e. 9 per cent of total export categories and accounted 
for 19.7 per cent of total Italian exports - measured in value terms). Although the RSCA 
provides a clear picture of which industries exhibit a revealed comparative advantage, 
                                                             
11 Subsequent to 2003, volume data observations are incomplete. 
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based on this indicator it is impossible to infer how this successful performance has been 
achieved: whether via a low cost or high quality product market strategy.  Hence, to 
understand and evaluate the product market strategy that characterise these goods, an 
analysis of relative unit values is performed.   
 
The relative unit value is a price-based indicator which under given conditions can act as a 
raw proxy for quality (Aiginger 1997; de Nardis and Trau` 1999; Aiginger 2000; de Nardis 
and Pensa 2004; Herrmann 2005; Hancké and Herrmann 2007; Hallack and Schott 2008).  
An analysis of unit values is just one of the available methodologies used to assess the 
validity of the quality ladder hypothesis (Grossman and Helpman 1991). This concept, 
which has been further clarified by the notions of across-industry and within-industry 
product differentiation, suggests that production not only differs in terms of the range of 
goods manufactured but also in terms of the quality and technological distance between 
goods of the same family class (Hallack and Schott 2008). Countries not only specialise 
across products but also within product classes (Schott 2004 : 2); thus, the same good can 
be classified as high vs. low quality according to what position it occupies in the vertical 
quality ladder. 
 
Unit values (UV) can be used to distinguish a market where price competition is more 
important than non-price competition as they measure how much output results from one 
input factor. The unit value (UV) of an exported commodity is the quotient of its value 
divided into a quantity measure - e.g. kilograms (Aiginger 1997: 571). If the value added of 
the final good is low, and the output unit (final good) closely resembles the input unit 
(intermediate good or material factor of production), then the UV is a close proxy of the 
good’s cost of production. If instead the dimensions and features of the input and the 
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output vary substantially, the UV is not a good proxy for its cost, rather of the added value 
which fed into such good’s production process (the “quality” component).   
 
Determining, beyond the single case, when a UV can be used to discriminate a quality-
competitive from a price-competitive market is a matter of debate, and a number of 
solutions have been suggested (Aiginger 1997; de Nardis and Trau` 1999; Aiginger 2000; 
de Nardis and Pensa 2004; Herrmann 2005; Hancké and Herrmann 2007; Hallack and 
Schott 2008). Aiginger (1997) first selects the product categories with a positive 
difference between exports and imports both in terms of quantity and value measures: 
therefore establishing in which industries a country exhibits a comparative advantage.  
Then, going backwards, he questions whether this advantage results from positive or 
negative unit values. 
 
The underlying assumption is that if an economy sells its products at higher unit values 
and, nevertheless, enjoys an export surplus, such good is quality elastic; alternatively, the 
product is price elastic. If country “i” is a net exporter in quantity despite the higher unit 
value of its exported good, it can be argued that the higher UVi is commanded by a higher 
quality. This idea is captured by the following relationships observed between unit values 
and trade quantities, where ‘exp’ stands for exports, ‘imp’ for imports and ‘Q’ for 
quantities.    
[UVexp > UVimp  ; Qexp > Qimp]                              (1)  
[UVexp < UVimp ; Qexp > Qimp]            (2) 
 
When equation (1) holds then the products which exhibit such relation belong to quality-
dominated markets; if instead equation (2) holds, they belong to price-elastic markets 
(Aiginger 1997: 576). Comparing the UV of a product category across the countries of 
reference allows us to establish in which countries the quality of such good commands a 
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higher price12. Consequently, this thesis uses a variant of Aiginger’s (1997) suggested 
methodology. In order to gauge the difference between country “i”’s unit value of good “j” 
from the world’s, each goods’ relative unit value is calculated13. Applying Aiginger’s 
rationale, each good’s revealed symmetric comparative advantage, which captures 
whether a good benefits from a trade advantage or not, is mapped with the respective 
relative unit value, for the most recent data point, 2003.  It should be noted that the RUV 
indicator has been made symmetric as well for reasons of comparability and ranges 
between -1 and 1: thus RSUV. This mapping results in a two-by-two matrix which 
discloses four states of the world. These states pin-point the four possible case scenarios 
resulting from the successful or unsuccessful pursuit of a quality or price competitive 
product market strategy. Scenarios one and three capture unsuccessful firms; scenarios 2 
and 4 capture successful firms (Table I.3). 
 
Table I.3 Firm performance defined by product market strategy 
 Negative RSCA Positive RSCA 
Positive RSUV 1. Structural problem product 
2. Successful quality 
competition product 
Negative RSUV 
3. Deficit in price competition 
product 
4. Successful price 
competition product 
Source: Own classification based on (Aiginger 1997 : 571-592) 
 
                                                             
12 Many have implicitly assumed that unit values are a reliable signal and indicator of endowment-driven 
vertical-differentiation [Schott, P. (2005). "The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports." Working Paper Yale 
School of Management and NBER..  This indicator has been used in analogous forms and combinations by the 
literature de Nardis, S. and F. Trau` (1999). "Specializzazione settoriale e qualità dei prodotti: misure della 
pressione competitiva dell'industria italiana." Rivista italiana degli economisti 2(Agosto): 177-212 ].  It has also 
been criticised on grounds of inaccuracy and spuriousness [Schott, P. (2005). "The Relative Sophistication of 
Chinese Exports." Working Paper Yale School of Management and NBER, Silver, M. (2007). Do unit value export, 
import and terms of trade indices represent or misrepresent price indices? IMF Working Paper WP/07/121, IMF, 
Hallack, J. C. and P. Schott (2008). "Estimating cross-country differences in product quality." NBER Working Paper 
Series Working Paper 13807.]  Despite the ongoing debate, it has been demonstrated that “within-product 
variation in export unit value is positively associated with exporter skill and capital abundance” [Schott, P. 
(2005). "The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports." Working Paper Yale School of Management and 
NBER.] – and thus that this exercise is a valid one.  Issues of inaccuracy and spuriousness are therefore 
disregarded.   
13 Relative unit values (RUV) have been computed by means of value and volume data [Herrmann, A. (2005). 
"Converging Divergence: How Competitive Advantages Condition Institutional Change under EMU." Journal of 
Common Market Studies 43(2): 287-310]..  Since weighting the RUV amplifies the indicator, RUV have not been 
weighted but only rendered symmetrical in order to ensure the comparability with the RSCA indicator - this 
has been done by standardising the RUV as follows: RUV -1/RUV +1. 
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For Italy, the product categories in which firms are successful exporters of quality 
competitive goods are identified through appropriate benchmarks: (i) an RSCA indicator 
greater than 0.5 is used to identify a good with an export advantage; (ii) a positive RSUV 
suggests that the unit value of country “i” is higher than the unit value of the world.  
Subsequently, a good’s product market strategy is identified by comparing the value of the 
relative symmetric unit value and that of the revealed symmetric comparative advantage 
indicator. This exercise enables a clear identification of which product categories hold a 
revealed comparative advantage vis-à-vis other OECD countries.  In itself, this suggests 
that arguments predicting the absolute decline of the Italian economy may be unfounded.  
 
Figure I.4 Twoway scatter: RSCA and RSUV (2003) 
 
Source: Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Own Calculations 
 
Moreover, when mapped against a proxy for quality (Figure I.4), the combination of these 
indicators (RSCA and RSUV) suggests that the majority of industries which have 
maintained or developed a comparative advantage have done so by producing goods 
characterised by a higher quality (as also suggested by Herrmann 2008a; Herrmann 
2008b).  These are the goods located in the north-western quadrant of the Figure I.4. The 
question addressed by this thesis attempts to understand where these firms have found 
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the resources (strategic, financial and institutional) to succeed in such markets.  Before 
doing so, the next section discusses the theoretical context the question touches upon, and 
the predictions that have been put forward by the literature regarding the link between 
firms, product market strategies, and institutions. 
 
1.2 Explaining firm-level performance through the institutional lens  
 
‘Old’ and ‘new’ trade theory argue that the variation in export trends of a good is 
functional to producer’s endowments; a country’s (in our case a firm’s) ability to export 
increased volumes of a good is linked to its capacity to do so at prices lower than those set 
by its market competitors (Schott 2003: 2-9). Accordingly, Carlin et al. suggest that the 
trend towards globalisation and the associate increase in international competition 
suggest a heightened sensitivity of exports to costs (Carlin, Glyn et al. 2001)14.   
 
Moreover, cost-based theories of international competitiveness argue that the 
competitiveness of a particular market segment depends on the exporting country’s (i) 
technology, (ii) wage and (iii) bilateral trade costs (Baldwin and Harrigan 2007: 3).  
Whereas the introduction of the European Single Market and the gradual removal of 
barriers to trade implied that bilateral trade costs impacted European firms 
homogenously; relative unit labour costs in Italy are high in international comparison 
(Graph 1.2). This suggests that the ability of Italian firms to hold a comparative trade 
advantage for certain goods is not grounded on price competitiveness – at least not at an 
aggregate level. On the other hand, institutional analysis offers plausible explanatory 
avenues for the competitiveness of Italian firms.  In this section, such analyses are 
                                                             
14 The authors perform an empirical analysis of whether costs or technology better account for a country’s 
changes in market shares in an industry; thus finding evidence for the importance of costs as well as of product 
specialisation. 
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reviewed and arranged in three different families according to the geographical focus of 
analysis: local, national or international.  
 
1.2.1 Flexible specialisation in the industrial district literature: the local perspective 
 
The concept of industrial districts was first developed as an interpretative tool to explain 
the relationship between firms and institutions in the central and north-eastern areas of 
Italy (Piore and Sabel 1984; Becattini 1987). Spatially concentrated small firms attracted 
the attention of researchers because of the high values of exports displayed relative to the 
rest of the country15 (Bagnasco 1977; Bagnasco, Messori et al. 1978; Trigilia 1997; 
Whitford 2001). Furthermore, the mode of production observed stood at the opposite end 
of mass production.  Flexible specialisation is defined as:  
 
“a strategy of permanent innovation […] based on flexible – multi-use – equipment; 
skilled workers; and the creation – through politics – of an industrial community 
[…]” (Piore and Sabel 1984 : 17). 
 
Industrial districts are the locus where flexible specialisation takes place.  They are 
defined as “socio-territorial entit[ies] characterised by the active presence of both a 
community of people and a population of firms in one naturally and historically bounded 
area” (Becattini 1990 : 39). Terms such as clusters or networks thus fail to capture the 
sociological interaction and relational density of districts, which are instead a particular 
category of clusters or networks where relations of trust and informal institutions govern 
interactions between small firms (Porter and Ketels 2009). 
                                                             
15 The model of industrial development typical of Italy’s north-western areas in the seventies closely 
resembled a Fordist, mass productive system; yet the economic preformance of these industrial areas 
worsened since the heated workers’ contestations of the late sixties. 
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Districts endow firms with the strategic capabilities to produce, high quality, light 
manufacturing goods directed at national and international markets (Sabel and Zeitlin 
1985). The institutional underpinnings which ground districts include: employers, artisan 
and workers associations, local technical schools, credit cooperatives, networks of local 
banks, and development agencies (Whitford 2001). Local vocational training schools and 
research centres contribute to the creation of a pool of skilled workers (Leonardi, Nanetti 
et al. 1991; Dei Ottati 1994). Cooperatives and local banks, and the figure of the 
impannatore16, are crucial in overcoming information asymmetries between small firms 
and lending institutions (Dei Ottati 1994). Strong trade associations are crucial to 
developing the necessary resources to compete in international markets. The local state 
brokers compromises between the players of the local economy (Trigilia 1986; Trigilia 
1990; Whitford 2001). Precondition to the development of these institutions are thickly 
tied communities of people and firms (Becattini 1990 : 39). 
 
Yet, the industrial district concept is no longer as useful to explain the performance of 
Italian firms today. In fact the dimensional structure of firms in industrial districts has 
changed and become more heterogeneous (Rinaldi 2002): numerous studies have shown 
that firms in better performing districts have grown in size (Foresti and Trenti 2007; 
Guelpa and Micelli 2007). Specific studies on Emilia Romagna show that small firms 
diminished in numbers, take-overs and mergers increased throughout the nineties and the 
role of large, networked-firms, increased (Farrell and Holten 2001; Rinaldi 2002). 
Moreover, Brusco’s interpretation of Emilia Romagna’s success, for example, relies heavily 
on the role played by the Communist party (PCI) as a public mediator and formulator of 
industrial policy; yet this changed substantially in the nineties as the PCI was first replaced 
                                                             
16 Various interpretations are associated to the term impannatore. They have been referred to as middlemen, 
as subcontracting coordinators, and as entrepreneurs [Lazzeretti, L., L. De Propris, et al. (2004). "Impannatori 
and business angels: two models of informal capital provision." International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 28: 839-854.].  
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by the PDS and then the DS (the Democrats of the Left), which allocated the responsibility 
over industrial policy to business associations.  Therefore the role of public actors changed 
even in those territories which were representative of prototypical industrial districts. 
Finally, the territorial and cultural boundaries, which sustain the social homogeneity of 
industrial district systems, are less defined (for example see Dei Ottati 2009 on recent 
developments in Prato). What has recently emerged is an altogether different organisation 
of production than that outlined by a purist reading of the industrial district literature.  
Such literature is thus less well placed to explain how some Italian firms are successfully 
competing in international markets today. 
 
German social systems of production 
 
Akin to the industrial district literature are the studies of Streeck and Herrigel on the 
competitive advantage of firms located in Baden Württemberg. For Streeck, the 
production of a high quality machine tool is best described by the notion of diversified 
quality production (DQP): “Customised and diversified high quality products which 
respond to non-mass markets in which competition is not only over the price of basically 
homogenous goods but over product quality and the degree to which products meet the 
special needs of individual customers” (Sorge and Streeck 1988 : 29). DQP relies on a 
number of institutional preconditions: (i) a congenial organisational ecology, (ii) the 
presence of redundant capacities, and (iii) the rich supply of collective productive inputs.  
Moreover these conditions develop only when an economic system “is at the same time a 
society” (Streeck 1991 : 24). A congenial organisational ecology exists when producers 
prosper in the presence of other, equally competent producers of the same kind, with 
whom symmetrical (non-hierarchical), trust-based alliances are struck (Streeck 1991 : 34; 
Herrigel 1993 : 20). This ecology must be rich with redundant capacities and governed in 
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such a way to allow for the supply of collective productive inputs.  Markets and hierarchies 
are not equipped to solve the collective action problems: therefore stable institutional 
constraints are set up in order to govern such establishment.   
 
Herrigel adds one further condition to the above: the practice of socialising risk across 
public and private organisations (Herrigel 1993, 17). In Baden Württemberg, small and 
specialised firms do not tolerate “the entire burden of developing new technologies, 
finding new markets, training skilled engineers and workers, raising capital […] many of 
the costs of specialisation are shared by or embedded in a deep network of organisations 
in the political economy” (Herrigel 1993 : 17). The institutions which Herrigel identifies as 
conducive to this are: (i) educational institutions, universities, Fachhochschule, and 
Berufsschule; (ii) trade associations and chambers of commerce (VDMA and ZVEI); (iii) 
regional banks which facilitated the flow of credit to local firms; and (iv) regional 
governments. 
 
Yet whilst Italy is indeed an institutionally rich society, it is far from the Weberian pure 
type which Streeck identified in West Germany; institutions appear to misfit each other 
and institutional variety is apparent at all institutional levels (Molina and Rhodes 2007).  
In Italy congenial ecologies do exist, yet even within classical local production systems 
(Prato, Biella, Bologna, Vicenza) relationships across firms are no longer symmetrical and 
non-hierarchical. The institutional obligations set up for the production and reproduction 
of redundant capabilities are not present at a national nor a sub-national level: there is no 
obligation to train workers, to join an employer organisation, to abide by common product 
standards, to share technology and know-how; nor institutional mechanisms which 
promote social peace and trust inside the firm - as the practice of German co-
determination would instead. The governance mechanisms of the system differ as well and 
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are far less formalised and stable (Chapter 6). The practice of risk socialisation which 
Herrigel identified in the Baden Wurttemberg region is limitedly reproduced in Italy 
within firms which employ more than 15 employees (Chapter 2). It therefore appears that 
the local institutional preconditions which allow firms to compete in export markets or to 
produce diversified quality products, as identified by the industrial district literature and 
Streeck et al., do not exist in Italy today. 
 
1.2.2 Product market strategies in Varieties of Capitalism: the national perspective 
 
Building on the findings of the literature on production regimes, industrial orders and 
innovation systems (Sorge and Streeck 1988; Streeck 1991; Streeck 1992; Herrigel 1996; 
Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Aoki 2001), Varieties of Capitalism has clarified the 
necessary national level institutional preconditions underlying the production of 
diversified quality competitive goods (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
 
Three input factors are deemed necessary for firms to produce quality competitive goods 
(Herrmann 2008a): a workforce endowed with (firm-specific and) industry-transferable 
skills, long-term patient capital, and coordinated institutions for standard setting. These 
factors are conditional on the existence of an institutional framework which allows firms 
to overcome the collective action problems involved in generating such input factors.  
Within this framework, institutions interact in order to create the stable conditions for 
firms’ production to take place. When positive synergies derive from this interaction of 
institutions, then institutions are described as complementary (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Institutional frameworks offer firms both incentives and constraints (Soskice 1999).   
Social policy regimes and industrial relations institutions in synergy support the 
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production of specific skills (Hall and Soskice 2001). Corporate governance regimes and 
financial systems interact in order to create the appropriate incentives to invest in long 
term relations aimed at the development of incrementally innovative products (Vitols 
2001). Inter-firm relations and corporate law systems interact in order to ensure the 
necessary compliance to standards of production (Casper 2001 : 404-407; Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Tate 2001; Teubner 2001 : 403). 
 
Further details on the characteristics of a Varieties of Capitalism institutional framework 
which allows the production of high quality goods will be discussed in Chapter 2.  Here it is 
sufficient to say that all firms in Italy do not have access to the input factors deemed 
necessary. Actually access to these factors varies with the size of firms. For this reason, the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature understands Italy as a deviant case, incapable of 
producing high/diversified quality goods. This theoretical structure is therefore not 
capable of explaining the success of some Italian export oriented firms. 
 
1.2.3 Offsetting detrimental institutional settings: the international perspective  
 
Aside from those few pure national systems identified by the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature, firms are very often confronted with institutional settings which are 
detrimental to the productive strategy pursued. On a case by case approach, a new 
research stream is developing on the solutions developed by firms to pursue a specific 
product market strategy when faced with non-supporting institutional settings.  
 
Most of this literature is born out of the attempts of biotech firms to establish themselves 
in Germany (Lerner and Gompers 2001; Herrmann 2005; Herrmann 2008b; Lange 2009).  
36 
 
This research claims that detrimental institutional settings can be offset by companies 
who tap into foreign business systems (Lange 2009 : 189). Empirical evidence of this 
hypothesis is found in the development of an international market for venture capital to 
attract investors willing to fund radical innovation in Germany (Lerner and Gompers 
2001). Tapping into foreign business systems also takes the form of Italian and German 
pharmaceutical firms employing international workers because of their different skill set 
and employment flexibility (Herrmann 2008a). Although this literature is concerned with 
one specific industry characterised by radical innovation, its intuitions may be stretched 
and re-employed elsewhere. Yet, an international market for venture capital has not 
developed in Italy (AIFI Italian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, 2007).  
Additionally, importation (Herrmann 2008b) of senior managers within Italian companies 
has not taken place, neither within SMEs nor in companies employing more than fifty 
employees. Recent research has shown that non-national managers in a sample of Italian 
firms are less than 2 per cent, only 4 per cent in Italian multinational companies; 
moreover hiring takes place through non-market relational channels  (Bandiera, Guiso et 
al. 2008). 
 
In addition, if Italian firms were pursuing the liberal market path more decisively more 
cases of production off-shoring should be observed. A move towards delocalisation was 
acknowledged in the early nineties (Camuffo, Gerli et al. 2004; Coro`, Tattara et al. 2006), 
driven by the search for cheaper labour inputs. This move had three unexpected 
consequences. In certain cases the relocation was reversed because of the unexpected 
control and monitoring costs involved: notable is Diesel’s – a denim-wear producer – 
declaration of returning all production to Italy in 2005 and transferring a large part of the 
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previously internationalised manufactures to the south of the country17 (Unknown 2005).  
In some cases, firms realised that outsourcing increased the risk of nurturing future 
competitors (Alberti 2006 : 492). Lastly, in some cases, whilst internationalising and 
moving to Eastern Europe, Italian companies reproduced the domestic set of institutions 
they had left behind (Camuffo, Gerli et al. 2004), as had been the case in Timisoara, 
Romania. This suggests that there was something worth preserving about these prima 
facie detrimental institutions.  It therefore appears that although Italian firms are set in a 
dysfunctional institutional setting, they have not escaped it systematically through an 
international route. 
 
1.2.4 The research question 
 
These three perspectives cannot explain in what way Italian firms produce high quality 
goods and, by so doing, preserve or develop revealed comparative advantages in given 
industries. The local perspective is no longer up to date because the boundaries and 
features of industrial districts and local economies have been transformed. The national 
perspective does not capture Italy’s institutional heterogeneity: since this perspective 
accounts for the behaviour of firms located in pure ideal types, and everything else is not 
observed. The prediction of this literature is: “if not our way, then no way”, therefore 
leaving much else unexplained. Lastly, although the international perspective is promising, 
it has yet to engage explicitly with other industries beside pharmaceuticals and biotech.  In 
this sense, it still has not addressed the question of how firms can engage in any product 
                                                             
17 Currently in 2010, this production has once more returned to Bassano: Diesel’s main production site and 
headquarter location.  This move is justified on the need to cut production, given the demand slow-down of the 
past years; yet, the implied skill level of Sicilian suppliers may allow the hypothesis that capital-skill asset 
mismatch has grounded such a move (see Ch.2 for a definition of capital skill asset mismatch). 
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market strategy other than one characterised by radical innovation (with the possible 
exception of  Herrmann 2008a).  
 
Nonetheless, the evidence presented in the above sections (1.1) must be explained. Some 
firms have exported sufficiently high value and volume of goods such that Italian industry 
has maintained a revealed comparative advantage in some product categories. In addition, 
this trade performance appears to be associated with the production of high quality goods. 
Whereas the use of unit values can be criticised on some ground, the fact that all studies 
employing such statistics contend that Italian goods are quality superior to those 
produced by competitors, implies that the method is robust. The question is therefore set: 
how can Italian firms produce high quality goods in the absence of the necessary 
institutional framework to do so? How can small firms access the necessary patient capital 
which allows for incremental innovation? And where do larger firms find a pool of 
workers endowed with industry specific skills required for the production of high quality 
goods? 
 
A myriad of Italian firms have developed the necessary mechanisms to overcome such 
constraints, yet the literature’s explanations are not persuasive. This thesis therefore 
investigates this question as its object of analysis.  It wants to identify which mechanisms 
have allowed Italian firms to overcome the institutional constraints which they are faced 
with. In the next section, the methodological approach employed to investigate such 
mechanisms is discussed. Whilst the case studies have been identified via quantitative 
analysis, qualitative analysis has been used in order to establish how firm behaviour has 
developed in light of the institutional constraints faced. 
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1.3 Methodology  
1.3.1 Case selection on the dependant variable: successful and unsuccessful industries 
 
The objective of the thesis is to explain how an Italian firm is capable of exporting high 
quality goods without the necessary institutional support to do so. The case studies 
investigated are derived from the mapping of high trade and quality performance values 
per each product class. Whilst this mapping is impossible at a firm level, it is possible 
instead at the industry level, where an industry is defined by the product manufactured in 
it. The cases selected call for an explanation in the face of a non-exhaustive literature.  
These are industries where Italian firms export proportionately more goods than their 
competitors in terms of the RSCA indicator and sectoral market share. These industries 
represent the dependant variable which is explained by this thesis. 
 
In order to understand which mechanisms have been developed by Italian firms to 
overcome the institutional constraints encountered three case studies have been selected 
on the dependant variable. One industry has been selected because the values of the trade 
and quality indicators have systematically been high throughout the industry’s 
development; one where higher export and quality values have only recently emerged; 
and one industry, the counterfactual, where a past successful trade performance has been 
foregone. The three case studies allow extrapolating the conditions necessary for firms to 
solve the institutional problems encountered when producing high quality goods. The 
analysis of increasingly disaggregated data (see Appendix 3 for details) confirms that 
industry segments exist in Italy where a revealed comparative trade advantage derives 
from the pursuit of a high quality product market strategy.  Moreover, three industries are 
identified showing a stationary, an improving and a deteriorating trend (Table I.4). 
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Table I.4 Industry selection based on RSCA and RSUV performance 
 Yesterday Today 
Textile, Footwear and Leather + + 
Yacht-building - + 
Office equipment /Computer + - 
 
The first case study selected thus concerns subcategories of the textile, leather good 
(handbag), footwear and apparel industry. Although the textile industry as a whole has 
worsened its performance over the last decade, some segments of the industry have 
instead shown stationarity or improvements in the RSCA indicator.  These subsections are 
listed in Appendix 3 and today make up for 93 per cent of total clothing accessories, 67 per 
cent of total hand bags, 20 per cent of total footwear and of total leather exported from 
Italy (OECD ITCS 2010).  
 
Figure I.5 Twoway scatter: RSCA and Sectoral Market Share (2003), various industries 
 
  
Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Own Calculations 
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The second case study selected is a subsegment of the “Ships, boats and floating 
structures” industry, the yacht building industry, which makes up for 52 per cent of total 
Italian trade in ships (OECD ITCS 2010).  This industry is a subsection of the shipbuilding 
industry; it covers firms producing vessels for pleasure and sport, specifically luxury 
yachts. The successful trade performance of these industries is further shown in Figure I.5, 
where the RSCA and sectoral market share for individual product categories are mapped 
by country (Italy = 15, Germany = 11, France = 10). The third case study is the 
counterfactual: the industry selected is the computer industry, in its current and early 
stages captured by the product category “office equipment machines”. “751 Office 
machines” captures an industry which exported high quality goods in the past but that 
failed to perform as successfully in recent years. 
 
1.3.2 Interview methodology  
 
Having selected three industries, the most successful firms in each industry are identified 
via a two-step strategy.  Firstly, the names of all firms, per industry, are extrapolated from 
the ORBIS database18. ORBIS offers detailed company level information including 
financials and activity specialisation on worldwide public and private companies. The 
latest accessible version of the database, October 2009, contains detailed current and 
partial historical information on over 40 million companies worldwide. In order to 
compare the international standing of Italian firms vis-à-vis global competitors, financials 
on all reported firms for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
                                                             
18 It would have been best to confront this list with the Unioncamere’s Movimprese database, which is a yearly 
revised database of firm birth and mortality produced by Italy’s central Chamber of Commerce, Unioncamere.  
Unfortunately this database is not free of charge. Firms registered with the Chamber can access information on 
other firms at a price.  For non members a much higher price is charged per each firm selected, therefore not 
allowing statistical analysis on this database to be performed.  
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the United States, Japan, China and Korea were extrapolated from the database. This data 
was then classified according to NACE’s (Rev.2, three digit level) economic activity 
classification system; ninety-one manufacturing activities were selected, and 3,145,327 
firms considered in total, 5% of which are Italian owned (167,315). Amongst this list, the 
names of Italian firms which ranked in the upper quintile were extrapolated. This list was 
presented to industry experts who both identified a number of inaccuracies with the 
database and, more importantly, pointed out which firms had in their opinion been key 
players in the industry’s restructuring. The industry experts who have provided this 
information were both regional and local trade union representatives (mostly from the 
CGIL), members of local employer associations, and local academic experts, who in Italy 
often mediate between firms and policymakers.  
 
Personal semi-structured interviews were used to extrapolate information on how to 
approach firms and who best to contact within them. Not only, these expert interviews 
also informed a clear idea of what industry-level developments had taken place and the 
shape of the resulting productive system. Thirty-eight such interviews were conducted 
between January 2008 and April 2010. Officials from Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 
CariFirenze and Intesa San Paolo, three of Italy’s most important monetary and financial 
institutions, were also interviewed (four in total) between January 2009 and February 
2011. In addition, firm-level interviews were conducted whenever availability was offered 
by the interviewed firm. Eleven such interviews were conducted between January 2008 
and April 2010. Lastly, original interview excerpts from a research project conducted by 
the Regione Piemonte were viewed, which included three industry-level and three firm-
level interviews (Ferraresi and Michelsons 2007). 
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Firstly, interviewees were questioned on the organisational structure of production in 
place at the industry and firm-specific level. They were asked to describe whether the 
organisational structure in place was vertically integrated or disintegrated and whether 
this had changed over time. In the event that the structure was recognised as vertically 
disintegrated, questions were asked on how production functions were allocated within 
this disintegrated structure and to whom. Both industry level experts and firms were 
asked to comment on the role played by individual firms within this disintegrated 
structure, in particular with reference to the relationships between firms of similar and of 
different sizes. Secondly, industry level experts and firms were asked to explain the 
process of skill acquisition of the typical young worker entering the labour market. 
Industry level experts, firms and banks were questioned on the large/small firm-bank 
relationship, and on how this changed over time given the reform of Italy’s financial 
sector. Finally, firm level, semi-structured, interviews were coupled with other methods of 
information gathering.  Industry or topic specific publications by regional governments, 
employer associations and trade unions were consulted to confirm and deepen the 
insights suggested by interviewees. Consequently, whenever possible, reference to 
published documents and not to single interviewees has been made to duly substantiate 
the thesis’ claims; where this was not possible, individual interviewees are cited. The 
research design has therefore relied on the triangulation of data collected from different 
sources: (1) firm-level semi-structured interviews; (2) publicly available statistics; (3) 
information on company websites; (4) industry experts such as trade unions, employer 
associations; (5) academic experts; (6) published industry or topic specific documents and 
reports. 
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1.4 Plan of the thesis  
 
The thesis is organised in seven chapters: two introductory, three case studies, one 
theoretical and one concluding chapter. Whilst this introductory chapter has touched upon 
concepts such as institutional heterogeneity and dis-functionality, they still need to be 
operationalised and empirically accounted for. Therefore, Chapter 2 is spent explaining 
the empirical distance between a pure coordinated market economy and Italy.  In this 
sense, it substantiates how different the institutional support which Italian export firms 
receive is from that received by German firms. Germany is used as the empirical 
benchmark of a typical coordinated market economy because it is still considered such, at 
least within the boundaries of its export oriented manufacturing sector (Eichhorst in 
Crouch, Streeck et al. 2005 : 566). Therefore Chapter 2 outlines how different Italy’s 
institutional system is with specific reference to the vocational training and education 
system, the finance and corporate governance system, industrial relations and collective 
bargaining systems. Crucially, Chapter 2 also outlines the thesis’ hypothesis contending 
that capital-skill asset pooling bridges differently institutionally endowed firms 
 
Chapter 3 is the first of three empirical chapters.  It discusses the industrial restructuring 
which has characterised Italy’s footwear and leather good (handbag) industry. This 
industry has historically been identified as one of the pillars of the Italian economy.  
Despite the increased competition faced by poor and labour intensive countries, many 
firms have countered this competitive shock by investing in a strategy characterised by 
high quality production. This strategy has come about through the transformation of 
previous forms of industrial organisation into vertically disintegrated networks of 
production. This chapter explains, through three firm-level case studies, how leading firms 
within the industry have reorganised their productive processes.  It then observes what 
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role lead and small firms play within this new disintegrated productive structure, and how 
interactions between small and large firms have changed over time. 
 
Chapter 4 explains how the luxury yacht industry in Italy has become a global player.  Over 
the past twenty years it has exhibited a trend at odds with the rest of the Italian industry, 
only comparable to one identified in the machine tool industry. The yacht industry has in 
fact grown in size, revenues and exports. In the seventies and early eighties the 
international trade performance displayed by yacht building firms was very poor. Yet 
today the RSCA indicator for the industry is positive (>0.55). By studying three lead firms 
directly, the chapter investigates how the organisation of production has changed.  By 
comparing these three successful firms to unsuccessful ones, it shows that capital-skill 
asset pooling between firms is crucial for this success. 
 
Chapter 5 explains how and why Italy’s performance in the computer industry 
deteriorated over time. Crucially, firms in this industry lost the comparative advantage 
accumulated in previous years. The chapter investigates the way in which the industry 
changed since its early years when office equipment manufacturers were producing 
electronic calculators, mainframes and minicomputers. The case study first explains that 
the mode of innovation and production in the industry is radically transformed by the 
introduction of micro-processor technology. Secondly it shows that the decline of the 
industry as a whole in Italy is linked to capital-skill asset mismatch, whereby the skills 
sought by lead firms are not provided by suppliers. 
 
Having presented the empirical findings, Chapter 6 systematises the evidence by 
introducing the concept of disintegrated hierarchy. Disintegrated hierarchy best captures 
the organisation of production which has developed amongst Italy’s export oriented firms; 
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it suggests that relations between firms are no longer symmetrical or horizontal, but are 
indeed verticalisaed and hierarchical. Disintegrated hierarchy allows for capital-skill asset 
pooling to develop in the absence of clear governance mechanisms. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by explaining in what way disintegrated hierarchy sets 
Italy apart from other Western European industrialised countries. It then presents 
extensions to the argument and lists the future research avenues that follow from this 
study. The chapter concludes that the correlation between institutional coherence and 
complementarity should be revisited in light of the empirical evidence offered by the study 
of Italian firms. It suggests that firm size is not irrelevant and that firm homogeneity has 
been wrongly assumed. 
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II. ON DETRIMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS AND INTER-FIRM 
NETWORKS IN ITALY 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
The Varieties of Capitalism literature claims that national institutional frameworks endow 
firms with a competitive and strategic advantage which leads to the development of 
national comparative advantages. This occurs when a country’s institutional mix is 
coherent; where coherence is defined by the vicinity of institutions to one or the other 
mode of coordination (liberal or strategic), and the consistency of institutions across 
spheres (Kenworthy 2006 : 72). This implies that when institutions are governed by one 
mode of coordination, they are endowed with the capacity to deliver to firms, through 
complementarities, valuable institutional assets. Consequently, when institutions are 
coherently organised, they are conducive to successful economic outcomes (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2009). 
 
As has been shown in Section 1.1.1, Italy’s economic performance over the last fifteen 
years has been far from successful. Growth and productivity rates have fallen. According to 
the above logic, the poor macroeconomic outcome logically implies that Italy’s 
institutional framework is incoherent: composed of institutions which near neither mode 
of coordination, or both. Yet the earlier empirical discussion on Italian firms’ export and 
product market performance suggests that this may not necessarily be the case. How can a 
product market strategy characterised by high or diversified quality production, 
commensurate with a coordinated market economy institutional structure, be possible if 
institutions are incoherent and simultaneously governed by market and strategic logics of 
coordination? The answer ought to be that Italy’s institutional mix is not as incoherent and 
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instead produces some institutional complementarities which “exist where very different 
‘logics’ operate in different institutional areas” (Amable in Crouch 2005 : 372).  
 
This chapter has two objectives: first it clarifies to what extent Italy’s institutional 
framework departs from a typical coordinated market economy. Instead of classifying 
market economies based on the mode of coordination governing actors’ interactions, this 
chapter resorts to establishing whether Italy’s institutional mix is capable of generating 
the institutional preconditions conducive to high or diversified quality production, as 
outlined by the Hall and Soskice approach. In order to do so, statistics on the vocational 
and training, wage bargaining, social protection and industrial relations, finance and 
corporate governance system are presented. The empirical analysis concludes that not all 
Italian firms access the necessary input factors for high quality production: patient capital 
and industry-specific skills. Rather, access is a function of the size of the firm which results 
in a clear institutional cleavage between small and large firms. 
 
Second, having established the existence of a large-small firm divide, the chapter 
addresses the question of how firms bypass the detrimental institutional settings they are 
confronted with. The thesis’ hypothesis contends that since Italy’s institutions produce the 
necessary input factors for high quality production but allocate them to firms by 
discriminating according to size, firms are expected to overcome this institutional 
constraint via the introduction of capital-skill asset pooling. By building formal and 
informal, strategic and market driven alliances with other firms, firms endowed with 
either of the two input factors (skills or capital) cooperate in the process of producing 
high-quality goods. By so doing, firms bridge the institutional divide which separates small 
from large firms. The hypothesis therefore contends that in order to produce high or 
diversified quality goods, Italian firms source the missing institutional factors from firms 
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serviced by other institutional conformations. Therefore, functional substitutes to a 
classical coordinated market economy framework develop within inter-firm networks, 
through the practice of capital-skill asset pooling. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 2.1 briefly sets the stage for the analysis by 
presenting some descriptive statistics on the size composition and distribution of Italy’s 
manufacturing sector. Section 2.2 proceeds with the empirical comparison between Italy 
and a coordinated market economy’s institutional mix. For completeness’ sake, descriptive 
statistics are also presented on a typical liberal market economy. This strengthens the 
reader’s recognition that Italy is indeed neither a liberal nor a coordinated market 
economy. Section 2.3 presents the thesis’ hypothesis; because it is grounded in the 
literature on industrial organisations, this literature is briefly recalled. Then, the chapter 
discusses in what ways this hypothesis departs from the Varieties of Capitalism literature 
specifically and the Models of Capitalism literature in general.  The last section concludes 
and introduces the first empirical case study. 
 
2.1 Size composition of the manufacturing sector in Italy  
 
The deindustrialisation thesis contends that advanced economies gradually progress from 
an industrial to a post-industrial state (Kaldor 1968). This thesis partially accounts for the 
reduced role of industry and manufacturing in explaining the growth paths of developed 
economies. Indeed the share of gross output produced by manufacturing and public 
services has changed: the former decreased whereas the latter increased. Yet this process 
has played out differently in each economy as this reduction has been less pronounced in 
Continental European economies: particularly Germany and Italy (Table II.1). In Germany 
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and Italy, total manufacturing has contributed to 35 and 32 per cent of total gross output 
respectively over the last decade. 
 
Table II.1 Share of Gross Output by Industrial Sector, selected countries (percentages) 
 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 
Germany  
Manufacturing 43 40 34 35 
Public Services 14 16 16 16 
 
Italy  
Manufacturing 41 39 34 32 
Public Services 12 13 14 14 
 
France  
Manufacturing 36 33 29 27 
Public Services 13 16 17 17 
           
United States  
Manufacturing   31 27 22 
Public Services   19 21 22 
           
United Kingdom 
Manufacturing 44 34 28 20 
Public Services 16 17 18 20 
Source: EU KLEMS 2009, Gross output at current basic prices (in millions of Euros) 
 
Manufacturing therefore appears to contribute differently to countries’ economic 
development. In addition, descriptive statistics on the size break-up of manufacturing 
firms in each country show that productive structures differ as well. Descriptive data on 
the size break-up of four statistics (number of enterprises, number of employees, turnover 
and production) shows that the balance between large and small firms in Italy differs 
substantially from other countries. Firms are aggregated into two groups defined by the 
sum of the OECD’s national size classes one, two and three on the one hand; four and five 
on the other. By so doing, statistics are presented separately for firms which employ 
between 1-49 and more than fifty employees (Table II.2). All values are calculated as a 
proportion of total manufacturing enterprises, manufacturing employees, manufacturing 
production and manufacturing turnover. 
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In terms of the number of enterprises, all countries except Germany, present a very similar 
picture where roughly more than 90 per cent of enterprises employ less than fifty 
employees. As the number of workers actually employed in these firms is investigated, the 
picture changes slightly. In Italy, 49 per cent of total employees in manufacturing work 
within firms which employ less than fifty employees; an average of 26 per cent do so in the 
other economies. This mismatch is evident also in terms of the proportion of total 
manufacturing production and turnover produced in firms employing less than fifty 
workers. In Italy 36 per cent of total production and turnover occurs in small firms; 18 per 
cent in France, 16 per cent in the US, 13 per cent in the UK and only 10 per cent in 
Germany. 
 
Table II.2 Industrial structure in manufacturing, by size (percentages) 
ENTR: Number of enterprises 
 
EMPE: Number of employees 
 (1-49) (50+)  (1-49) (50+) 
France 96 4 France 30 70 
Germany 89 11 Germany 20 80 
UK 94 6 UK 28 72 
US 93 7 US 25 75 
Average  93 7 Average  26 74 
Italy 98 2 Italy 49 51 
 
TUTT: Turnover 
 
PROD: Production 
 (1-49) (50+)  (1-49) (50+) 
France 18 82 France 18 82 
Germany 10 90 Germany 10 90 
UK 16 84 UK 16 84 
US 13 87 US   
Average  14 86 Average  15 85 
Italy 36 64 Italy 36 64 
Source: OECD, Structural and Demographics Business Statistics, 2010 
 
These numbers show that the Italian manufacturing industry presents a different 
compositional structure vis-à-vis its major western counterparts in terms of the 
contribution of small firms to total employment, production and turnover. The question 
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that this data suggests is whether the institutional framework surrounding firms in Italy is 
also characterised by size based segmentation.  
 
2.2 Institutional mismatch in Italy’s production system 
 
This section investigates in detail how industry specific skills and patient capital are 
produced in general and in Italy specifically. As discussed in Section 1.2, these two 
institutional assets are deemed necessary for the production of high quality goods 
(Streeck 1991a; Streeck 1991b; Hall and Soskice 2001 : 5, 28-32; Herrmann 2008a). Little 
empirical support exists for the hypothesis that coordinated standards and civil code-
based anti-trust legislation are necessary for high quality production (Herrmann 2009 : 
83-102). Moreover, in Italy, both small and large firms are equally confronted with the 
Italian state’s weak enforcement of anti-trust legislation (Casper 2001 : 404-407; Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Tate 2001; Teubner 2001 : 403). Therefore, given the limited evidence on 
the role of anti-trust legislation and standard setting in shaping firms’ product market 
strategies, this section merely focuses on the capacity of Italian institutions to provide 
firms with industry specific skills and patient capital. 
 
2.2.1 Skill provision systems in comparative perspective 
 
Crucial for the production of high quality goods is the ability of firms to recruit workers 
with industry-specific skills: i.e. those skills which are useful to all firms of the same 
industry  (Becker 1993). Whereas a system for the provision and certification of 
vocational training is important for the actual education of workers, necessary incentives 
must be in place for both employers and employees to invest in such training.  Industrial 
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relations and social protection systems intervene and interact in order to limit the risks 
faced by both parties when investing in industry specific, non-transferable, skills. 
 
A general overview suggests that the proportion of young persons enrolled in upper 
secondary programmes by programme orientation differs across countries (Table II.3).  
The US only engages in general types of education, in accordance to the Varieties of 
Capitalism framework. German youths are mostly vocationally trained, also in accordance 
with such framework. Interestingly, the UK uncomfortably fits the framework’s 
predictions, given the high proportion of workers in vocational training (41.4%).  In Italy  
26.5 per cent of the upper secondary sector engages in vocational education;  33.2 per cent 
instead participate in pre-vocational programmes, where “pre-vocational programmes […] 
prepare students for further vocational education and do not lead to vocational or technical 
qualifications relevant to the labour market and at least 25% of programme content is 
vocational or technical” (OECD 2008 : 324).  
 
The effectiveness of a vocational training system is hard to pin down through such 
numbers.  More useful instead are statistics on the expectations of young workers to find 
high-skilled blue-collar jobs, once a training programme is completed. Given the 
educational opportunities available, 30 per cent of 15-year-olds expect to have a high-
skilled blue-collar job in Germany; approximately 20 per cent in France; approximately 10 
in Italy and less than 10 per cent in the US.  Surprisingly approximately 15 per cent of 
young persons expect such a job in the United Kingdom (OECD 2004).  Despite the British 
controversy, Germany and the US perfectly fit the predictions of the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach. 
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Table II.3 Vocational education as a share of the upper secondary sector education 
 Vocational Pre-vocational General 
Germany 57.4  42.6 
France 43.8  56.2 
Italy 26.5 33.2 40.2 
United States 0  100 
United Kingdom 41.4  58.6 
Source: OECD at a Glance, 2009 (data refers to 2003) , Table C1.1. 
In Germany, still a typical coordinated market economy within the boundaries of its export 
oriented manufacturing sector (Eichhorst in Crouch, Streeck et al. 2005 : 566), initial and 
continuous vocational training is organised by the regional state, unions and employers 
jointly. Education programmes are developed by local governments, but must be approved 
by social partners. This set up was confirmed by the 2005 Vocational Training Act.  
Moreover the cost of its financing is shared between employers and employees (Estevez-
Abe, Iversen et al. 2001). The German system is a “dual system” as it combines part-time 
vocational schooling with apprenticeships in private or state owned enterprises 
(Pollmann-Schult and Mayer 2004). This system appears to secure employment for its 
participants as the unemployment rate of training graduates from 1998 was 12 per cent in 
1998 and fell to 4 per cent by 2001 (German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 
Dual training at a glance). In Italy pre-vocational training is provided by the state.  
Throughout many reforms, the latest in 2009, the organisation of istituti  tecnici and 
industriali has been streamlined and simplified. The opinion shared by the majority of 
interviewees and training experts is that these istituti fail to form students appropriately 
because of the distance between firms’ needs and the training offered. 
 
On the other hand, continuous vocational training is administered by social partners.  
Framework Law 845/78 gave social partners a major role in the vocational training 
system since training plans drawn up by the regional authorities became subject to the 
agreement of social partners. With respect to continuous training, a fraction of lifelong 
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education and training for the acquisition of initial, general and pre-occupational skills is 
also provided by the Permanent Regional Centres for Adult Education (Centri territoriali 
permanenti per l'educazione degli adulti,  CTPs), run by the Ministry of Education, 
Universities and Research alone (Ministerial Order 455/97) (ISFOL 2003 : 25).  Law 
236/93 promoted continuous training by funding measures for the introduction of in-
company training by enterprises, training for trainers, systems actions, testing of 
company, sectoral and regional training plans promoted by the social partners and testing 
of tailor-made training for individuals (ISFOL 2003 : 25). Laws 196/97 and 388/00 
(amended by Law 289/02) introduced another fund, financed by employers and managed 
by social partners, geared towards supplementing the work of regional state-provided 
forms of training with enterprise based and specific training (ISFOL 2003 : 25), the so 
called fondi interprofessionali. 
 
Table II.4 Firms which provide continuous vocational training 2005, percentages 
Textile, ATECO 17-19 13.2 
Machine tools, ATECO 29 36.8 
Transport equipment, ATECO 34-35 38.7 
10-19 employees 25.6 
20-49 employees 36.2 
50-249 employees 58.1 
250-499 employees 82.1 
500-999 employees 86.5 
1000 employees and beyond 96.7 
TOTAL 32.2 
Source: ISTAT, La Formazione del Personale nelle Imprese Italiane, (2008) 
 
Yet, despite these administrative and financial incentives, few Italian enterprises provide 
workers with continuous vocational training. Statistics suggest that the majority of 
training is provided by firms employing more than 250 employees; furthermore there are 
also significant differences across the amount of continuous training provided across 
sectors (Table II.4). Moreover, in Italy at least 70 per cent of young workers entering the 
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labour market are not endowed with a vocational training certificate, but instead have 
attended a general or pre-vocational education programme (CEDEFOP 2003; MIUR 2007).  
Additionally, these statistics suggest that once workers are employed, very few 
opportunities for continuous vocational training are offered by employers. This is in 
contrast to both a German and US skill formation landscape.  In the first case training is 
organised around the needs of firms; in the second there simply is none. 
 
On the other hand, Varieties of Capitalism shows that, besides the actual system for skill 
provision, necessary institutional complementarities must be in place for young workers 
to pursue a vocational training programme. Such supporting institutions are necessary to 
ensure that the financial investment in training is not lost on the part of workers and 
employers. For workers to reap the benefits of such investment over time, labour market 
regulation must contrast employers’ ability to hire and fire workers easily; this is achieved 
through the contribution of stringent employment protection legislation (Rueda and 
Pontusson 2000; Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001; Franzese 2001; Mares 2003; Streeck 
and Thelen 2005). Moreover, coordinated wage bargaining systems stop employers from 
poaching other firms’ workers by offering higher wages and salaries, thus enabling 
employers not to lose the returns on the skill investment made. 
 
Labour market regulations and social policy 
 
Data on the strictness of Italy and Germany’s employment protection legislation (EPL) 
compared, shows that, with respect to collective dismissal Italy’s EPL is more stringent on 
employers; yet with respect to individual dismissal Italian workers are less protected 
(Table II.5). With regards to temporary employment, increased policy laxity results from 
the labour market reforms which have been introduced in Italy since the early 2000s 
57 
 
(Treu and Biaggi reforms). The traditional strictness of employment and long tenure rates 
of Italy’s labour market has in fact gradually been eroded. The 1997 Treu reform increased 
the number and available forms of fixed term contracts; the 2001 Biagi reform allowed 
their unrestricted use and abolished their maximum accumulated duration period.  
Moreover, Eurispes (2006) drew attention to the heightened problem of rising precarious 
employment – affecting 57% of young people between 18-25, and 67.8% between 33-39 
years of age  (Ricceri 2006 : 4).  Altogether, these reform have concurred to a widespread 
sense of social and job instability (Ricceri 2006 : 5).  
 
Gross earnings replacement ratio of unemployment benefits in Italy rose from 19 per cent 
in 1996 to 34 per cent in 2003;  in Germany it measured roughly 60 per cent in 2002 
(Biewen and Wilke 2005) – significantly higher than in Italy. This implies that once 
unemployed, workers are pushed to take up any available form of occupation in order to 
replace the missing income.  Over time, this jeopardises the preservation of the acquired 
skills (Pissarides 1992; Ljungqvist and Sargent 1998). Moreover, these statistics are also 
reflected in the different tenure rates across European labour markets. Italy ranks 
amongst the highest OECD countries for average job tenure in years (12.1 vs. a 10.8 
average in 2002). Yet data on employment distribution by class tenure suggests that over 
the 1992-2002 period there has been a significant increase in the share of workers 
employed in short term forms employment, i.e. less than a year: from 7 per cent in 1992, 
to 10.8 in 2002. Therefore a 3.8 per cent increase, compared to an OECD-wide 0.5 per cent 
increase on average (Auer, Berg et al. 2005). 
 
It thus appears that the necessary social policy measures required to incentivise workers’ 
investment in vocational training are absent in Italy. Turning to employers’ incentives: 
coordinated wage bargaining systems ensure that employers cannot poach workers from 
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other firms by offering wage increases; and give employers the incentive to invest in the 
training of workers.  Yet, whilst coordination does indeed govern the mechanisms for 
wage increases in Germany, in Italy this is not entirely the case. 
 
Table II.5 Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation 
Series 
Germany Italy 
1990 1998 2003 1990 1998 2003 
Overall EPL 3.16 2.46 2.21 3.57 2.69 1.94 
Collective dismissals .. 3.5 3.75 .. 4.87 4.87 
Notice and severance 
pay for no-fault 
individual dismissals 
1 1.28 1.28 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Overall strictness of 
protection against 
individual dismissals 
2.58 2.67 2.67 1.77 1.77 1.77 
Regular procedural 
inconveniences 
3.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Source: OECD Social and Welfare Statistics, Social Protection (2008) 
 
Collective bargaining and poaching 
 
The German system of collective bargaining is based on the collective bargaining law 
(Tarifvertragsgesetz) passed in 1949, which established that only employers’ 
organisations and trade unions have the right to conclude collective agreements 
(Tarifvertrage). Tarifautonomie holds that neither the state nor regional governments can 
intervene in such negotiations. German collective bargaining negotiations take place at the 
sectoral level and wage increases are coordinated throughout the economy. This 
coordination rests on the pattern-setting role played by the metalworking industry (EIRO 
1999).  Thus IG Metall sets wage increases based on overall labour productivity growth 
and inflation; the remaining sectors of the economy follow these wage-developments 
which de facto establish an upper limit to pay increases (Traxler, Brandl et al. 2008).  This 
cross-sectoral coordination has ensured high levels of wage moderation over the past 
decades. 
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In Italy, the development model underpinning the growth of the 1950s and 1960s was 
structured around an export oriented system supported by low wages and intensified 
work: the structure of collective bargaining featured managerial unilateralism and wage 
bargaining decentralisation at the industry level. The Hot Autumn strikes destabilised this 
structure, led to a surge in unit labour costs and a fall in competitiveness (Flanagan, 
Soskice et al. 1983). In 1975, the trade union front and Confindustria negotiated a diluted 
incomes policy which provided for an automatic wage setting mechanism - the punto unico 
di contingenza of the scala mobile (Rogari 2000). Collective bargaining was thus 
centralised. Yet, the creation of the European Monetary System (1979), of the Single 
European Market (1986) and the Lira’s entering of the Exchange Rate Mechanism set the 
background for mounting internal divisions between union and employer confederations 
over the scala mobile. As a consequence, peak level bargaining lost its central role and 
bargaining decentralisation became again widespread (Regalia and Regini 2004). After the 
Lira’s exit from the ERM, concerted negotiations re-emerged and resulted in a period of 
corporatist industrial relations. During the run-up to EMU, further internal trade union 
governance reforms took place, aimed at increasing unions’ internal coherence and 
democracy (Baccaro, Carrieri et al. 2003). Most importantly a new structure for collective 
wage bargaining was institutionalised in 1993 which created a two-level bargaining 
structure: the national and the company or territorial level.  
 
Thus, contrary to Germany’s coordinated wage bargaining system, Italy’s instead has been 
characterised by a historical tension between bargaining centralisation and 
decentralisation. The structure introduced in 1993 embedded this tension in a wage 
system that allows for both centralised and decentralised bargaining to take place and 
institutionalises numerous opt out clauses. Though opt-out clauses are slowly becoming 
common amongst Germany’s Mittelstand as well as a means to defect the system (Ochel 
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2003 : 8), in Italy opt-out clauses are part of the system itself (see,  Johnston, Kornelakis et 
al. forthcoming). Although the coordinated bargaining structure is established at the 
industry level, within each industry there are numerous possibilities for firms to negotiate 
individualised contracts with workers. Firstly, the system sets the minimum industry-wide 
wage increase; then each firm is free to top that increase upwards.  Secondly, not all firms 
abide to the same sector level contract. Size discriminations apply as there are indeed two 
or more separate contracts per industry: one which applies to firms with more than 15 
employees, one to artisan firms, and one to local territories where small firms cluster.  
Moreover, only industry level contracts appear to be renegotiated regularly, whilst the 
latter remain linked to past inflation rates and are less capable of binding forthcoming 
wage developments.   
 
Although assessing empirically whether poaching takes place is not possible, the 
widespread opinion of interviewees is that in Italy it is indeed a widespread practice. The 
ability of firms to escape binding wage agreements implies that individualised wage 
bargaining is a common tool employed to attract workers from other firms: a growing 
practice in Italy’s textile industry, where a specific name has been given to the 
phenomenon. Cannibalismo imprenditoriale captures the tendency of large firms to poach 
employees from smaller firms by means of better salaries and increasingly secure forms of 
employment. The Varieties of Capitalism literature instead contends that this should not 
be the case in coordinated market economies, as is in fact not the case Germany. Despite 
the national and regional pre-vocational and vocational training systems are not effective, 
industry-specific skilled workers can still be found in Italy.  Mechanisms for the 
production and flow of tacit, non-codified, industry-specific skills are identified within 
systems of spatially concentrated and sectorally specialised firms. 
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“Learning by doing” in small firms 
 
As already contended by Piore and Sabel “craft workers are bred, not born […]” (Piore and 
Sabel 1984 :274). Young locals who grow within areas where the level of industry 
concentration is high acquire industry-specific skills unconsciously. These young workers 
benefit from formal and informal processes of skill acquisition. The formal at school, 
whilst attending general or pre-vocational compulsory education programmes. The 
informal at home, whilst taking on minor and varying roles within family firms.  For these 
workers,  “becoming skilled is part of a larger process of taking on a certain identity” 
(Piore and Sabel 1984 : 274).  These coarse skills are then further polished once the young 
person starts to work. 
 
In Italy, small firms do not abide to any employment protection legislation and therefore 
can hire and fire employees at will. The Articolo 18 does not apply to small firms (with less 
than fifteen employees), where small firm legislation is variably applied to firms 
employing between 15 and 20 employees according to their legal status. The ease with 
which firms manage their workforce is the other side of the coin of flexible specialisation: 
volumes of production are flexibly adjusted as firms can easily employ and deploy new 
workers.  Yet the local concentration of firms in the same industry specialisation implies 
that although employment in one firm is terminated, the industry-specific skill acquisition 
process is not. A laid-off worker will most certainly be employed in another firm 
specialised in the same industry. Skill acquisition thus develops through a process of 
learning by doing, using, interacting and specialising. Whereas mobility could act as a 
double edged sword as workers migrate to other firms, a firm who is unwilling to let a 
worker off can provide him/her with strong incentives not to do so: individualised pay 
agreements are very common mechanisms through which employees are retained. 
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In sum, it appears that whilst Italy’s institutional mix does not incentivise the investment 
in industry specific skills, a pool of industry-specific skilled workers does still develop.  
Workers employed in small firms situated within local industry concentrations develop 
such skills through a process of informal learning by doing, using, interacting and 
specialising. Skill availability varies with the size of firms, thus creating a cleavage between 
the institutional assets available to large and small firms. How have medium-to-large firms 
then been able to find the skilled workers necessary to compete in the production of high 
quality goods? Before answering this question, the following section turns instead to the 
issue of raising patient capital. 
 
2.2.2 Capital acquisition in comparative perspective 
 
Patient capital grounds incremental innovation because of the willingness of capital 
providers to finance projects which do not deliver quick returns. It is these projects that 
generate the incremental innovation which grounds the production of high or diversified 
quality goods. Additionally, firms competing in international consumer goods markets 
must also face a noticeable investment in retail and distribution which cannot be 
recovered in the very short term (Lazerson and Lorenzoni 1999 : 371-372). This reaps 
slow returns against large sunk costs, yet is a prerequisite for export success. 
 
In order to accept investments over a longer time horizon, capital providers require an 
understanding of the product, the market and the firm which is not easily read off 
company quarterly reports and profit statements. A relationship banking system helps 
capital providers acquire such information by becoming active members in the strategic 
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government of firms (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes et al. 1997). Ownership concentration 
and stability are necessary conditions for patient capital because they provide a barrier to 
hostile take-overs and “give block-holders large incentives to develop capacities to 
monitor companies, such that the share price is not the principal source of information 
about company prospects” (Culpepper 2005 : 185). By so doing, concentrated ownership 
sets the necessary conditions for “large companies [to] provide each other with patient 
capital” (Culpepper 2005 : 178). Hence, block-holders, be they financial or non-financial 
actors, are the major providers of patient capital. The table below presents a brief cross-
country overview of the ownership types present in a sample of the 1000 best performing, 
listed and private, firms in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy (Franks, Mayer 
et al. 2009 : 33). These numbers are presented in percentages by the original authors 
(Table II.6). They suggest that in France, Germany and Italy family ownership is the most 
common ownership type. They also show that widely held ownership types (domestic or 
foreign) are very common in the UK, less so in Germany and France, very uncommon in 
Italy. 
  
Table II.6 The landscape of ownership of largest 1000 firms, 1996, selected countries 
 Germany France UK Italy 
Multiple blocks 4.4 2 0.3 2 
Family 35.9 38.4 10.9 47.9 
Foreign 18.4 20.6 33.9 27.6 
Other 2.1 3.2 2.8 2.2 
State 12.1 8.8 1 12.5 
Widely held 9.9 8.9 27.4 5.6 
Widely held parent 17.2 18.2 23.7 2.3 
Total number of firms 923 970 980 954 
Source: (Franks, Mayer et al. 2009 : 33) 
An investigation into the concentration of ownership shares for Italy and Germany allows 
a further observation. Italian firms’ ownership appears to be just as, if not more, 
concentrated than Germany’s where 86.7 per cent of total firms in one sample (sub-table B 
which includes large and small firms) are controlled by single shareholders holding more 
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than 75 per cent of shares (Table II.7)19. Thus it is clear that in Italy the ownership of both 
large and small firms is concentrated, as much if not more than it is in Germany. 
Table II.7 Ownership shares in Germany and Italy 
A Germany  B Italy  C Italy 
>25 85.4  0-50 0  0-50 39 
>50 57.3  >50-75 13.3  >50-100 61 
>75 22.2  >75-100 86.7 
Source:(Franks and Mayer 2001, table A; Bianchi, Bianco et al. 2005 : 86-88, tables B and C) 
 
Moreover the Italian corporate governance system20 is characterised by the widespread 
use of pyramidal ownership structures where a limited capital investment is sufficient to 
ensure control over a large number of companies (Bianco and Casavola 1999; Barca and 
Becht 2002; Bianchi, Bianco et al. 2005; Culpepper 2005; Deeg 2005). This mechanism 
“can allow current holders of capital to effectively control companies, in practice 
disenfranchising minority shareholders and allowing management to pursue its strategy 
without respect to quarterly results” (Culpepper 2005 : 188). Yet, whilst this is an accurate 
account of a firms’ ability to raise patient capital for medium, large and listed firms 
                                                             
19 For the sake of clarity, the data in Table 2.7 derives from separate authors: whilst the Italian data can be 
added vertically as the ownership classes are bounded, this is not possible for the German case.  One further 
caveat, whilst the German data only apply to corporations, the first sample of Italian firms also includes small 
firms (<50 employees), the latter only firms employing more than fifty employees. The data for table B is 
derived from Bankitalia’s Invind database; data for table C from Bankitalia’s Esetra database. The median size 
of firms in the former database is 432; in the latter the median size amounts to 162 employees. The data in 
table B collects information on the ownership distribution of the three largest shareholders; table C of the first 
largest shareholder only.  Lastly German data is for quoted firms, the Italian is not.   
20 Notice that in June 2003. the traditional system of corporate governance, the sistema dualistico orizzontale 
[Fiori, G., R. Tiscini, et al. (2004). Corporate governance, evoluzione normativa ed informazione esterna d'impresa. 
Corporate governance e sistemi di controllo della gestione aziendale. D. M. Salvioni. Milano, FrancoAngeli.], was 
reformed.  This system included a board of directors (consiglio di amministrazione) and a board of auditors 
(collegio sindacale) elected by shareholders - board of directors are usually composed of block shareholders. 
Legislative decree 6/2003 introduced the sistema dualistico verticale (in line with the German system ) and the 
sistema monistico (with the Anglo-Saxon one) on top of the traditional system [Herrmann, A. (2009). One 
Political Economy, One Competitive Strategy? Comparing Pharmaceutical Firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK 
Oxford, OUP.]. Patterns of corporate ownership do not seem to have been much affected by these reforms 
[Deeg, R. (2005). "Remaking Italian Capitalism? The Politics of Corporate Governance Reform  " West European 
Politics 28(3): 521-548, Herrmann, A. (2009). One Political Economy, One Competitive Strategy? Comparing 
Pharmaceutical Firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK Oxford, OUP.].  
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(Bianco and Casavola 1999), it is instead a distorted image of the financing capacity of 
small firms. 
 
The small-firm and bank relationship 
 
Despite the stable ownership structures, small enterprises are incapable of constructing 
strategic relationships with lenders. Effectively, Italian small firms resort to short term 
bank lending for a third of their total financing (European Commission 2005), and do so in 
order to smooth the actual running of business and not to fund long term growth and 
investment (Salza 2004). In addition, lending is not obtained from a single bank since 
small firms are accustomed to the practice of multiple bank sourcing: multiaffidamento 
bancario (Giacomelli and Trento 2005; Vulpes 2005); a practice supported by banks 
because it limits individual risk; pursued by firms to promote competition between banks. 
 
Although the literature suggests that cooperative banks facilitate small firms’ access to 
finance, the cost of borrowing from non-cooperative banks has been shown to increase 
over time (Angelini, DiSalvo et al. 1998). The absence of proper accounting rules abided by 
small firms implies that the information asymmetry between banks and firms is large; 
therefore banks must rely on cash flows (andamentale) when estimating a firm’s default 
risk and the price of loans. Consequently, small firms avoid banks and finance themselves 
through the reinvestment of cash flows; implying that the relationship between 
investments and cash flows is pro-cyclical. This tendency to rely on cash-flow financing is 
reinforced by small firms’ owners reluctance to raise finance via private capital issuance 
(Salza 2004; European Commission 2005) which affects their ability to issue short term 
credit on behalf of the firm. Its cost is a function of a firm’s implied default risk and of 
owners’ credit performance; therefore, although the better credit profile of owners allows 
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firms to obtain lower rates, owners have little incentive to take on loans as this affects 
their future lending costs. This combination of negative incentives results in a vicious 
complementarity whereby small firms avoid raising capital altogether and rely on cash 
flows as the main means of financing. The last factor affecting small firms’ inability to 
access patient capital is related to the forties’ banking crisis, when all commercial, 
cooperative and universal banks were legally forbidden from holding a stake in non-
financial firms – the only exception being Mediobanca (Piluso 2005). 
 
Small firms’ difficulty to access credit is confirmed in the data. The growth rate of loans to 
firms which employ more than twenty employees is five times greater than that for firms 
employing less than five workers (Table II.8). In 2008 the increase in bank loans to firms 
employing more than twenty employees of an amount greater than 1 million euro21 was 
8.3 per cent; 2.5 per cent to firms employing less than twenty employees, and 1.6 per cent 
to firms employing less than five employees (Banca d'Italia 2010 : 208). Thus lending falls 
proportionally to size. 
 
Table II.8 Twelve month increase in bank loans by area and economic activity (2008) 
Public admin. 
Firms 
Consum
ers 
NGOs Total 
Total 
Medium-
to-large 
(>20) 
Small (<20) 
  
Producing 
families 
(<5) 
6.1 7.3 8.3 2.5 1.6 5.1 5.4 5.7 
Source: (Banca d'Italia 2010 : 208) 
Therefore whilst large (and medium-large: >100 employees) firms are catered by a 
coordinated financial system, small firms are not. Large firms are capable of raising 
patient capital through internal capital markets, of varying form, small firms are not. They 
are instead subject to the short term fluctuations of cash flows and multi-bank financing.  
                                                             
21 Based on: Monetary and Financial Institutions Interest Rate Statistics, European Central Bank. 
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How do small firms then overcome the problems accruing from inadequate financing in 
order to produce high quality goods?  The answer to this question builds on the institution 
of inter-firm networks. 
 
2.3 The hypothesis 
 
Organisational, industrial, historical and evolutionary economics predict that networks of 
firms will be formed as a consequence of market or bureaucratic failures (Grandori and 
Soda 1995); this thesis argues that institutional failure too may drive firms to organise 
economic activity around inter-firm networks, albeit differently than what the Varieties of 
capitalism literature would predict.  Inter-firm networks become the locus where firms 
are endowed with the missing institutional assets. They represent an organisational 
arrangement which differs both from the market and hierarchy (Johanisson 1987; Powell 
1990). For industrial economics, networks are understood to be beneficial because of their 
ability to create economies of scale, scope, specialisation and experience. Historical and 
evolutionary economics instead view networks as instruments to reduce costs and 
learning problems, thus facilitating technological developments. Organisational economics 
understands networks as mechanisms which enable the reduction of governance costs 
(Grandori and Soda 1995 : 186). 
 
For the Varieties of Capitalism literature, inter-firm relations (in networks) “cover the 
relationships a company forms with other enterprises, [...] suppliers or clients, with a view 
to securing [...] appropriate supplies of inputs, and access to technology” (Hall and Soskice 
2001 : 7).  In coordinated market economies, these networks are crucial to the diffusion of 
technology because long term contracts preclude the movement of engineers and 
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technical personnel across firms (Hall and Soskice 2001 : 26). Standards22 agreed within 
industry level frameworks ground the ability of firms to interact as compliance is required 
when semi-finished goods supplied by one firm have to abide by the standards of another 
(Herrmann 2009 : 84); standards ground the ability of firms to pursue a product market 
strategy (Casper 2001 : 393). In Italy, the skewed availability of assets of production which 
derives from the heterogeneous size of firms implies that inter-firm networks take on a 
new function and form.  This thesis suggests that through networks firms source the input 
factors they lack by allocating production functions to firms governed by alternative 
institutional configurations. Capital-skill asset pooling captures this phenomenon and 
provides a predictive tool to understand how and why networks of firms should develop 
in Italy. 
 
2.3.1 Capital-skill asset pooling: bridging institutional frameworks 
 
The hypothesis presented builds on the assumption that firms act strategically within the 
institutional frameworks they are placed in by being active institutional users and not 
passive institutional takers. It contends that when confronted with incoherent institutions, 
firms develop the willingness and capacity to source the necessary input factors 
somewhere else. In line with the internationalisation hypothesis, but logically extending it 
to the Italian case, this thesis expects firms to source missing input factors from other 
institutional frameworks located within national, mostly local, borders. 
 
                                                             
22 Standards allow firms to “reduce internal and external transaction costs; to drive down prices from 
suppliers; to block or circumvent competitors; to lock in quasi-monopoly profits through control of a 
proprietary standard (...); and to set baselines for subsequent rounds of innovation [Tate, J. I. e. O., Oxford 
University Press. (2001). National varieties of standardization. Varieties of capitalism. The institutional 
foundations of comparative advantage. . P. A. Hall and D. Soskice. Oxford, Oxford University Press.  Herrmann, A. 
(2009). One Political Economy, One Competitive Strategy? Comparing Pharmaceutical Firms in Germany, Italy, 
and the UK Oxford, OUP.]. 
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Not all firms can access patient capital in Italy, nor can all firms access a pool of skilled 
workers, yet as a whole both input assets are available to firms in Italy.  In order to 
understand how Italian firms produce high quality goods it is therefore necessary to 
extend the boundaries of the firm as a producing entity. Modularised production and value 
chains are useful tools to conceptualise such extension (Kogut 1985; Sturgeon 1997; 
Sturgeon 2002). If Italian firms take advantage of such developments and allocate 
research, production and distribution functions to different firms, then they too can 
compete in the production of high quality goods. In practice, since large firms lack the 
ability to access skilled workers, they are expected to (indirectly) employ the workers of 
small firms, which are specifically skilled, by downloading all production functions to 
them. Since small firms lack the patient capital necessary to pursue an incrementally 
innovative and internationally oriented distribution strategy, they are expected to 
renounce autonomy over such functions and (indirectly) become the skilled workforce 
asset of the large firm. By pooling the input factors which each firm’s sub-national 
institutional framework generates, the large and the small firm successfully compete in 
the production of quality-competitive goods. 
 
The thesis’ hypothesis thus suggests that when two firms (large and small) behave 
accordingly, they are said to be engaging in capital-skill asset pooling. Thus, despite being 
placed in an incoherent institutional framework, a large and a small firm in Italy can 
pursue a high quality product market strategy by sourcing from each other (and pooling) 
the relevant missing input factor which is not generated by the respective institutional 
mix. Therefore a large firm is expected to access, through the small firm, an industry 
specific workforce. A small firm is expected to acquire, through the large firm, patient 
capital.  In the event that capital-skill asset pooling develops, the small firm becomes the 
supplier of a large firm which takes the name of lead firm. 
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Extending this hypothesis to the complex processes involved in the production of high 
volumes of quality goods, it implies that a lead firm will employ more than one small firm 
as supplier. Moreover relationships are expected to differ as the skill endowments of small 
firms vary with their degree of specialisation. Although all suppliers are endowed with 
industry specific skills, some have developed further product or process specialisations; 
this implies that the knowledge held presents different degrees of tacitness or codification. 
Process specialists are expected to be recognised by the lead firm as valuable because of 
their ability to convert tacit knowledge into firm specific skills. In order to control and 
nurture such skills, lead firms qualify the pooling of assets by entertaining coordinated 
relationships with such firms. Coordination between large and such small firms entails 
know-how exchange and financial support, although it does not necessarily involve the 
ownership of the small firm by the large. On the other hand, product specialists price their 
codified skills accurately on a market which extends the local boundaries of production; 
thus the interaction between lead firms and product specialists is expected to be market 
based rather than coordinated. Remaining suppliers, endowed with industry but neither 
firm nor product-specific skills, are expected to produce simple components and compete 
against each other on prices. Relationships between these suppliers and lead firms or 
other (trusted) suppliers are expected to be market-based. 
 
Figure II.1 graphically reproduces the hypothesis by classifying firms according to the 
differential assets held; the arrows capture the mode of interaction which follows. A large 
(lead) firm, endowed with patient capital and general skills pools its assets with a small 
firm, endowed with firm-specific skills and short term capital: moreover this interaction is 
expected to be coordinated and continuous because of the nature of the skill held by the 
small firm (captured by the bidirectional, double arrows). Both construct market based 
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relationships with other small firms23 which possess product and industry specific skills 
(captured by the single, unidirectional arrow). Both coordination and competition are 
expected to coexist within this structure. 
 
Figure II.1 Graphical representation of the hypothesis: a lead firm and its suppliers 
 
Source: Own representation 
 
2.3.2 Falsifying the hypothesis  
 
Hypothesis falsification is crucial to the strength of an argument since a “theory which is 
not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a 
theory (as people often think) but a vice" (Popper,1965, p. 36). Moreover, falsifiability 
must be a guiding principle for qualitative research (King, Keohane et al. 1996 : 100).  The 
thesis’ hypothesis contends that firms set in an incoherent institutional system can 
compete in high or diversified quality product market strategies if they engage in capital-
                                                             
23 In terms of definitions, this thesis will refer to the former type of suppliers as first tier suppliers, to the latter 
type as second tier suppliers; large firms will be referred to as lead firms. 
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skill asset pooling by building inter-firm networks composed of lead firms and skilled 
suppliers. Two conditions for success are therefore logically outlined: the presence of 
large firms and that of capable suppliers. 
 
Firstly, in the absence of capable suppliers lead firms could not outsource the 
manufacturing of parts in return for final goods which are quality compatible to the 
market strategy pursued. Alternatively, they would be confronted with the necessity to 
invest in skilled workers directly or fail to pursue such a competitive strategy.  Secondly, 
the absence of large firms endowed with patient capital allows small firms to revert to a 
craft production strategy based on the production of low volumes of customised quality 
competitive goods (Willman 1986). Small firms do not lack the skills to pursue a high 
quality product market strategy but the necessary capital to increase the amounts of 
volume produced, to invest in technological innovation and to expand the reach of their 
distribution network. 
 
Logically extending the case selection criteria, the hypothesis is falsified by identifying an 
industry where the value of the revealed symmetric comparative advantage is greater 
than the success benchmark established and where the coefficient of the relative 
(symmetrical) unit value is positive in the absence of either of the two conditions.  
Identifying a success case, such as the textile or yacht building industries, where neither 
skilled suppliers nor lead firm exists would lead to the falsifiability of the thesis’ 
hypothesis. Additionally, the identification of such a case would imply that either the 
hypothesis has limited scope of application24 or that it is incomplete and missing a further 
qualifying condition. 
 
                                                             
24 The scope of application of the thesis’ hypothesis could be possibly defined by the industrial specialisation 
investigated (heavy vs. light industry for example). 
73 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The systematic comparison of the institutions characterising coordinated, liberal and 
Italy’s market economy highlight their differences. Such a comparison, structured around 
the theme of explaining how patient capital and industry-specific skills are generated by 
institutional frameworks, shows how striking is the inability of each Italian firm to 
compete on par with typical coordinated market economy manufacturers. This 
comparison therefore strengthens the appropriateness of the question asked by this 
research project. Given the incoherent institutions faced, how can Italian firms compete in 
markets dominated by the production of high volumes of high or diviersified quality 
goods? 
 
The answer proposed by this thesis builds on the hypothesis that inter-firm networks 
provide firms with the mechanism to source the missing institutional assets from each 
other. Capital-skill asset pooling nullifies the divide between small and large firms which 
has been identified as a crucial feature of Italy’s post-industrial atmosphere (Piore and 
Sabel 1984). While the market failures that networks solve derive from the presence of 
asset specificities, context uncertainties, difficulties in monitoring performance, and risk 
aversion (Grandori and Soda 1995), the sharing of proprietary information and the risk of 
exploitation in joint ventures (Hall and Soskice 2001 : 7); in Italy networks solve the 
institutional failures solved derive from the heterogeneity of institutional rules which 
apply to differently sized firms - with respect to the accessibility of patient finance on the 
one hand and industry-specific skills on the other. Capital-skill asset pooling across 
networks of firms is expected to act as a bridge between institutional frameworks, 
endowing firms with the missing institutional capabilities. Through it, large and small 
firms are capable of pooling patient capital and skills. 
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The next three chapters are empirical.  The case studies presented allow for “variation on 
the dependant variable” (Munck 1998 : 31) as they represent two cases of Italian industry 
success and one of failure. Chapter 3 analyses the evolution of the footwear, handbag and 
leather goods industries over time; Chapter 4 the yacht building industry. Based on these 
two chapters it is clear that lead firms and skilled suppliers interact in order to produce 
high volumes of high quality goods. On the other hand, Chapter 5 investigates the 
evolution of the Italian computer industry. Its demise confirms the hypothesis that capital-
skill asset pooling is necessary for firms to remain competitive in international markets 
when faced with detrimental institutional settings.   
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III. CASE MADRI AND GLOBAL LEADERS: CAPITAL-SKILL ASSET POOLING IN 
THE LEATHER GOODS AND FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY IN ITALY 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
Historically, the apparel, leather and footwear25 industries have been among the biggest 
exporters in the Italian economy.  In the eighties and early nineties, flexible specialisation 
characterised the system through which production and inter-firm interaction was 
organised (Brusco 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984; Becattini 1987; Becattini 1990; Bellandi 
and Russo 1994). Firms competing in these industries gained global market shares by 
benefiting from competitiveness enhancing (nominal) exchange rate devaluations (Colli 
2002; Dunford 2006 : 44). The business strategy adopted by Italian textile producers thus 
centred on the advantages deriving from currency manipulations which reduced the real 
cost of exported goods abroad. This consequently promoted an “effortless” export growth, 
which was not sustained by increasingly competitive or innovative products, but by 
“cheapened” and low cost goods26 (Dunford 2006 : 28). The combination of these elements 
meant that production costs were kept at bay. The competition model adopted was based 
on a low cost, low price, market strategy (classification based on Herrmann 2008a) and 
quality production was residualised (there is disagreement with Locke 1995 here: though 
Biella may have been the exception, most industrial districts in the eighties heavily relied 
on price rather than quality competitiveness; Onida 2004; Bianchi in Bianchi, Brancati et 
al. 2007). 
                                                             
25 Whilst these goods fall within the textile industry at large, Appendix 3 showed that not all segments of the 
textile sector exhibit today either a high revealed (symmetric) comparative advantage or a positive relative 
(symmetric) unit value.  The textile sector has not shown a continuous success over time, as defined by the 
thesis’ criteria; yet, for simplicity and brevity, the chapter at times refers to the textile industry in general, but 
the specific reference is not to the whole industry but to those sub segments listed in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1.  
26 Due to Italy’s institutional divide, this model of production was dove-tailed by industrial legislation which 
benefited small firms over larger ones: artisan flexibility implied that the initial sunk costs of setting up a firm 
was small, Article 18 of the Labour Statute implied that employment costs were lower the smaller the firm, the 
absence of collective bargaining coverage over small artisan firms implied that wage settlements were 
individually bargained.   
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Yet, during the nineties and early 2000s, three systemic shocks implied that these factors 
would no longer be a recipe for success: the introduction of the common European 
currency and EMU, the removal of trade barriers, and the rise of low cost competitors in 
China and the East. First, in 1998 European currencies were irrevocably fixed and 
conflated to the common European currency, the Euro. Secondly, the Multifibre Agreement 
- which allowed bilateral quota-setting - was removed in 1994 (Comino 2007).  
Additionally, between 1995 and 2005, textile and clothing sectors became subject to the 
rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which removed all remaining 
tariffs and barriers27. Consequently, all European “sheltered” textile and clothing firms 
began to face a strong competitive challenge from low cost competitors, especially Asian.  
Between 1990-1998 Indian exports of textiles to the world increased by 140.6 per cent, 
and exports of clothing by 71 per cent (Dunford 2004  : 299 on OETH 2000 data).  China 
instead produced approximately 24 per cent of total global exports, during the same time 
period. These three exogenous developments in monetary and global trade policy altered 
the market within which Italian, and European firms competed.  European textile and 
clothing firms have since experienced a dramatic change in the structure and geography of 
production (Dunford 2004 : 295). Yet, Italy’s performance in these industries worsened 
far less than in its European counterparts, and still preserved a revealed comparative 
(trade) advantage in a number of sub-segments; therefore it is important to ask in what 
way Italian firms responded to these external changes. How were Italian firms capable of 
maintaining a strong revealed comparative advantage whereas German and French firms, 
for example, failed to limit the effects of the changes occurring to global trade patterns? 
 
This chapter will show that the model of production adopted by Italy’s textile firms has 
changed over time. Initially part of prototypical industrial districts, some firms have 
                                                             
27 For further details on the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) and the GATT  see: 
www.jurisint.org/pub/06/en. 
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changed the way in which they interact with other district firms by hierarchicalising inter-
firm organisational structures. By so doing, these firms have become lead firms (case 
madri, as known in the specific textile context) set at the helm of a vertically disintegrated 
structure of production. As hypothesised in chapter two, this structure of production is 
borne out of the need to pool together differently institutionally endowed actors:  lead 
firms, first and lower tier suppliers. Through this structure, case madri have engaged in 
capital-skill asset pooling with first tier suppliers, and constructed privileged relationships 
with them. They have engaged in capital-skill asset pooling with lower tiered suppliers 
and product specialists although have entertained arm’s length, though not completely 
spot market, relations with them.  
 
This chapter explores these developments in detail. First, it takes a bird’s eye view of the 
industry as a whole and its evolution both from a domestic and a comparative perspective.  
Thus the first section illustrates indicators capturing the industry’s performance over 
time, with particular reference to the successful sub-categories identified in Chapter 1. It 
also presents a brief discussion on the average firm and the institutional framework it is 
catered by. Secondly, the chapter traces back how the organisational productive structure 
of Italy’s successful firms has changed, with an eye on the different mechanisms which 
characterised the relationship between case madri and their suppliers over time. Thirdly 
the chapter compares the organisational structure adopted by internationally successful 
and unsuccessful firms. The section also discusses how the consortium model of financing 
and production has failed to adjust to the exogenous shocks discussed.  The discussion is 
informed by evidence collected via primary and secondary sources28. This presentation on 
                                                             
28 As in previous studies, secondary data was obtained from published material using a range of sources: 
academic and trade journals, magazines and newspapers, industry and government reports. Primary data was 
gathered from personal semi-structured interviews with managers of shipyards and suppliers (`firm level 
interviews' – currently 4); trade unions, industrial associations, (`institutional interviews' – currently 12); and 
academic experts (`expert interviews' – currently 2) (following similar set-ups as [Eich-Born, M. and R. Hassink 
(2005). "On the battle between shipbuilding regions in Germany and South Korea." Environment and Planning 37: 
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multiple firm strategies draws the reader’s attention to the different organisational 
structures which are still in place in Italy today; this may suggest that Italian firms are still 
navigating through a process of institutional transition.  Nonetheless, the evidence 
presented throughout the chapter reinforces the claim that in order to compete 
internationally in a market for high quality and incrementally innovative goods - in the 
absence of the appropriate institutional setting (Hall and Soskice 2001) – Italian firms 
have resorted to capital-skill asset pooling.  This allows them to source the necessary 
production inputs factors from firms set in different institutional frameworks, endowed 
with different institutional assets.  The chapter then concludes by introducing the 
following case study. 
 
3.1 The Italian apparel, leather goods and footwear industry over time  
 
The Italian apparel, leather, leather goods and footwear segments of the textile industry29 
have over the past decade limited the negative trade effects of the competitive pressures 
of low cost firms based in East Asia. This cannot be said as easily for the industry as a 
whole: producers of actual textiles of silks, cottons and wools for example have suffered 
from a preference shift of buyers towards East Asian producers. Nonetheless, a finite 
number of firms have developed new product market strategies which have ensured the 
preservation of a competitive advantage. This has ultimately implied that Italy has 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
635-656, Lindsay, V. (2005). "The Development of International Industry Clusters: A Complexity Theory 
Approach." Journal of International Entrepreneurship 3: 71-97, Lange, K. (2009). "Institutional embeddedness 
and the strategic leeway of actors: the case of the German therapeutical biotech industry." Socio-Economic 
Review 7: 181-207.].  
29 The data used for the empirical analysis of trade flows covers the 1988-2003 period.  The current credit 
crisis, 2008 and beyond is not included in this research. Its repercussions on the real economy are affecting the 
textile sector.  The direct impacts are twofold and act on the very small, 2nd/3rd tiers of suppliers, as well as 
on the very large leader firms.  The former bear the consequences of reduced consumer demand, and the 
subsequent decline in production commissioned by customers.  The latter risk defaulting on debts, previously 
granted and undertaken on the basis of more buoyant times – the recent bankruptcy of Itierre in January 2009 
(head of a large pyramidal structure which controlled both lead firms and first tier suppliers) speaks to this 
problem.  Tsunamis, in fact, bring away with them both good and bad swimmers.  
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maintained a positive revealed comparative advantage for these goods (see RSCA 
indicator). Empirical studies have indeed shown that for textile and apparel firms, as well 
as for firms set in industrial districts at large (regardless of the industry specialisation), a 
clear dualism has emerged in terms of firms’ performance: while some firms have 
responded to external pressures by increasing their level of productivity and innovation, 
others have not (Camuffo, Pozzana et al. 2008; Guelpa and Micelli 2008). In section 3.2 a 
model is introduced which accounts for both trends. This section instead provides a 
statistical overview of the industry’s international performance. 
 
3.1.1 Statistical overview of the industries 
 
The following graphs trace the performance of Italy’s export markets share vis-à-vis the 
OECD countries and the world economy as a whole.  This indicator, produced by the OECD 
STAN database, shows the exports for a given industry for a given country (or country 
group) as a percentage of the exports for this industry for the OECD or the world economy 
respectively.  With respect to the OECD group of countries (Figure III.1), Italy exhibits a 
very strong performance in the “leather, leather products and footwear” category 
producing an average of 35 per cent of total OECD exports between 1997 and 2008 
(unfortunately STAN does not produce any earlier data at this level of dis-aggregation).  
The production of “wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur” has acquired over the past 
ten years an increasing share of the OECD’s exports for these goods, rising to roughly 20 
per cent of the total.  The share of Italian “textiles” has remained roughly constant. 
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Figure III.1 Export market share relative to OECD 
 
Source: OECD STAN Indicators ed. 2009 
 
With respect to the world economy, which also includes all available data for China and 
India, the situation is slightly worse (Figure III.2). Italy’s export market share relative to 
the world for “textiles” has been falling further to a meagre 7 per cent roughly.  Despite the 
share of Italian “wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur” relative to the world is lower 
than that relative to OECD countries only, it has been on a rising trend.  Interestingly, this 
has been the case also after the end of Multifibre and the application of GATT.  The market 
share of “leather, leather products and footwear” has also exhibited somewhat of a 
structural readjustment to these changes in trade policy, nonetheless resting nicely at 
roughly 16 per cent of world trade.  Moreover, for each industry segment, Italy holds the 
largest market share relative to any individual country. 
 
Since this indicator30  is based on an ISIC Rev.3 classification which covers all activities at a 
two digit level disaggregation, it therefore provides a less detailed level of investigation 
                                                             
30 “The export market share relative to the OECD shows the exports of a certain industry for a given country 
(or country group) as a percentage of the exports of this industry for the OECD zone.  The OECD 
here includes all OECD countries but Luxembourg (for which series are only available from 1999).  This 
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than otherwise used throughout this thesis.  Individual commodities’ trade performance at 
lower levels of disaggregation via the OECD International Trade and Commodities 
Statistics database is therefore used to construct the revealed symmetric comparative 
advantage indicator. As discussed in Chapter 1, this indicator not only captures the 
percentage of a certain industry’s trade for a specific country over that of a larger basket of 
countries, but also weighs this percentage with respect to a specific country’s total trade.   
 
Figure III.2 Export market share relative to the world 
 
Source: OECD STAN Indicators ed. 2009 
 
The tracking of this indicator for the 1988-2003 period for all textile sub-segments reveals 
a much greater variety in performance than the graphs presented earlier. Indeed a 
number of product categories have performed poorly, whilst a number of categories have 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
indicator is calculated as follows:  100 * (expo c, i / expo OECD,i)  ... where OECD aggregate covers all OECD 
countries but Luxembourg.  The export market shares relative to the WORLD shows the exports of a certain 
industry for a given country (or country group) as a percentage of the exports of this industry for the Total 
World.  Here, Total World exports have been estimated by adding up all OECD and major non-member 
economies' exports from STAN Bilateral Trade Database (BTD).  The aggregate Total World gathers 47 
countries, i.e. OECD countries and the following non-member economies:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Estonia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, Thailand, 
Chinese Taipei, South Africa.  This indicator is calculated as follows: 100 * (expo c, i / expo WORLD, i).  Note: 
Total World includes exports from Chinese Taipei up to 2006 (inclusive). From 2007 onwards, Total World 
excludes exports from Chinese Taipei” (OECD STAN definitions). For further explanations on the methodology, 
see: “Statistical Databases: OECD Structural Analysis Statistics Online Database”: 
 http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en_21571361_33915056_39146886_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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instead performed no worse, if not better, than in the past.  Figure III.3 presents the trend 
dynamics for the revealed symmetric comparative advantage for nine product categories 
defined at the four digit level of the SITC Rev.3 international classification system which 
hold both a positive RSCA (greater than 0.5) and a positive RSUV in 2003 (based on the 
identification process described in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1).   
 
Figure III.3 RSCA for nine successful textile industry sub-segments 
 
Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Rev. 3, 29 countries, Own 
Calculations 
 
All these sub-segments have a value for the RSCA which ranges between 0.4 and 0.85 over 
the 1988-2006 period. The graph shows how exports of handbags, specific segments of 
wearing apparel, and footwear have maintained a steady and positive value. This is 
particularly interesting given the declining textile performance observed previously 
(Figure III.2  in particular) and the widespread discussions on the Italian textile industry’s 
decline (Amighini and Chiarlone 2004). Disaggregated statistical analysis instead suggests 
that certain segments of the textiles industry have continued to hold a revealed 
comparative advantage in international export markets. It therefore emerges that Italian 
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firms have not been completely outdone by the increased competitive pressures, 
aggravated by reformed exchange rate and trade policies. Quite the contrary, Italian firms 
still appear to rank amongst the top ten European clothing companies and Italian leather 
goods’ exports show values of the RSCA significantly greater than 0.5 for a substantial 
amount of years (be it in the form of handbags, simple leather, or footwear).  
 
Table III.1 Legend of textile industry sub-segments tracked in Figure III.3 
6115: Sheep or lamb skin leather, without wool (excl. 6118) 
6116: Goat or kid skin leather, without hair (excl. 6118) 
6118: Leather, specially dressed or finished, n.e.s. 
8311: Handbag, whether or not with shoulder strap 
8461: Clothing accessories, not for babies, not knitted 
8462: Panty hose, socks & other hosiery, knitted or crocheted 
8515: Other footwear, with uppers of textile materials 
8517: Footwear, n.e.s. 
8519: Parts of footwear, in-soles, heel-cushions & similar 
Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010 
 
How is this development accounted for? Why have Italy’s most similar trading 
counterparts (Germany and France) lost so much in terms of export market shares, 
employment and output whilst Italian companies have not (Dunford 2004; Lane and 
Probert 2009)? A shift into higher quality production (captured by the RSUV indicator) 
seems to explain how Italian companies have shielded themselves from the competitive 
pressures experienced (de Nardis and Pensa 2004; Camuffo, Pozzana et al. 2008; Guelpa 
and Micelli 2008). Yet, it is important to understand what mechanisms have allowed 
Italian firms to succeed in upgrading their products. Before doing so, the average firm is 
introduced as well as the relationships it nurtures with unions, employer associations, 
skill and financial provision systems. How this performance has come about is thus 
explored in more detail in what follows, in particular with respect to how lead firms have 
initiated a restructuring in the organisational structure of production over time.  
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Beforehand, it is useful to present some details on the compositional and territorial 
structure of the Italian textile industry at large.   
 
3.1.2 Compositional and institutional structure  
 
Instances of textile production are largely distributed across the whole of Italy, although 
some regional concentrations offset others in terms of magnitude (see Table 3.1 ISTAT 
2001). Close to 30 per cent of the total number of firms and 18 per cent of total employees 
of the textile sub-segment are located in Tuscany; as well as roughly 10 per cent of total 
wearing apparel firms and employees; and close to 30 and 25 per cent of the total number 
of firms and employees in the leather, leather goods and footwear sub-segments 
respectively ( 
Table III.2). Lombardy as well collects a large proportion of total textile producers and 
firms, hosting close to 20 per cent of total wearing apparel companies and employees. 
Thus, although significant numbers of firms and employees are located in Puglia and 
Campania as well, the lion share of the distribution appears to be located between 
Lombardy and Tuscany.    
 
If compared to the total of Italy’s manufacturing sector, it emerges that there are on 
average more small firms, and that they are more profitable. Statistically, 47 per cent of 
total textile and apparel workers are employed in small firms which count less than 19 
employees; 33 per cent of the industry’s total revenues are also produced by small firms; 
55 per cent of total leather goods and footwear workers are employed in small firms; so 
are 29.9 per cent of the industry’s of the industry’s total revenues (Table III.3).   
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Table III.2 Territorial distribution of firms and employees 
Textiles Wearing apparel 
Leather, leather goods and 
footwear 
No. of firms 
Tuscany 26.90% Lombardy 18.40% Tuscany 29.30% 
Lombardy 24.40% Veneto 13.80% Marches 20.30% 
Emilia-Romagna 9.50% Tuscany 11.90% Veneto 13.40% 
Veneto 7.90% Emilia-Romagna 11.20% Lombardy 10.20% 
Piedmont 7.90% Apulia 9.10% Campania 9.40% 
Employees 
Lombardy 36.90% Veneto 22.30% Tuscany 24.90% 
Tuscany 17.10% Lombardy 19.50% Marches 21.00% 
Piedmont 13.30% Puglia 10.90% Veneto 18.90% 
Veneto 11.60% Tuscany 10.30% Campania 8.70% 
Emilia-Romagna 6.50% Emilia-Romagna 10.30% Lombardy 8.40% 
Source: ISTAT Censimento Industria e Servizi 2001 
 
This phenomenon is extremely typical of Tuscany, explaining why there are 
proportionately less employees than in Lombardy, despite the greater number of firms.  As 
a matter of fact, the size of firms is on average smaller in Tuscany than it is in Lombardy 
(ISTAT 2001). In terms of performance, Unioncamere’s (Italy’s national Chamber of 
Commerce institute) report on the state of subcontracting firms in Italy highlights that 
small firms (15 employees) lag behind their larger counterparts in terms of: profits, labour 
productivity, export- over total revenue, and the ratio of investment per person employed.  
Interestingly, though still lagging behind, textile firms perform slightly better than the 
manufacturing average (rows 4-7 in Table III.3). The fact that these firms do not comply 
with the Worker’s Statute and centralised collective wage and normative bargaining, as 
well as escaping the tax system, implies that employment costs are smaller. As a matter of 
fact, the same report suggests that unit labour costs in small firms are 32.7 points lower 
than the industry average in textile and apparel firms; 33.9 points in firms producing 
leather goods and footwear. Similar differences emerge also in terms of the average 
individual wages paid to employees in the industry.   
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With respect to wage bargaining, nationally agreed contracts exist which regulate salary 
and working conditions for the industry. Yet, not only does a size differentiation in terms 
of compliance to the industry or artisanal contract exist, but also territorial 
differentiations. This implies that industry specific normative regulation vary substantially 
across firms which may compete in the same niche but employ varying numbers of 
employees. Employee skill formation occurs on the job, despite a number of technical 
schools exists locally.  In 2005, only 4.7 per cent of total workers were involved in some 
form of formal training (16 per cent in total manufacturing). Moreover, as expected, there 
is a huge cleavage between proportion of employees trained: 2 per cent in small firms, 12 
per cent in medium-large enterprises (Tartaglione 2007 : 26).  As a consequence, firm 
struggle in finding workers meeting the necessary skill profile criteria (Tartaglione 2007 : 
20, based on Unioncamere: Subcontracting Observatory).  There appear to be significant 
matching difficulties given that the average period required to find the necessary workers 
is 6.5 months (1 month longer than for the average industry).   
 
Table III.3 Comparison of industry average and small firm performance 
 
Textile 
and 
apparel 
Leather 
goods 
and 
footwear 
Man- 
ufacturing 
Proportion of firms (%) 
Employment 47 55 40.8 
Revenue 33 29.9 21.8 
Performance results, 
industry average = 100 
Profits 86.6 93.4 76.5 
Labour productivity 74.2 74.6 65.2 
Export revenue/Total revenue 65.4 57.1 40.7 
Investment/Employee 71.1 85.5 62.7 
Unit labour cost, 
industry average = 100 
Unit labour cost 77.3 76.1 71 
Wage 79.5 77.8 73.1 
Source: (Tartaglione 2007 : 20, based on Unioncamere: Subcontracting Observatory) 
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Unions, in tandem with local authorities and employers, are therefore trying to set up 
forms of explicit (initial and continuous) vocational training. One such initiative is 
operationalised by the establishment of the a formal training school specialised in leather 
close to Florence (Alta Scuola di Pelletteria Italiana – Castello dell’Acciaolo). This project 
has benefited from the interaction of lead firms (Gucci and Prada) as well as employer 
associations (CNA, and Confartigianato) and local authorities (Comunes of Scandicci and 
Pontassieve). A similar example is found in Biella, yet these are still residual and rare 
initiatives often financed by state or EU funds and are therefore subject to financing 
fluctuations. Therefore, given the lack of such formal structures, employees acquire skills 
on the job, through a process of learning by doing and continuous skill acquisition.   
 
In terms of financing, similar country-wide patterns are reproduced at the sectoral level.  
Small enterprises fund themselves through short term bank lending and the reinvestment 
of cash flows, where available. Since regulation implies that small firms cannot obtain 
loans from a single bank but through multiple bank sourcing, accessing finance for small 
firms is a highly problematic affair. Moreover, large firms are capable of raising patient 
capital through internal capital markets, close relationships with international investors 
(see the links of Gucci with French luxury investment funds LVMH and PPR), small firms 
are not. Interestingly, empirical analysis has revealed that the cost of borrowing for firms 
also varies across regions, and is most expensive in Tuscany (Pozzoli and Radicchi 2003).  
Coupled with the notion that borrowing for small firms is more expensive than for larger 
firm, this implies that small Tuscan firms face the highest cost of borrowing capital. It 
therefore appears that collective bargaining, skill formation and financing systems appear 
to be problematically structured, providing fragmented assets across the differently sized 
firms of the industry.  
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Textile production in comparative perspective 
 
Lastly, a brief international comparison is useful to highlight the differences between 
Italy’s textile industry at large and that of Germany, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. A first clear difference emerges when comparing the average size of firms: in the 
US firms employ on average close to 250 employees, thus are generally large (Table III.4).  
In the UK and Germany the average firm employs +40 employees. Although this number 
conceals the intense polarisation between British large and small firms, it confirms the 
important role of the German medium sized firm (Mittelstand) in textiles and clothing 
production which accounts for 60 per cent of employees and 63 per cent of total turnover 
in the industry (Lane and Probert 2009).   
 
The institutions which cater the industry differ across these countries and vis-à-vis Italy: 
the German vocational training system is better structured and effective, whereas no such 
system is in place in either of the two Anglo-Saxon countries. German firms are mostly 
family owned, British are privately owned but controlled through diffused ownership 
structures, and American companies are instead mostly listed.  In tandem with corporate 
and labour market legislation, institutional frameworks have direct implications on the 
ability of firms to compete in high or low end markets.  For example, until 2004, German 
firms could not be set up without the presence of a master craftsman (Meister) registered 
on the artisan roll (Handwerksrolle) (Rath 2002 : 16-17): this implied that on average 
German products would fall in the medium-to-high quality end of the market (Lane and 
Probert 2009 : 49, 55). On the other hand, US and UK textiles firms produce low-quality 
and medium-to-low quality goods, respectively (Lane and Probert 2009 : 54).  A handful of 
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high quality British producers do exist, but quite often the actual production of these 
goods’ products doesn’t actually take place in Britain (see for example the production of 
Vivienne Westwood’s Red Label in Italy).   
 
Table III.4 The Clothing Industry in the USA, UK and Germany (2005) 
 Firms Employees (000s) Turnover (million) 
United States 10889 243 $ 16549  
United Kingdom 3335 40 £ 4389 
Germany 408 45 € 9134 
Source: Lane and Probert 2009 : 45 (German data is for 2004) 
 
Regardless of the institutional and product market differences, the textiles and clothing 
industries have witnessed an important decline in terms of output, turnover and total 
employees employed in all three countries. The reasons for this decline are aplenty 
although the heightened competition from East Asia appears to be common to all cases.  
Thus, given that the external pressures faced are equivalent to those faced by Italian firms, 
it is important to understand what mechanisms Italian firms have developed to counter 
them. 
 
3.2 Changes in the organisational set-up of the industry 
 
Today the most internationally successful firms in the apparel, footwear and leather 
segments of the textile industry appear to have become lead firms31, set at the helm of a 
hierarchically disintegrated production structure. They have specialised in the design, 
                                                             
31 I will use this term interchangeably with casa madre.  The term most commonly used in the literature to 
capture the firm which is placed at the head of a supply chain original equipment manufacturer (OEM)  
[Herrigel, G. and V. Wittke (2005). Varieties of Vertical Disintegration: The Global Trend Towards Heterogeneous 
Supply Relations and the Reproduction of Difference in US and German Manufacturing. Changing Capitalisms. G. 
Morgan, R. Whitley and E. Moen, Oxford University Press.].  Although the position held in the value change is 
similar, lead firm/case madri are distinctly different because they engage in capital skill asset pooling with 
their suppliers. 
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development, distribution and marketing phases of a good whilst its actual production is 
instead delegated to a chain of suppliers. Yet suppliers should not be grouped under a 
single heading as they differ in terms of the skill specificity possessed: industry-, firm-, or 
product-level. Accordingly they are classified as first and second tier suppliers, process or 
product specialists respectively.  Moreover, process specialists are always located in the 
nearby vicinities; product specialists and hierarchical sub-contractors may not be. The 
introduction of capital-skill asset pooling between firms holding the patient capital and 
firms holding the specific skills has prompted the adoption of this organisational structure. 
 
Yet this set-up only emerged recently replacing symmetrically organised inter-firm 
networks of production in the eighties, typical of classical industrial district, and the 
hierarchically integrated structure of production in the sixties. As a matter of fact, the 
industry faced two critical junctures during which previously established organisational 
structures were called into question: (1) in the seventies rising labour costs implied that 
the traditional economic model based on low wages and low skills was no longer viable; 
(2) in the late nineties growing competitive pressures from emerging economies and the 
removal of the exchange rate competitiveness enhancing mechanism implied that the 
traditional district model, characterised by horizontally symmetrical relations across 
firms, was also no longer successful.  As a consequence, the organisational structures in 
place were restructured.  This section is spent tracing these developments.  
 
3.2.1 From vertical integration to a horizontally symmetric system  
 
As contended by Chandler, the vertical integration of production phases and processes is 
the most efficient structure. It minimises the problems of hold-up and control which 
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derive from the dependence on external firms (Chandler 1977).  This production structure 
was widespread in the fifties and sixties across the Italian textile industry at large.  As a 
matter of fact, the European market of the sixties was dominated by large, vertically 
integrated, Fordist Italian firms of the likes of: Lanificio Rossi, Lanificio Rivetti, Marzotto, 
Lebole, Cantoni, Bassetti, etc. (Locke 1995; Locke 1996).  Moreover, this organisational 
structure was found in most of the firms which later “fed” (Lazerson and Lorenzoni 1999) 
and gave birth to the Italian industrial districts (Piore and Sabel 1984; Becattini 1987; 
Becattini 1990).   
 
During the seventies the industry was hit by a widespread crisis fuelled by altered 
patterns in competition and consumer demand, increased energy costs, and the 
introduction of government health and safety regulations which increased production 
costs. Additionally, unit labour costs surged as a consequence of the institutional 
innovations which followed the 1968-1969 years of worker unrest: specifically, the 
introduction of an instrument for wage indexation, the scala mobile, and the 1970 Statute 
of Workers (Rogari 2000).  As a consequence, a vast number of Italian textile firms entered 
a phase characterised by organisational disintegration and restructuring (Locke 1995).  
Large firms were broken up and workers fired; these opened up work-shops and small 
firms, having taken away with them their own portable firm-specific skills (Becattini, 
Bellandi et al. 2009; Guenzi 2009).  Subsequently these workers specialised in the labour 
intensive skill carried away when leaving the integrated structure they were previously 
part of.  The interaction between what remained of these large integrated organisations, 
casa madre, and the small artisanal firms became characterised by arm’s length and spot 
market relations. The casa madre would decompose the production of a final good into 
separate and independent parts which would be externally outsourced. These separate 
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components would then make their way back to the OEMs and were recomposed into a 
final item, through a process which added value to each individual part.   
Figure III.4 Post-Fordist Sub-contracting Model 
 
Source: Own representation 
 
So was the case in the leather goods industry for example. In the pursuit of producing a 
leather-based shoe or handbag, hierarchical lead firms provided suppliers with pre-cut 
pieces of leather and paid for the sewing and stitching, labour-intensive, phase of 
production. Semi-final goods would then make their way back to the casa madre where 
finishing touches were applied to the goods. Within this process, the ownership of the raw 
material employed remained with the lead firm: small suppliers thus only offered manual 
labour at a price. Maintaining an external network of suppliers significantly reduced lead 
firms’ labour costs, which had inflated after the social unrest of the late sixties.   
 
Similarly, in the apparel industry, lead firms would outsource to – mostly female – external 
labour the stitching and sewing of parts which would a priori be developed and a 
Fordist Firm
Component Sub-contractors
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posteriori overlooked and refined in house. The lead firms of the seventies would thus 
retain under their direct, internal, control the most value added phases of production: 
such as the modelling, cutting of leather, product development (i.e. the creation of new 
collections), and the finishing – finissaggio – of the product. The remaining, labour 
intensive and low value added phases would instead be outsourced to a chain of suppliers, 
who de facto had once been part of its own workforce. The interaction between what 
remained of these vertically integrated large companies and laid off workers is captured 
by the Figure III.4. 
Figure III.5 Traditional industrial district model 
 
Source: Own representation 
 
Yet by the late eighties the interactions between small firms evolved into an independent 
model of production, detached from the large firm.  Whilst the demise of large firms was 
central to the formation of (some) industrial districts32, during the late eighties and 
                                                             
32 Whilst some scholars attribute the origin of district to the disintegration of large firms [Belussi, F. (1989). 
Benetton Italy: Beyond Fordism and Flexible Specialisation to the Evolution of the Network Firm Model. 
Information Technology and Women Employment: The Case of the European Clothing Industry. S. Mitter. Berlin, 
Springer Verlag, Trigilia, C. (1989). Il distretto industriale di Prato. Strategie di riaggiustamento industriale. M. 
Regini and C. R. Sabel. Bologna, Il Mulino, Lazerson, M. and G. Lorenzoni (1999). "The firms that feed industrial 
districts: A return to the Italian source " Industrial and Corporate Change 8(2): 235-266.].  Others maintain that 
the creative pressures developed from sharecropping and cottage industry experiences which at times also 
Horizontally Symmetric Inter-firm Relationships
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nineties districts more accurately conformed to the following definition: they had become 
“socio-territorial entit[ies] characterised by the active presence of both a community of 
people and a population of firms in one naturally and historically bounded area” (Becattini 
1990 : 39). Sociological interaction and relational density, coupled with the presence of 
employers, artisan and workers associations, local technical schools, credit cooperatives, 
networks of local banks, and development agencies served as the district’s underpinning 
(Whitford 2001). Within these districts, individually owned and independent enterprises 
distributed production amongst one another, shared information and – through the 
rotation of apprentices and craftsmen - skilled labour (Harrison 1994 : 81).  Most 
importantly, districts were characterised by the co-location of horizontally organised 
small firms, engaged in symmetrical relations.  Flexible specialisation had become the 
economic model informing the distribution of production processes between firms (Piore 
and Sabel 1984), as captured by Figure III.5. 
 
The extensively researched districts of Carpi, Santa Croce sull’Arno, Prato, Schio, Fermo 
and Biella featured these characteristics - though with some minor differences (Locke 
1995; Bigarelli 2003; Trigilia, Dei Ottati et al. 2008; Dei Ottati 2009; Maitte 2009).  
Specifically, Schio and Biella have always been exclusive textile producing districts, Carpi 
and Prato combined both the production of textiles and that of clothing, Fermo specialised 
in the production of leather and footwear and Santa Croce sull’Arno in that of leather and 
leather goods. These districts share similar origins: during the eighties, the large mills of 
Biella had outsourced most of their labour intensive production to subcontractors, thus 
initiating the establishment of an horizontal production system (Battagion and Corrocher 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
anticipated the first wave of mass industrialisation [Belfanti, C. M. (2009). The genesis of a hybrid. A Handbook 
of Industrial Districts. G. Becattini, M. Bellandi and L. De Propris. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, Colli, A. 
(2009). Industrial districts and large firms: the stubborn persistence of a 'weak' productive model. A Handbook of 
Industrial Districts. G. Becattini, M. Bellandi and L. De Propris. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing.].  The jury 
is still out as to which hypothesis carries more weight, though the empirical evidence available suggests that 
both hold some clout.  
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2003).  In Prato, these dynamics took place earlier (mid-fifties) but along similar lines: 
large mills laid workers off and provided incentives to ex-employees to set up their own 
workshops (Dei Ottati 2000; Dei Ottati 2009). These districts all experienced a period of 
very successful export and economic growth in the early nineties 
(Federazione.dei.Distretti.Italiani. consulted throughout 2009-2010). Yet, the same 
development model which had made them so successful in the past, appeared to have lost 
steam during the early years of the new millennium (Whitford 2001; Varaldo 2005). In 
Prato for example, the number of textile establishments fell by more than 30 per cent over 
the 1991-2001 decade (Dei Ottati 2009 : 1822 on ISTAT Censimento Industria e Servizi 
1991-2001 statistics).  
 
Despite the model’s reduced growth potential, which became increasingly apparent over 
the last decade, a radical reform of manufacturing processes in the textile industry has not 
occurred. Quite the contrary, neither the reintegration of production phases within one 
independent unit has not been observed, nor the complete outsourcing and off-shoring of 
textile production to low cost countries. On the contrary, within some districts, there is 
evidence of a movement towards hierarchically governed, yet disintegrated, production 
structures.  Rather than being established anew, this new model of production 
organisation appears to build on a pre-existing industrial and institutional sub-stratum.  
 
3.2.2 Hierarchical production chains and capital-skill asset pooling 
 
The industrial district model of production of textiles, leather, apparel and footwear 
products came under pressure because of the creation of a European Economic and 
Monetary Union, the liberalisation of international trade policy and the emergence of a 
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competing clothing model of consumption – ready-to-wear fashion (Lane and Probert 
2004; Lane and Probert 2009).  As a consequence, the supply mechanisms of apparel, 
leather goods and footwear products were reformed so as to produce greater volumes of 
quality competitive goods. In order to do so, individual firms required two assets of 
production: patient capital and specific skills (Streeck 1991a; Herrmann 2008a). As some 
firms have grown in size they have been able to access forms of patient capital financing; 
they have not however been capable of accessing a pool of redundant capacities.  
Therefore such firms (lead firms) have come to stand at the helm of a multi-level 
hierarchical structure of production within which they engage in capital-skill asset pooling 
with suppliers.  Suppliers have become hierarchically differentiated since first and second 
tier suppliers differ in terms of the respective capabilities possessed and the governance 
mechanisms which regulate their interaction with lead firms.   
 
Within this, lead firms: (a) draw up an initial product design and collection, based on their 
prediction of the behaviour of consumer markets; (b) they download this design to 
specialist technicians and external artisans who translate the initial designer project into a 
standardisable item, composed of multiple parts, each characterised by varying quality 
intensity; (c) they subsequently organise and manage multi-level supply chains by 
distributing production phases to sub-contractors; (d) they perform the important 
function of overlooking and certifying that supplier behaviour and products conform to 
both formal and informal criteria of quality; (e) they set up and manage the marketing, 
retail, branding, customer service which feed into the success of a final good.  Proceeding 
downwards, lead firms have agreed to share the proceedings of the above endeavours 
with suppliers in exchange for their skills.  Therefore first tier suppliers pool their skills by 
cooperating in the technical design and development of specific component parts for 
which specific skills are required In practice, they offer their skills by completing the 
97 
 
following activities: the actual incision of leather in the leather (handbag or travel bag -
producing) industry; the process through which uppers of shoes are attached to their soles 
in the footwear industry; and the cutting of cloth and allocation of input items in the 
apparel industry. Lead firms also exchange their capital with product specialists who 
produce heels and soles which require substantial sunk cost investment in terms of 
machinery and plants; metal accessories which complement a leather (handbag or travel 
bag) product; and other component items which are produced according to semi-
customised and modularised arrangements – such as buttons, laces, or zippers for 
example.   
 
Ultimately, lead firms engage indirectly in capital-skill asset pooling with industry-skilled 
suppliers. De facto first tier suppliers download to them the actual production of finite 
parts and components, and of codified production processes. Given the large availability of 
such suppliers, they are important as they enable quantitative fluctuations in demand to 
be smoothed out. In the second place, this availability allows production costs to be kept at 
bay, as in the absence of clear product or process specialisation; competition amongst 
these firms is price-based.   
 
Currently, a process of institutionalisation –fidealizzazione- of first tier of suppliers has 
been observed whereby lead firms have ensured that their most important suppliers 
would receive additional financial support during the recent crisis (additional patient-
capital was transferred to preserve their skills). Moreover, this process of 
institutionalisation of first tier suppliers is reinforced by the recurrent practice of know-
how exchange via the mobility of expert personnel across them. Nonetheless, lead firms 
continue to monitor suppliers through so-called ispettori – de facto process overseers. Yet, 
whereby first tier suppliers benefit from the close ties webbed with one lead firm, they 
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often pool their skills with other lead firms, attracted by the reputational benefits of 
working with one lead firm already. This cross-fertilisation becomes possible since the 
practice of exclusive customer-supplier relations is not widespread.   
 
On the other hand, this process of upward institutionalisation is dovetailed by the drastic 
intensification of spot market and hierarchically informed relations between first and 
subsequent tiers of suppliers. Work is outsourced to sub-suppliers according to two 
criteria: who bids the lowest price and who produces the same quality product in the 
shortest time. Thus competition among sub-supplier firms is fierce; not only in terms of 
buyers but also in terms of competition for the skilled workers which are trained in-house.  
As a matter of fact, all small firms compete against lead firms who, from time to time, 
poach their most specialised employee to enrich their own product development 
department (for example), and thus compromise the survival of the sub-supplier itself.  
Besides the few instances of poaching, in general lead firms obtain a skilled labour force by 
outsourcing the actual manufacturing phases of production to suppliers which are selected 
on the basis of their skills: industry-, firm- or product- specific. In exchange for the 
possibility to access an international distribution chain, first tier suppliers cooperate with 
lead firms in the incremental innovation of products via continuous interaction and the 
exchange of tacit skills. In sum, the pooling of capital and skills between lead and first tier 
suppliers, between first and subsequent tiers of suppliers, coupled with horizontally 
competitive forces at every level, has emerged as a new model of production organisation 
in the textile industry.  
 
 
 
99 
 
3.3 Internationally competitive firms and consortia 
 
Because the number of firms captured by the product categories listed in Figure III.3 is 
considerable, I have limited my firm level analysis only to the leather goods family as a 
whole, thus including footwear and handbag producers and excluding apparel and 
clothing firms. This choice is also justified by the large export market share obtained for 
this industry by Italy, both with respect to the OECD and the World – thus once developing 
and low cost economies are included as well.  This section therefore presents firm-level 
evidence collected on a handful of highly internationally competitive Italian leather goods, 
handbags and footwear producing companies. These firms are deemed successful in terms 
of their export and financial performance captured by analysing the ORBIS database for 
this given (NACE) product category. When compared to their international counterparts, 
taking into account the specific industrial specialisation and the size of the firms, these 
companies rank very high. Moreover, it is the widespread opinion of industry experts that 
these are indeed amongst the most successful internationally renowned companies for 
this industry. These firms are cases of successful quality competitive manufacturers, who 
have not only invested significantly in the branding and marketing of their products, but 
also in the quality of the goods actually produced. 
 
In what follows, the section shows how the international competitiveness of Ferragamo, 
Gucci and Tod’s is based on the quality enhancing capacity of the supply chain constructed.  
Second, through the use of negative performance case I further establish that conditional 
to this success is the interaction between lead firms and skilled suppliers. Skilled suppliers 
alone lack the patient-capital required to invest in technological innovation and in 
extending distribution channels so as to remain successful in internationally competitive 
markets. 
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3.3.1 Brand and value-chain leaders: Gucci, Ferragamo and Tod’s 
 
Gucci and the Gucci Group 
 
Gucci is a historical brand in the production of leather goods and footwear products.  
Originally founded in the early 1920s, it is today one of Italy’s largest company within such 
industry.  Gucci was born as a small niche brand which significantly increased its size and 
reach through changes to its corporate ownership structure.  It first became part of the 
Anglo Arab investment fund, Investcorp, then of the French LVHM luxury holding group, 
and lastly of the French Pinault-Printemps-Redoute, PPR.  The injections of liquidity and 
the easier access to funds which these acquisitions brought about resulted in a process of 
internal, as well as external, expansion through the increase in personnel and the purchase 
of a multitude of smaller luxury brands incorporated into the Gucci Group. Moreover, this 
transition in ownership structures, and financial means, was paralleled by a process of 
restructuring and reorganisation of Gucci’s productive set-up.   
 
Gucci and the Gucci Group (a by-product of Gucci’s external expansion strategy) therefore 
represent a case of a small district firm which has grown into an important international 
player. Though admittedly Gucci is a very old company, the transition only began during 
the early nineties when Investcorp first purchased 50% of the company’s shares (1989), 
and developed exponentially with the final acquisition by the PPR group. This 
development is in line with the thesis’ argument that once a firm can access patient-capital 
it can engage in capital-skill asset pooling with suppliers.  In this section the organisational 
changes which followed the first and subsequent injections of external capital are 
described, with particular reference to Gucci’s footwear and leather goods’ (i.e. handbags) 
production. 
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Gucci’s revenue stream is mostly of foreign origin: 42 per cent of its profits are collected 
across Europe, 21 per cent in the US, 20 per cent in Japan, and 12 per cent in Asia 
(company data for 2003). It has also established a global sales network, with more than 
163 directly controlled shops scattered around Europe, America and Asia.  Despite the 
extensive internationalisation of its retail activities, most – if not all – of its productive 
activities are instead concentrated in Italy, particularly around Tuscany (Florence and 
Scandicci). In terms of personnel, whilst 67 per cent of its personnel are employed in 
white collar functions (12 per cent in research, development and design), only 31 per cent 
of its employees are involved in manufacturing.  Moreover 9 per cent of the latter are only 
involved in the management and organisational planning of production (Bacci and Bianchi 
2004 : 159, based on company data for 2002). Who then manufactures Gucci’s products 
and according to what organisational logic? 
 
Until the company’s strategic turnaround, which followed the ownership changes 
mentioned earlier and which was initiated by Domenico de Sole and Tom Ford, most of 
Gucci’s production was internal: only the assembly phase of production was outsourced to 
external suppliers. Today we observe a very different picture. The design and 
development of each individual product are completely internalised; the production of 
prototypes takes place both within Gucci and within trusted suppliers addressed by Gucci 
as partners, (aka. process specialists). The cutting of leather and raw inputs is mostly 
externalised to first tier suppliers, except where raw materials are extremely precious.  
Finally, the actual production of a handbag is completely outsourced to a hierarchically 
organised network of suppliers. In what follows the organisation of the subcontracting 
network employed for the production of leather goods and footwear is discussed. The 
latter appears to be more articulated because of the larger capital investment required for 
the production of footwear.   
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Gucci internally designs its leather goods’ products.  The design stage is then followed by 
the development of prototypes. This process is distributed across Gucci and partner firms; 
approximately 20 per cent of the process takes place within Gucci, the remaining 80 per 
cent takes place within five exclusive partner firms (first tier suppliers) who use the same 
IT and machine systems as Gucci and maintain open channels of interaction with Gucci in 
developing these prototypes. These machines and IT infrastructure represent part of the 
patient-capital exchange that Gucci has offered to these firms in exchange for their skill 
assets.  These relationships are long established and continuously nurtured via skill and 
patient-capital exchange which occurs when Gucci employees directly spend a proportion 
of their working time within the premises of partner firms, or when Gucci purchases 
machinery directly for its suppliers.   
 
The act of translating a design into a prototype is highly artisanal and skill intensive.  Each 
of the partner firms employs between 30 and 60 employees, and are therefore not micro-
firms in terms of size, yet are mostly non-unionised. Once prototypes are completed, they 
are sent to suppliers accompanied by clear guidelines and the necessary raw materials for 
production, which is supplied by Gucci directly.  There at least 60 such suppliers which 
receive direct guidelines from Gucci, based on the prototype developed in partnership 
with trusted suppliers. Agreements with these suppliers are often sanctioned via detailed 
contracts, and prices are established ex ante based on the knowledge that Gucci has 
acquired during the prototypisation stage. 
 
Subsequently, these firms further subcontract self-contained production phases to 10-15 
second tier suppliers; each will subsequently download the production of finite 
components to 6-20 third tier suppliers (Bacci and Bianchi 2004 : 165). The relationships 
amongst these lower tiered suppliers vary: we observe both long term relations as well as 
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market-based fluctuation-absorbing interactions. Though Gucci only selects first tier 
suppliers directly, it will give recommendations to the latter on their respective suppliers 
and, if necessary, Gucci will advise against some in order to preserve quality standards.  In 
total there are at least 650 firms producing Gucci leather-ware, employing a total of 4000-
4500 workers, on top of the 4000 directly employed by Gucci itself (Bacci and Bianchi 
2004 : 165).   
 
The production of footwear is structured according to similar guiding principles, although 
it is less disarticulated because of the higher capital investment required to assemble a 
shoe. Prototypes of shoes are developed internally through the interaction of design and 
development divisions; once a prototype is agreed upon, a limited (12) number of shoes 
per model are produced by trusted suppliers in order to establish the feasibility of its 
manufacturing. These limited items are then presented to the market.  Once the market 
perceptions for each model are tested within show-rooms, mostly located in Milan, the 
successful shoe models are produced in large scale. Gucci purchases from product 
specialists items such as soles, heels and other accessories. Four first tier suppliers 
(exclusive Gucci partners) and their suppliers are in charge of the actual manufacturing of 
footwear, along the lines of what takes place in the leather good industry. Finally, since a 
number of shoe-accessories may often be non-standardisable, they are sourced from 
highly specialised laboratories, often artisanal in nature. Gucci and these firms establish 
clearly defined contractual agreements, and these firms most likely produce shoe-
accessories for multiple brands at the same time.   
 
In this example, the capital exchange between lead firms and first tier suppliers takes the 
form of Gucci paying for expensive fashion designers to come up with a new design. That 
between lead firms and second tier suppliers takes the form of Gucci providing suppliers 
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with the necessary leather and material to produce the footwear item.  For both the skill 
exchange takes the form of translating a prototype into a retail-able product. The 
oversight of this articulated production structure is performed by process overseers – 
ispettori – who overlook actual production at initial as well as final phases, along similar 
lines of what happens in Ferragamo (forthcoming firm-level study).   
 
Salvatore Ferragamo Italia S.p.A. 
 
Salvatore Ferragamo S.p.A. (Ferragamo in what follows) is a family owned enterprise 
based in Florence. It was set up by Neapolitan born Salvatore Ferragamo in the late 
thirties - after a brief stint spent in the US, manufacturing shoes for Hollywood movie 
actors. Ferragamo’s main products today are footwear and leather (hand) bags.  Footwear 
products take up 38 per cent of its total sales; leather (hand)bags and minor leather 
accessories take up 28 per cent; clothing 16 per cent; and apparel accessories and 
perfumes the remainder (calculations based on company data for 2004). In what follows, 
Ferragamo’s production and development activities are analysed: specifically, for footwear 
and leather (hand) bags.   
 
Ferragamo is an export oriented manufacturer; 92 per cent of its total revenues were of 
foreign origin in 2006: 30 per cent of which was produced in America, 23 per cent in 
Japan, 23 per cent in East Asia, 21 per cent in Europe, and 3 per cent in South America (De 
Michele, Foresti et al. 2008 : 41-42). These results are the by-product of an extensive 
international chain of, directly controlled, shops (450 in 2006, located in more than 50 
countries). Despite the extensive coverage of its retail activities, Ferragamo is a family 
owned company and currently employs no more than two thousand employees (Bertolini, 
Molteni et al. 2006 : 113). Moreover, despite the trans-nationality of its revenue stream, 
105 
 
Ferragamo manufactures all of its products in Italy. Ferragamo does not produce its goods 
directly; rather it subcontracts the manufacturing of its goods to a chain of suppliers.   
 
The production of leather goods appears to be highly fragmented as Ferragamo claims to 
make use of roughly fifty to sixty first tier suppliers. Respectively, each of these is known 
to download its production load to at least six to ten sub-contractors (interview number 
30, Ciucchi). In light of the extensive number of suppliers and sub-suppliers, Ferragamo 
recently – in the early 2000s - performed a rationalisation of its leather goods supply 
chain. It performed a census of its suppliers (Censimento dei Subappaltatori) in order to 
protect its brand by improving its ability to control and oversee the outcomes of 
production, and to ensure compliance to its ethical Code of Conduct. At the time, a high 
proportion of third level subcontractors were small Chinese sweatshops, which failed to 
comply to health and safety, employment protection legislations; consequently, Ferragamo 
initiated a census in order to sever such ties. Following this census, and consequent to the 
termination of numerous supplier relations, Ferragamo’s supply chain was streamlined.   
 
Over time the suppliers used by Ferragamo have fine-tuned their own specialisation in 
order to best meet the skill needs of the casa madre. Ferragamo and these firms have 
interacted in a knowledge-transfer process which has trained the latter to manufacture 
Ferragamo-specific components or process raw material according to tacit Ferragamo 
guidelines.  Amongst these first tier firms, firms with firm-specific and product-specific 
skills exist.  The former are used to manage highly sophisticated machines and/or costly 
raw materials.  Quite crucially, they appear to be in charge of the cutting of leather which 
is then passed onto other firms, assemblers and finishers – i.e. they are called fustellifici. 
The latter are firms selected because of a capacity to produce customised items in large 
scale, thus an ability to produce so called ‘entry-price’ products which are proportionately 
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more textile- rather than leather-based. Another product specialist is Dmc (di Renzone 
2007 : 48 - 52): a medium small (28 employees), family owned company, set at the helm of 
a network of firms which produces metal accessories to be assembled into leather good.  
Whilst these firms have indeed a clear product specialisation independent of Ferragamo, 
some have engaged in instances of capital-skill asset pooling whereby Ferragamo has 
financed the development of specific metal products. Dmc has specialised in the 
production of such (desired) metal accessories although it does not only supply 
Ferragamo but also other brands of the likes of Gucci, Bulgari, Lanvin, J-P Gaultier, Pucci. 
Lastly, each of these first tier suppliers has constructed its own chain of subcontractors to 
whom the production of parts or their assembly is downloaded. Whilst first tier suppliers 
are selected by Ferragamo on the basis of their firm-specific or product specialisation, sub-
suppliers are selected by suppliers on the basis of the price and timing terms offered, 
assuming they hold industry-specific skills. Nonetheless, these firms are still expected to 
comply with the above mentioned Code of Conduct.    
 
The manufacturing phases which lead to the completion of a leather product are 
structurally flexible, and are not always performed within industrial premises.  In 
comparison footwear production is dependent on a higher rate of physical capital 
investment. Footwear has remained one of the very few light manufacturing products 
whose final assembly takes place along an assembly line - called manovia. In this case, 
Ferragamo’s footwear is produced by quasi-exclusive first tier suppliers with which it has 
established long term relationships, at time spanning for more than fifteen years. These 
suppliers in particular specialise in assembly, rather than component production, as 
assembly is for Ferragamo footwear a high value added production stage. For example, the 
process of attaching an upper of a shoe to its sole is highly tacit and variable: within this 
stage, trusted suppliers and Ferragamo have developed co-specific knowledge and skills.  
107 
 
The same holds for the actual production of a shoe’s upper – the so called tomaia. In this 
case, the pooling of capital-skill has occurred over time as Ferragamo financially 
supported the necessary physical capital investment and suppliers have committed to 
specialising in those footwear segments pursued by Ferragamo.     
 
First tier suppliers source the components assembled from other suppliers, which at the 
same time interact with their own subcontractors. This is true for example for those firms 
which produce heels and soles of shoes which are highly labour intensive products.  
Ultimately, these first tier suppliers resort to price-competitive suppliers which produce 
the cloth bags which contain finished shoes – though this may appear a negligible 
component, it too is part of the footwear production chain.   
 
Co-development between Ferragamo and its first tier suppliers takes place within a highly 
informal environment. Ferragamo rarely participates directly in the ownership structures 
of firms, yet it ensures those first tier suppliers are equipped with the necessary physical 
capital investment and demand flow to remain active.  In times of crisis Ferragamo has 
stocked up its inventories and increased its own demand in order to compensate for 
possible decreases in demand on behalf of other buyers.  Ultimately, Ferragamo oversees 
this highly disintegrated production chain by using process overseers and inspectors – 
ispettori.  These travel across suppliers, both first and second tier, in order to oversee that 
all production is up to standards in terms of process as well as end product.  Where these 
inspectors may find below par conditions, these suppliers will be fined and possibly their 
contract may be terminated. 
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Tod’s Group and Bottega Veneta 
 
Tod’s Group is a footwear and leather goods manufacturer based in the Marche region.  It 
was set up in the early 1920s and is today a highly successful, export oriented 
manufacturer. In 2005 51.7% of its revenue stream was of foreign origin; 46% in 2010 
(from 2005 and 2010 company accounts).  Roughly 70% of total production is in footwear, 
15% in leather goods and 12% in apparel goods. Its ownership is firmly held in the hands 
of the Della Valle family; although a proportion of the company’s shares have been listed 
on the Milan stock exchange in 2000 (67.8% of shares are held by the Della Valle family, 
the rest by various international investors). A combination of (little) primary and 
secondary evidence enables a reconstruction of the productive structure in place at Tod’s 
today.   
 
Tod’s Group employs more than 2500 employees (2009), 68% of which were white collar 
workers, 32% blue collar. Its footwear production takes place in six Tod’s factories located 
in the Marche region. Yet the role of external suppliers is also relevant.  Tod’s engages in 
long term relationships with trusted (first tier) suppliers, firms which employ between 15-
20 employees (Tunisini 2003). Whereas Tod’s oversees production, orders standard 
components in bulk from product specialists, and focuses on order management and 
distribution, first tier suppliers cut the main constituent parts of a shoe (or bag) and 
assemble all component parts together in a final product.  Lower tier suppliers are 
employed by first tier suppliers to contribute to the sowing and assembly of parts.  Tod’s 
nurtures its relationship with first tier suppliers by offering business and IT advise, as well 
as by purchasing machinery on behalf of the latter, if necessary.  In exchange, first tier 
suppliers offer their specific skills and workforce. In addition to Tod’s, other successful 
Italian firms have adopted a hierarchically structured system of production as well. They 
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have engaged in capital-skill asset pooling in order to be able to produce large quantities 
of quality competitive goods.  Moreover, as captured by the picture below (Fig. III.6), some 
of these firms share their supply chain with the other two cases investigated in detail.   
 
Bottega Veneta is a luxury manufacturer of luggage, handbags, founded in 1966 as a family 
business in Vicenza. Since its birth, Bottega Veneta was always associated with notions of 
quality, high fashion and value.  All its products are hand-crafted in Italy, by artisans and 
highly skilled workers within the Venetian territory. Bottega Veneta was only a locally 
renowned atelier in the eighties; moreover in the nineties its value declined significantly.  
As a measure of its international exposure, by the mid-nineties it only had twenty one 
international shops and employed only 118 employees.  In 2001, Bottega Veneta was 
incorporated into the Gucci Group (which includes Gucci as well as other labels). The 
acquisition and the recapitalisation which followed, worth $96.2 million, implied that 
Bottega Veneta was now capable to access significant amounts of patient-capital.  
Consequently Bottega Veneta aggressively pursued an internationalisation strategy by 
opening 110 international outlets (2007) and by doubling its white-collar employee size.  
As a result, Bottega Veneta is twice as productive (in terms of value added per employee) 
than the industry average (based on AMADEUS calculations on 2007 financial data), and 
fifty per cent more productive than it was in the early nineties.  Nonetheless, production 
and manufacturing is still entirely performed in Italy, by the same skilled workers and 
suppliers as in the past, albeit the structure of production has become increasingly 
verticalised. The injection of capital also allowed Bottega Veneta to nurture its own 
suppliers.  It appears that Bottega Veneta’s international success results from the capital-
skill asset pooling which occurred once it was acquired by the Gucci Group.  Bottega 
Veneta lacked the patient-capital required to set up an international distribution network; 
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the acquisition offered an opportunity to restructure its model of production in line with 
what occurred at Ferragamo and Gucci.  
 
Interestingly, a study of the leather and footwear industry in Tuscany, has shown that 
Gucci and Ferragamo suppliers have often catered to the needs of other lead firms as well.  
Suppliers perform subcontracting functions for other firms such as Tod’s and Bottega 
Veneta (Fig.III.6), proportional to the demand and capacity it holds(Bacci and Bianchi 
2004).  This study also identified non native lead firms employing suppliers from these 
localised productive systems (Dior for example is French). The figures represent the 
production organisation adopted by Gucci and Ferragamo and the extent to which their 
suppliers are employed by a wide range of other firms as well. The bottom part of the 
figures offers highlight the linkages with other lead firms that have been empirically 
identified (Bacci and Bianchi 2004 : 117, author's reproduction).   
 
Figure III.6 Gucci and Ferragamo: relationship with own suppliers and interaction with 
other lead firms in the leather goods and footwear industry 
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Source: (Bacci and Bianchi 2004 : 117, author's reproduction) 
 
These firm level case studies contribute to the operationalisation of the model presented 
in section 3.2.  Lead firms (Gucci, Ferragamo, Tod’s and Bottega Veneta) appear to have set 
111 
 
up a highly fragmented production structure, over which they maintain a high degree of 
control. They have done so in order to overcome the dual problem of financing research, 
development, retail and branding costs as well as training and personnel costs: costs 
which arise because of the heterogeneous distribution of the patient-capital and specific 
skill assets. Capital-skill asset pooling has allowed large firms to pool the capital asset with 
the skill asset of suppliers and thus to develop international distribution chains and 
continue to feed on the ability of small firms to train workers.  The following section 
presents evidence on firms who, despite the territorial overlap, have adopted a different 
organisational structure and have not engaged in capital skill asset pooling.  Because of 
this, their international performance deemed to be less successful.  
 
3.3.2 Consortia and hierarchical supply chains  
 
Consortia33 have been traditionally widespread in Italy’s building, textile, agricultural and 
food processing sectors. They consist of a multitude of small and micro entrepreneurs who 
come together under a joint banner and have access to pooled resources.  Consortia can 
develop for the purpose of (1) limiting competition between firms, (2) coordinating the 
fulfilment of a project (as is often the case in the building industry), or (3) facilitating the 
distribution of services and information.  Crucially consortia do not entail any form of joint 
ownership between firms and do not represent a single legal entity, as would be the case 
with cooperatives instead. Participating in a consortia grants reputational gains to each 
member firm.  Firstly, participation may be associated with a title or label or brand, linked 
to a joint marketing program. Secondly, consortia will sometimes contribute to the set up 
                                                             
33 The broader literature refers to the act of small firms coming together within a single umbrella entity in 
order to share the cost of specific production phases as “cooperative”; note this does not include the 
management of individual firms, nor the common distribution of profits.  The Italian administrative code 
instead uses the term “consortium” to capture the legal entity accounted for by the term “cooperative” in the 
Anglo-Saxon literature.  A “cooperative” in Italy is instead a company formed by a minimum of three firms 
which share the cost and profits of production. 
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of “Confidi”, a jointly-funded, para-public, institution whose main function is to act as an 
intermediary between banks and SMEs, so as to limit the information asymmetry between 
the two. This implies that credit becomes more accessible because of the reputational 
spill-over  (Angelini, Di Salvo et al. 1998). In sum, consortia represent amalgams of 
horizontally symmetric firms which come together and establish clear parameters for 
cooperation in service or financial provision.   
 
Yet, this section shows that the recently created Consortio 100% is not in itself a 
successful entrepreneurial project. It shows that it is highly reliant on the interaction with 
local Tuscan lead firms, such as Gucci and Ferragamo for example.  The section argues that 
capital-skill asset pooling between the firms of the consortium is missing as no firm has 
access to patient-capital whereas all firms are endowed with industry-specific skills. The 
empirical evidence shows that the firms which make up this consortia are eventually 
drawn to become part of the supply chains set-up by lead firms in order to access sources 
of patient-capital. 
 
The Consorzio 100% was born in the vicinities of Florence in 1997 as a response to the 
financial and structural difficulties faced by a number of small local enterprises. Following 
the application of the Multifibre Agreement an initial trend among local firms entailed 
outsourcing production to developing countries with low labour costs. The roughly 
seventy firms that founded the Consorzio 100% opted against this low cost strategy, and 
chose to invest in the Made in Italy label for the production of leather goods (mostly 
handbags).   
 
This investment was followed by the consortium’s SA8000 certification. It attests the 
Italian location of origin of the goods and confirms that their production has taken place 
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under the abidance of a number of ethical criteria. The consortium’s driving objectives 
were to pool resources to invest in technological and process innovation, in the costly 
process of certification and patenting, in training, and in strategic marketing and access to 
finance.   
 
A number of measures and joint actions thus followed: the kick start of a campaign for 
better training which lead to the establishment of the Alta Scuola di Formazione per la 
Pelletteria Italiana – a vocational training school specialised in the manufacture and 
processing of leather. The Consorzio 100% is not the sole actor behind the schools 
establishment, rather external actors participated as well: two case madri (Gucci and 
Prada), the employer association for small-and-micro sized firms (CNA and 
Confartigianato), and local administrations. With respect to the objective of improving the 
quality of the strategic marketing received, the consortium pooled resources in order to 
provide its members with project managers and marketing experts which were ex ante 
largely missing. Finally, with respect to the issue of financing, the consortium negotiated 
with the Tuscan Region and the artisans’ employer organisation a number of guarantees to 
banks. These guarantees reduced the banks’ inability to assess the collateral of small and 
micro enterprises when discussing the possibility of loans.   
 
Some of the firms which make up the Consortio 100% have since 1997 proven to be 
internationally active in export markets, have produced items characterised by very high 
quality, and some are quite successful in terms of their own individual financial 
performance (Sapaf and Braccialini34 for example). Sapaf has been one of the main drivers 
behind the establishment of the Consorzio 100%, and is currently one of the largest firms 
                                                             
34 Braccialini’s success was identified by MBFG (Mariella Burani Fashion Group).  This was (as it went 
bankrupt during the recent crisis) a holding company of small-but very successful mid range companies.  In 
identifying Braccialini’s potential, the group took ownership of the brand. 
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of the consortium. It is a family owned company which employs less than thirty employees 
and which produces varying ranges of handbag products, which are sold both under its 
own label as well under that of other firms. Yet, although comparing Sapaf and Gucci 
correlates nicely to comparing apples and oranges, it is important to highlight that the 
export to total production ratio, of the two firms differs substantially, despite the same 
industry specialisation.  Close to 95% of Gucci’s profits are of foreign origin (company data 
for 2003); instead close to 90 per cent of Sapaf’s profits are of domestic origin (primary 
data obtained from Sapaf’s owner, 2009).   
 
Moreover, although the establishment of the Consorzio 100% may suggest that alternative 
organisational set-ups are viable within the same territorial space and industrial segment, 
a deeper investigation of the activities of the firms that make up the consortium shows 
that this is actually not the case. Figure III.7 presents a stylistic representation of the 
consortium and its interactions with the hierarchical inter-firm network established by 
local lead firms.  It suggests that firms within the consortium interact with all actors of the 
model, both with the lead firm, first and subsequent tier suppliers. In reality, though the 
Consorzio 100% represents the joint effort of firms to achieve predefined objectives, it is 
still made up of multiple, independent, firms which retain their individuality and maintain 
a cooperative yet competitive relational-behaviour with each other.  Sapaf too competes 
with its consortium partners, except on the issues discussed above where it instead 
cooperates.   
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Figure III.7 The interaction of Consorzio 100% and neighbouring firms 
 
Source: Own representation based on interviews conducted with the firm and suppliers, and evidence 
collected from firm-level publications and industry reports 
 
Moreover, individually each firm is drawn towards local lead firms.  In order to become 
part of their supply network, the Consorzio 100% firms offer firm- or industry-specific 
skills. It therefore appears that although the consortium was expected to behave as a self-
contained industrial player, its activities are instead intertwined with that of the 
hierarchical structure set up by local lead firms (specifically Gucci and Ferragamo). The 
reason for this is that the financial resources pooled together as a consortium are 
insufficient to pursue an international distribution strategy. As a matter of fact, the only 
retail avenue of the Consorzio 100% is a business-to-business fair, hosted in Scandicci, 
where buyers (not customers) come to view and purchase the Consorzio’s products.  
Consequently, the firms of the Consorzio 100% are drawn towards lead firms with greater 
sources of patient-capital financing.  Moreover, the widespread opinion of the local trade 
unions and employer organisations consulted has been that the firms which make up 
Consorzio 100% earn the biggest share of profits by acting as sub-suppliers or suppliers 
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within the inter-firm networks established by case madri.  Only a residual part of profits 
results from the sales of goods sold under private labels. 
 
In sum, the main activities observed within the firms which make up the consortium are 
three: first there are firms which act as second tier suppliers by producing specific 
components, secondly there are firms which act as first tier suppliers by hierarchically 
downloading functions to second tier suppliers, thirdly there are firms which diversify in 
the production and development of goods retailed under their own label. The evidence 
collected thus suggests that although the symmetrical and horizontal features of consortia 
seem to differ from the hierarchical inter-firm networks built by Gucci, Ferragamo, Tod’s 
and Bottega Veneta; the individual behaviour of member firms actually overlaps with the 
dynamics observed within those hierarchically organised chains of production where 
capital-skill asset pooling is the driving rational for inter-firm exchange (as captured by 
Fig. III.6). This is quite a disappointing result given that the driving objective of the 
consortium itself was to enable member firms to effectively curtail the spread of such 
disintegrated and imbalanced production structure.   
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The leather good and footwear industry in Italy has exhibited continuous vigour and 
economic growth by retaining close to 35% of the OECD’s export market share.  Related to 
its export performance, the revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) for the 
goods which make up the industry has stood at values continuously greater than 0.5: 
above 0.8 for handbag goods, above 0.6 for footwear. This industry clearly represents a 
success case by international standards.  This chapter has explained this industry’s export 
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performance through the detailed analysis of four firm-level success cases, and one failed 
case: Gucci, Ferragamo, Tod’s and Bottega Veneta on the one hand, the Consorzio 100% on 
the other.  These firm-level case studies show that the production of high quality goods in 
these industries depends on the establishment of hierarchically disintegrated production 
structures within which capital-skill asset pooling takes place.  By studying the 
mechanisms through which successful firms have reorganised their manufacturing 
process, this chapter has showed that the interaction with suppliers has gained 
prominence by allowing lead firms to pool the specific skills required to manufacture high 
quality goods with small firms. Consequently, lead firms have been able to pursue joint 
innovation and to source specific skills, too costly to develop internally, from the outside. 
On the other hand, small firms have bypassed the problem of accessing patient-capital 
necessary for the design of new products and their international distribution. This case 
study has therefore shown that lead firms have set up a model of production which hinges 
on the introduction of capital-skill asset pooling and is conducive to expansion and growth 
in international markets. Moreover this structure builds on a fragmented and hierarchical 
supply chain populated by suppliers endowed with firm-, industry- and product-specific 
skills.   
 
In order to support this argument, the first section of the chapter provided a chronological 
bird’s eye view of the industry. It presented empirical details on the characteristics of the 
average firm, in Italy and abroad. The second section discussed stylised representations of 
the model of production applied by firms throughout the decades, ranging from the 
Fordist to the industrial district type. Furthermore it developed a stylised model which 
accounts for the industry’s performance today in light of the shocks which transformed 
the industry’s market structure in the nineties. The third section discussed the empirical 
evidence in support of the argument. The following chapter examines whether comparable 
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dynamics have characterised the development of Italy’s yacht building industry, an 
industry which only recently has been characterised by high levels of export growth. 
Although, the ship producing industry is compartmentalised into two segments, one 
producing “yachts and vessels for pleasure or sport” and the other producing “commercial”, 
as well as “military” vessels; the next chapter only investigates the export performance of 
the former over the past fifteen years. Moreover, the chapter will show that the sub-
segment of luxury and mega yachts has driven this success.    
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IV. CLUSTERS OF EXCELLENCE: CAPITAL-SKILL ASSET POOLING IN THE 
ITALIAN YACHT BUILDING INDUSTRY 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
Common knowledge associates the production of ships and vessels with large, oft state 
subsidised, vertically integrated ship yards; yet this is not completely accurate. Whilst this 
description fits producers of large “commercial and military” vessels - such as Fincantieri 
in Italy, and Daewoo Shipping in Korea (Shin and Ciccantel 2009), producers of “yachts 
and vessels for pleasure or sport” are often smaller. Moreover they tend to agglomerate in 
spatially concentrated production clusters characterised by the proximity to the sea and 
customer outlets, such as maritime resorts (Chetty 2004; Blundel and Thatcher 2005; 
Chetty and Agndal 2007; Tracogna 2007; Bacci 2009; Bruni and Carcano 2009; Tracogna 
2010). However, whilst this organisational model is widely recognised, a number of 
exceptions exist. Blundel and Thatcher (2005), for example, provide evidence on a yacht 
manufacturer not located in the proximity of a maritime resort (the German company 
Bavaria). Moreover, although the literature does not delve into this particular aspect at 
length, production clusters differ with respect to the following dimensions: the structure 
of inter-firm relations, the exchange of production assets which takes place within these 
networks and the governance mechanism which regulates them.   
 
For example, American firms located in the cluster of Southern Florida resent inter-firm 
relations which are not characterised by arm’s length spot market governance 
mechanisms (Blundel and Thatcher 2005); moreover, within these networks firms 
exchange finished products, characterised by codified technology. This appears to also be 
the case for British firms located in the Solent cluster (Blundel and Thatcher 2005).  On the 
other hand, New Zealand firms located in the Auckland maritime district have established 
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forms of cooperation and institutional coordination typical of industrial districts (Piore 
and Sabel 1984; Becattini 1990): within such production cluster firms exchange both skills 
and capital simultaneously, appear to be of similar size and endowed with homogeneous 
assets (Chetty 2004; Chetty and Agndal 2007). German yacht-building firms instead are on 
average larger in size and fulfil all manufacturing stages within vertically integrated 
structures of production; in addition, they tend to be largely disconnected from other 
firms (Blundel and Thatcher 2005 : 412-414). Also, Italian firms follow a different 
organisational structure from any of those briefly touched upon in the above.   
 
The multiplicity of production structures found in practice suggests that although 
producers of “yachts and vessels for pleasure or sport” (henceforward: yachts) are generally 
identified with small and medium sized firms located in spatially agglomerated clusters, 
quite significant variations from this standard account exist.  Especially variations in terms 
of the median size of firms, the inter-firm relationships entertained, and of the governance 
mechanisms which regulate these interactions.  
 
Building on the understanding that varieties of production structures exist in the yacht 
industry, this chapter proceeds to examining what mechanisms have allowed a sub-
segment of the Italian yacht industry to gain international prominence over the last 
decade. As the literature introduced above suggests, clusters are a useful interpretative 
tool to analyse the economic development of the luxury and mega yacht segment in Italy. 
In fact, the most successful Italian luxury and mega yachts manufacturers are located 
within industrial aggregations characterised by the homogenous specialisation of firms 
(i.e. clusters in Porter and Ketels 2009). Yet these clusters have evolved over time. In the 
sixties, flexible specialisation was the model of production employed. In line with what 
occurred in prototypical industrial districts, inter-firm relations were characterised by the 
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overlapping of cooperation and competition between firms. Yet, today both the model of 
production employed and inter-firm relations have changed. Capital-skill asset pooling has 
become the mechanism informing these inter-firm relations.   
 
This chapter shows that capital-skill asset pooling has enabled luxury yacht producers to 
reform their production organisation so as to successfully compete in international 
markets. The introduction of product modularisation transformed the model of 
production in place by rendering flexible specialisation increasingly hierarchical and 
regulated.  Within this system, small and large firms (suppliers and lead firms) pool the 
assets of production respectively obtained from Italy’s institutional framework: the 
specific skill and patient capital asset of production. The chapter shows that capital-skill 
asset pooling has taken on different features in accordance with the specific skills 
suppliers are endowed with: be they firm, industry or product specific. Yet, the 
introduction of capital-skill asset pooling, and the hierarchically disintegrated structure of 
production which derives from it, is not historically inherited.  Rather it is a by-product of 
the skewed-ness of Italy’s institutions towards differently sized firms. In Italy, once 
various yacht building (small) firms grew in size, they gained access to the patient capital 
asset required to enter international markets. Consequently they initiated a process of 
organisational readjustment which aimed at using the specific skill asset possessed by 
small firms, necessary to shift from craft to diversified quality production (Streeck 1991: 
31). 
 
This chapter explores these developments in detail.  Firstly, it takes a bird’s eye view of the 
industry as a whole and its evolution both from a domestic and a comparative point of 
view. The first section thus presents indicators capturing the industry’s performance over 
time, with particular reference to the mega-yacht segment. Secondly, the chapter 
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investigates the transformations in the organisational structure of production of Italy’s 
most successful firms, tracing back the different types of relationships in place between 
firms and suppliers up to the inception of capital-skill asset pooling. Thirdly the chapter 
compares two types of producers: internationally and domestically oriented firms – 
proxying for cases of unsuccessful firms. Moreover, this comparison offers support the 
thesis’ hypothesis: in order to produce high quality goods, Italian large and small firms 
must resort to capital-skill asset pooling so as to each obtain the missing institutional 
input factors35. Lastly, the chapter concludes by summarising the evidence presented and 
introducing the third case study.  
 
4.1 The Italian yacht and vessel building industry over time  
 
As already mentioned, over the past twenty years the Italian shipbuilding industry as a 
whole has exhibited a trend at odds with the rest of the macro-economy. The yacht and 
vessel building industry has in fact increased in size and revenues, continuously growing 
since the early nineties both internationally as well as domestically (UCINA, La Nautica in 
cifre, Editions from 2004 to 2009). Yet, if one were to analyse this industry in the seventies 
or early eighties one would be set back by the poor international trade performance 
displayed (Figure IV.1). The revealed symmetric comparative advantage for the ship 
building industry as a whole was constantly negative in the sixties, seventies and eighties, 
reaching troughs of -0.8 in the mid-seventies.   
 
 
 
                                                             
35 As with the study on the textile industry, this chapter systematises the mechanisms which account for the 
performance of successful firms through a combination of primary and secondary sources (see footnote #8). 
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Figure IV.1 793: Ships, boats and floating structures 
 
Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Rev. 2, 22 countries, Own 
Calculations 
 
Yet, since the late nineties the industry exhibits a very different outlook.  Not only 
domestically (see OECD STAN 2009), the industry’s u-turn is particularly striking with 
respect to the industry’s international position (Figure IV.1, where the graph uses a basket 
of comparison of 22 countries to construct the RSCA indicator that starts in 1961).  Over 
the past twenty years, the RSCA indicator improved by roughly thirty per cent.  Despite 
this increase, the product category “793: Ships, boats and floating structures“ fails today to 
breach the 0.5 benchmark set as capturing those sectors qualified by a revealed symmetric 
comparative advantage (see Ch.1 pp. 10) by only reaching a value of 0.2.  Nonetheless, this 
product category can be further decomposed into six subcategories, disaggregated at the 
fourth digit level of the SITC (Revision 3) classification (see Table IV.1 for details). This 
breakdown is justified as such categories capture heterogeneous industries, characterised 
by different consumer markets. 
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Table IV.1 SITC Rev.3 Product Classification, relevant breakdown 
793.1 - Yachts and other vessels for pleasure or sports; rowing-boats and canoes 
793.2 - Ships, boats and other vessels (other than pleasure craft, tugs, pusher craft, special-purpose 
vessels) 
793.3 - Vessels and other floating structures for breaking up 
793.5 - Light vessels, fire-floats, dredgers, floating cranes, and other vessels the navigability of which is 
subsidiary to their main function; floating docks; floating or submersible drilling or production platforms 
793.7 - Tugs and pusher craft 
793.9 - Other floating structures (e.g., rafts, tanks, coffer-dams, landing-stages, buoys and beacons) 
Source: (UN Statistics Division, 2009) 
 
Of these subcategories, one stands out for its development over time.  As opposed to all 
other product subcategories, the production of “793.1 - Yachts and other vessels for 
pleasure or sports; rowing-boats and canoes” (henceforward: yachts) has exhibited an 
exceptional trend, increasing by close to 200 per cent (Figure IV.2). The other 
subcategories instead still hold negative revealed symmetric comparative advantage 
values, though decreasingly so if compared to 1988. This further supports the claim that 
this sub-segment’s trade performance has not been within the norm. 
Figure IV.2 793.1: Yachts, other vessels for pleasure or for sports; canoes 
 
Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Rev. 3, 29 countries, Own 
Calculations 
UCIMA, the main employer association for the industry compiles statistics on the 
proportion of total global volumes of yachts and vessels for pleasure and sports produced 
by each country (Table IV.2). Although the proportion of total volumes produced by the 
125 
 
United States is striking, most vessels are domestically traded (Blundel and Thatcher 
2005). France, Italy and Germany appear to be the largest producers in Europe.  
Noticeably, Italy produces a larger proportion of global production than Germany, albeit 
less than France.   
 
Table IV.2 Global Production of Yachts as a proportion of total volumes 
 2003 2004 2006   2003 2004 2006 
USA 74.5% 78.1% 78.1%  Norway 0.8% 0.8% 0.6% 
France 3.7% 5.3% 5.7%  UK 1.3% 1.3% 0.5% 
Australia 3.8% 3.9% 3.8%  Portugal 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
Italy 2.0% 1.3% 2.5%  Netherlands 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Germany 0.5% 2.3% 2.3%  South Africa 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Finland 2.3% 1.9% 1.9%  Turkey 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Japan 1.8% 2.0% 1.3%  Denmark 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Greece 0.0% 0.0% 0.9%  Ireland 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
New Zealand 1.1% 1.0% 0.9%  Switzerland 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Source: UCIMA 2004, 2006, 2009, based on ICOMIA 2003, 2004, 2006 
 
4.1.1 The mega yacht industry  
 
Show Boats International, North America's premier luxury yacht publication and a point of 
reference for statistics’ collection for the industry, keeps track of the number of mega-
yachts produced yearly and by which country through its Super Yacht Order Book 
registrar. Yearly data starting in 1998 shows not only how the global supply of these 
products has significantly increased over the past ten years, but also that Italian 
production has followed this trend (Table IV.3 left).  Furthermore, the ratio of Italian to 
globally produced luxury yacht vessels suggests that today more than forty-five per cent of 
total vessels is produced in Italy, whilst only twenty per cent was Italian-produced in the 
late nineties (Table IV.3 right). 
 
 
 Table IV.3 World and Italian production of mega yachts (left); ratio of the two (right)
Source: (UCINA 2004, based on Show Boats International 2009 statistics
 
The same industry publication contributes to the compilation of the ranking of mega yacht 
producing countries based on the number of realised vessels (
and 2008 Italy has ranked first in this classification. The same publication reveals
the average length of vessels produced by country. This data shows that Italian produced 
mega yacht vessels are on average smaller than German ones, but that Italian firms 
produce fourteen times more mega
sub-segment of the industry is characterised by significantly greater unit values per unit 
produced, it appears that, by specialising in this industry niche, Italian firms have focused 
on the higher quality intensive segment.
 
How the above performance has been achieved will be investigated in depth in the 
remaining parts of the chapter, particularly with respect to how the organisational 
structure of production has changed over time. For now, the following section briefly 
presents details on the
yacht building industry. By so doing the differences with other competitor countries 
becomes apparent. 
 
 
 
Table 
-yacht vessels than firms in Germany. Given
 
 compositional and institutional structure of the Italian and foreign 
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Table IV.4 Mega Yacht Producing Countries: Ranking 2008 
  
No. of 
projects 
Average 
length 2008 
Average 
length 2007 
2007 
Ranking 
1 Italy 427 116 113 1 
2 USA 104 129 127 2 
3 Netherlands 65 161 166 3 
4 Germany 31 294 254 5 
5 Taiwan 71 95 97 6 
6 UK 57 101 94 4 
7 Turkey 38 137 144 9 
8 Australia 21 127  8 
9 China 23 96 110 10 
10 New Zealand 13 133 137 7 
Source: UCIMA 2009, Show Boats International 2009 
 
4.1.2 Compositional and institutional structure  
 
In Italy, the greatest concentration of vessel manufacturers is located in Lombardy, where 
there are 23.5 per cent of total firms and 19.1 per cent of total employees.  Noteworthy are 
also the concentration of employees in Tuscany (12.3 per cent), Emilia Romagna (19.2 per 
cent) and Piedmont (11.5 per cent). Respectively there are in Tuscany 10 per cent of firms, 
8 per cent in Emilia and only 3.5 per cent in Piedmont, suggesting that the average firm 
size is greater in Piedmont than in Tuscany or Emilia Romagna. The spatial location of 
component manufacturers follows similar trends: 32.1 per cent of total employees and 
29.3 per cent of total firms are in Lombardy. Liguria, Tuscany, Emilia Romagna and 
Piedmont follow in this order with respect to both the number of employees and of firms 
(data for 2008, obtained from UCINA 2004 : 102-103). The production of mega-yachts 
though is concentrated in Tuscany and Liguria (Bruni and Carcano 2009 : 19). In terms of 
firm size, less than 4.2 per cent of total firms employ more than 100 employees, and only 
6.1 per cent employ between 51 and 100 employees. The majority of firms are therefore 
very small as more than sixty percent of firms employ between 1 and 15 workers (33.9 
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employ 1-5 employees, 36.3 employ 6-15). The remaining firms (19.3 per cent) fall in to 
the 15-50 employee category (data for 2008, obtained from UCINA 2004 : 104). 
 
Size analysis therefore suggests that the majority of firms in Italy are small, and that a very 
small proportion of them employ more than 100 employees (less than 4.2 per cent).    
Moreover, they are mostly family owned artisanal or micro-firms where the internal 
presence of unions is limited. With respect to wage bargaining, no nationally agreed 
contract for the sector exists as this industry has yet to be legally recognised as a sector.  
Pay rates for workers in firms which employ more than fifteen workers are assigned 
following a variety of other industry contracts, spanning from the metalworking, to the 
chemistry, the wood and the textile contracts (CNA-Liguria 2002).  This also implies that 
no industry specific normative regulation exists despite the industry’s specific working 
conditions.  In light of the varieties of Capitalism literature, this finding is puzzling as wage 
coordination is crucial to curtail the ability of firms to poach workers and to provide 
workers incentives to acquire industry specific skills (Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001; 
Mares 2003).  It further suggests that the preconditions for high quality production are 
missing a priori.  
 
In addition, employee skill formation occurs on the job. Only a few technical schools exist, 
and are located in those areas where ship-building was historically rooted. Therefore 
employers and trade unions have voiced the need for better initial and (some) continuous 
training system to be set in place (Casini-Benvenuti 2002 : 26; CNA-Liguria 2002; ISMERI-
EUROPA 2006 : 23-31). Unions, in tandem with local authorities and employers, are 
initiating coordinated attempts to institutionalise forms of explicit vocational training.  An 
initiative jointly supported by employers, unions and the regional state in Livorno is 
currently attempting to set up a vocational training school (Accademia dei Mestieri) for the 
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provision of vessel-building formalised training; another one has been set up in the 
province of Forli by a handful of employer and union associations (CNN, Confartigianato, 
Ecipar and Formart) promoting forms of continuous upgrading in CAM/CAD technology 
for sail producers and designers (ISMERI-EUROPA 2006 : 27). Given the lack of formal 
vocational training structures, employees can only acquire skills through a process of 
learning by doing and on the job training in small firms. Large firms thus use the workers 
employed by small to satisfy their need for workers endowed with specific skills. In terms 
of accessing forms of patient capital financing, large firms located in Tuscany have 
established privileged relationships with banks, in particular with the Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena which caters to most of the largest yacht building firms. Not only, some have also 
listed themselves on capital markets in order to access greater volumes of capital.  
    
Table IV.5 Global Leaders: Sales and Employee Size Comparison 
 Country Sales (€ mill.) Employees 
Value added 
per 
employee 
Brunswick Group USA 1866 (2007) 12650 (2007) 0.148 
Azimut Benetti Group Italy 960 (2007-8) 2300 (2007-8) 0.417 
Ferretti Group Italy 933 (2006-7) >3000 (2009) 0.311 
Beneteau/Jeanneau 
Group France 799 (2006-7) 6000 (2008) 
0.133 
Sunseeker International 
Ltd. UK 350 (2007-8) 2350 (2008) 
0.149 
Source: (Tracogna 2010 : 45, based on KPMG LLP and company financial statements ) 
 
Internationally, a comparison of size and production of global lead firms suggests that 
Italian lead firms are on average much smaller than international counterparts (Table 
IV.5). A comparison of global lead firms’ sales value (in million of euro) and of employees 
suggests that Italian firms are indeed smaller than the rest. American and French firms are 
the largest in terms of employee size, yet this difference does not translate into 
proportionally greater sales. Actually, Italian firms are producing comparable numbers of 
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sales, when measured in € millions, despite the smaller firm size. Also, the sales to 
employee ratio36 may suggest either of two hypotheses: (1) that Italian yacht yards are 
significantly more productive than their international counterparts, or (2) that the 
number of employees fails to capture a more extensive web of inter-firm relations 
conducive to the production of these goods. Field level evidence cannot reject the former 
hypothesis given the country specific nature of the interviews, although cross country 
macro-productivity trends may suggest otherwise. The evidence collected has nonetheless 
substantiated the second hypothesis. The construction of inter-firm networks and the 
strategic distribution of production across sub-contractors have allowed Italian lead firms 
to translate an apparent structural size weakness into an asset.   
 
On the other hand, the organisation of production adopted in international shipyards 
diverges significantly from that by Italian firms. For example Taiwanese mega yacht 
producers, Horizon Yacht Company and Jade Yacht Company, are organised around highly 
vertically integrated structures of production (Yan 2008 : 477 and 480).  This is similar to 
the organisational set-up of Bavaria Yachtbau, which is aligned to that of a typical German 
machine tool company. Whilst important structural components are sourced from outside 
firms (notably the hull, produced by a Slovenian company, J&J Design), the production of 
remaining parts and their assembly are internal. Crucial to the Bavaria’s performance is its 
workforce, which does not appear to possess any traditional craftsmanship in boat 
building but only engineering skills, abundant in the region (Blundel and Thatcher 2005).  
Similar to the above is the production structure of Dutch yacht builder, Royal Huisman, 
which has also evolved over time into a vertically integrated structure (Bacci 2009 : 36).  
All production phases, spanning from the production of hulls to that of furniture is 
internalised (see also Section 4.3.1 in the Perini Navi subsection). Given the variety of 
                                                             
36 A very rough proxy for value added per employee given the mismatch in the data’s timing – i.e. firm level 
productivity. 
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organisational models identified, it is important to accurately identify the mechanisms 
which have led to the reorganisation of production structures amongst internationally 
competitive Italian ship yards. 
 
4.2 Changes in the organisational set-up of the industry 
 
The production of a mega yacht is a very complex process of multi-product and multi-
specialisation assembly (Delbridge and Edwards 2008 : 307-309).  Yet, this does not imply 
that horizontal disintegration is a necessary condition for production as examples of fully 
vertically integrated ship-yards show (see evidence on Taiwanese yacht producers’ 
vertically integrated structures in Yan 2008; as well as the Dutch examples of Heesen 
Yachts and Royal Huisman, or the German Luerssen in Bruni and Carcano 2009 : 33-36).   
 
Nonetheless, Italian mega yacht manufacturers, directly produce a very small proportion 
of a vessel; most parts are outsourced to subcontractors (Tosi 2004; Castelli 2008). For 
example, a mega yacht manufacturer does not invest in the skills to produce an engine, 
rather this will be purchased from specialised manufacturers instead (product specialists 
such as Volvo Penta, MTU – Motoren und Turbinen Union, and Caterpillar); it would not 
produce the internal furniture of a yacht, but subcontract this to carpenters and furniture 
manufacturers (as the close interaction between Tuscan naval suppliers and 
carpenters/wood manufacturers suggests, Bacci, Casini-Benvenuti et al. 2006); neither 
would it design helixes or propellers, rather resort to specialist technicians and 
consultants. Essentially, Italian yacht manufacturers have fully endorsed the practice of 
capital-skill asset pooling whereby lead firms provide capital (directly or indirectly) to 
small firms, in exchange for their skills – which they indirectly employ by outsourcing 
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production phases. Specifically, Table IV.6 shows how extensively fragmented this 
industry is in Italy today.  At least sixteen separate specialisations exist which contribute 
to the production of a yacht ranging from the production of accessories to structural 
components, engines, and internal decor. External design specialists too vary extensively, 
ranging from naval architects who design the hull and outside structure of a vessel, to 
sound and vibration engineers who explore the implications of that structure on the 
vessel’s resistance and sound proof-ness. Nonetheless, this fragmented production chain 
has exhibited significant structural changes over time, developing from a casual to a more 
structured and increasingly hierarchical organised production system.   
 
Table IV.6 Yacht Industry Sub-contractors in Italy of: 
Accessories 
Structural 
Components 
Engines 
Internal 
Decor 
Anchors; 
Cables and 
ropes; 
Safety 
devices; 
Windscreens 
and 
dashboards; 
Masts and sails;  
Windows, portholes 
and hatches; 
Engine rooms; 
Bodies, hulls and 
upper structures; 
Navigating devices; 
Electronic devices; 
Motors; 
Power 
generator; 
Furniture; 
Electronics; 
Lighting; 
Textiles; 
Source: (Bruni and Carcano 2009 : 96) 
 
In the sixties Italian ship yards were accustomed to purchase American fibreglass yachts 
and manufacture boats based on their in-house adaptation. In this way, they would gain 
knowledge of US technology in constructing vessels’ hulls and bodies – in particular with 
respect to the introduction of fibreglass which replaced wood as the main raw input 
(Bruni and Carcano 2009 : 17). By the seventies, Italian firms became stylistically 
emancipated from American firms and produced vessels aligned to European consumer 
preferences. For example: narrower as opposed to wider hulls were preferred by 
European buyers, whilst the opposite was true for US buyers. Consequently, European 
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producers would transform US-built vessels to satisfy the preferences of domestic 
European markets.   
 
Yet, shipyards were still very small in size. They engaged in craft production and were 
artisanal both from a productive and a managerial point of view. Flexible specialisation 
informed the allocation of production functions among firms (suppliers), and relationships 
with other firms were ad hoc, unstructured and motivated by demand fluctuations (refer 
to Castelli 2008 for anecdotal evidence on impromptu buyer-supplier relationships set up 
in order to complete orders). By the late nineties instead we observe a very different 
model of production organisation. Within it lead firms stand at the helm of a highly 
structured chain of subcontractors with which they engage in capital-skill asset pooling.  
In what follows, this section stylistically elaborates on the two structures of production. 
 
4.2.1 Impromptu production and the failures of the eighties 
 
Lead ship-yards (original brand manufacturers) in the seventies and eighties were on 
average smaller in size (Castelli 2008) and engaged in the craft production of yachts. The 
wave of mergers and acquisitions which resulted in the creation of larger enterprises and 
groups only began in the late eighties when Azimut Benetti, Perini Navi and Ferretti Group 
started incorporating smaller ship yards and specialised suppliers. Prior to this date, yacht 
producers were not specialised in a specific vessel segment but produced both smaller and 
larger, sail and motor-boats, pleasure, military and commercial vessels (see Baglietto 
testimony in Bruni and Carcano 2009 : 11).   
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In the seventies and eighties exchanges between firms were ad hoc and not strategically 
defined.  In terms of the input factors required for high quality (craft) production, all firms 
individually provided for its own capital and skills. The patient capital was obtained 
through the re-investment of retained earnings: this implied that the successful delivery of 
a vessel, i.e. the source of earnings, was causally linked to the presence or absence of 
retained earnings. Often, the failure to manufacture a vessel below the selling price - thus 
not allowing retained earnings to accumulate - would result in the financial bankruptcy of 
the firm.  This could occur in the event of production accidents or the miscalculation of 
initial costs.   
 
In terms of the various phases of production: the production of structural components, 
such as bodies (see Table 4.5), hulls and upper structures was internalised.  This was also 
the case for processes such as the plastering and painting of hulls which were (are) both 
capital and skill intensive.  Only the production of engines, accessories, and internal décor 
was outsourced to suppliers whose main market was not the yacht producing industry. 
For example, historical transcripts show that the conceptualisation and architectural 
project of a vessel would take place from scratch at each new commission, often with no 
actual planning or official project management (Castelli 2008). Moreover, this design 
would vary greatly according to the preferences of the future owners. Consequently, the 
skill needs of a lead firm were not explicit a priori to the actual commission. This implied 
that very few parts of the production process would thus be standardised, despite 
fibreglass technology had actually enabled firms to do so for the first time37. Production 
processes and supplier interactions were therefore still ad hoc and varied according to the 
crafting of a vessel.   
 
                                                             
37 The production of wooden based vessels, which preceded fibre-glass lacks the necessary characteristics for 
industrialisation because of the artisanal nature of the craftsmanship required. 
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Figure IV.3 Traditional Sub-contracting Model 
 
Source: Own representation 
 
Figure IV.3  captures the flow of these impromptu buyer-supplier relations.  They appear 
to be vertically arranged, with lead firms choosing suppliers based on demand fluctuations 
and time-contingent needs. Very often suppliers did not only cater a naval market, but 
resorted to ship-yard work only to increase profits. These suppliers were therefore not 
specialised in the production of yacht components, and possessed neither firm nor 
industry specific skills. This reinforced the likelihood of miscalculating cost estimates, 
delivering low quality goods, and increasing the probability of expensive time delays.  
Moreover, having to bare the full costs of providing patient capital and of training workers 
(own and of supplier firms), firms were prone to manufacturing errors and financial 
miscalculations. The thesis thus contends that this system proved to be less conducive to 
the export of vessels which competed both on timing and quality.  Since firms could not 
access a specifically skilled workforce directly, nor via a network of suppliers through 
Shipyard
Component Sub-contractors
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which workers would be trained, the cost of producing high quality yachts was 
uncompetitive. 
 
The insolvency of Cantieri Benetti, a historical Tuscan yard, is in line with this argument 
and reinforces this interpretation. At the time of the bankruptcy, Cantieri Benetti had 
significantly undervalued the costs of constructing Nabila, a 86 metres long mega-yacht.  It 
failed to factor in the penalties imposed as a consequence of its late delivery.  This was 
caused by Cantieri Benetti’s inability to approach the suppliers with necessary skills on 
time (Munsey and Pezzini 1992). The combination of these events led to Cantieri Benetti’s 
bankruptcy and its takeover by Azimut in 1985.  The merged company took the name of 
Azimut Benetti: currently one of Italy’s most important yacht producers (ICOMIA and 
Show Boats International 2009). A similar explanation accounts for the failure of another 
historical yard, Cantieri Picchiotti, which between1989-1990 was purchased by Perini 
Navi. Following these important failures and the subsequent take-overs, the nature and 
structure of sub-contracting relations started to change: consequently the industry’s 
production strategy moved from craft to diversified quality production. 
 
4.2.2 Hierarchical production chains and capital-skill asset pooling  
 
A wave of greater standardisation in processes, products and components followed these 
failures. This implied that, parallel to the growing demand for yachts, a number of 
suppliers who previously had engaged in ad hoc subcontracting practices now instead 
decided to specialise in servicing a yacht market explicitly. For example, TECNAV, a sound 
and vibration consultant firm, a process specialist, is founded in the late eighties.  
Besenzoni, which had first opened in the late sixties as a relatively unspecialised supplier, 
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commenced the production of its own range of gangways and cranes for yachts in the mid-
eighties. Boero, initially a constructions paint producer, began manufacturing specific 
nautical paints, as well as developing and producing the necessary machinery to spray a 
vessel’s hull.  
 
This increased specialisation of firms allowed a process of industrial restructuring to take 
place. Not only that, the increased specialisation of suppliers is followed by a parallel 
specialisation of lead firms away from the actual production of a vessel and towards the 
development and sales’ distribution which are associated with it. This specialisation was 
enabled by the inception of the practice of capital-skill asset pooling. Faced with the 
impossibility of accessing a pool of redundant skills, lead firms exploited the skills owned 
by suppliers directly. On the other hand, small firms realised that the closest substitute for 
accessing patient capital directly from banks was via lead firms, either directly or 
indirectly. By so doing, they tied themselves to firms capable of funding the production of 
high volumes of vessels and of distributing them internationally: thus they could 
emancipate themselves from a craft production.  
 
The practice of capital-skill asset pooling has given rise to a new system of production.  
Within this system, lead firms stand at the helm of a multi-level hierarchical structure 
where first and second tier suppliers differ in terms of their skill capabilities. Hence 
relationships between all actors are governed via heterogeneous governance mechanisms.  
Today lead firms perform the following functions: (a) they draw up an initial project 
design, independent of the preferences of buyers, which allows for the partial 
standardisation of structural parts (hull, body and upper structures); (b) they 
subsequently rally up specialist technicians and engineers whom they rely on for the 
development of technically innovative solutions to the initial project; (c) they organise the 
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highly complicated logistic phase which brings together component parts produced in 
different locations (essentially components produced by product specialists which can be 
located elsewhere); and finally, (d) they set up marketing, retail and customer service 
systems which are directly managed. These activities are capital intensive and are 
expected to incrementally further the technological frontier of each product. Small firms 
alone have traditionally been capitally underfunded and hence could not engage in such 
activities alone. Instead they take on the role of producing the goods developed by lead 
firm; although in line with the specific skill possessed, suppliers occupy different positions 
within this structure.  
 
Lead firms subcontract to those suppliers possessing firm-specific skills – i.e. first tier 
suppliers: (1) the technical design and development of specific component parts for which 
highly specific skills are required (these firms are usually made up by mechanical, naval 
and acoustic engineers); (2) the actual production of vessel bodies, hulls and upper 
structures; (3) their plastering and painting; (4) the electrical cabling and installation of 
electronic, ventilation and lighting systems; and (5) the production of vessel specific 
furniture, designed at the discretion of future buyers. These suppliers have developed 
both product specific and process specific skills. Moreover, lead firms interact repetitively 
with them so as to nurture and hone their firm-specific skills, sometimes also by funding 
joint research partnerships with them.   
 
Lead firms subcontract to other suppliers possessing product-specific skills: (6) the 
production of motors and power generators: (7) and the production of standardised ship-
ware (such as ropes, buoys and fenders for example).  These suppliers possess product 
specific skills only and lead firms engage in marked based relations with them.  Finally, 
first-tier suppliers rely on the productive skills of less specialised suppliers which hold 
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industry-specific skills (second and third tier subcontractors) in order to smooth 
quantitative fluctuations in demand. The fact that competition amongst these latter firms 
is price-based, because of a lack of clear product or process specialisation, allows first-tier 
suppliers to force down production costs. 
 
Technological innovation is to a large extent confined to the locus of the lead firm and the 
interaction between lead firms and first tier suppliers. Whilst first tier suppliers pursue 
new forms of technological innovation which are incremental and often process based; 
innovation in lower tiered suppliers only arises with the purchase of new machinery.  
Second tier suppliers which hold industry-specific skills are therefore passive innovators 
(CNA-Liguria 2002 : 65; Fravega and Bonatti 2006 : 52). Empirical observation suggests 
that any interaction between second tier suppliers and lead firms is rarely geared towards 
developing new innovative solutions to a problem or concept but towards smoothing 
demand fluctuations and cutting production costs (CNA-Liguria 2002 : 66; Fravega and 
Bonatti 2006 : 55). 
 
Despite the legal separation between lead firms and suppliers, lead firms have maintained 
control and oversight over suppliers through three mechanisms: firstly, outsourced 
specialist technicians report back to a lead firm’s research and project department.  These 
are populated by technicians with firm-specific skills, capable of exchanging know-how 
with suppliers. Secondly, as in the textile industry, lead firms employ inspectors – 
ispettori; they are technical experts who travel across supplier firms and control the ability 
of suppliers to meet the quality standards set. Thirdly, the outsourced manufactured 
functions are partially produced and assembled within the lead firm’s premises, thus 
facilitating the oversight of inspectors. Furthermore, being in charge of the logistical 
140 
 
phases involved in assembly and delivery attributes lead firms more extensive control 
over the timing and quality of the products sub-contracted. 
 
The application of capital-skill asset pooling delivers clear advantages to lead firms.  
Firstly it allows them greater organisational and numerical flexibility than a vertically 
integrated structure would. Secondly, by reducing the total burden of overhead costs, lead 
firms can employ the patient capital for research and innovation, marketing and 
distribution. Thirdly, this structure also allows lead firms to limit demands for firm level 
wage premia by firm level trade unions – which become mandatory once the number of 
workers employed meets the certain threshold of 15 employees (RSU, Rappresentanze 
Sindacali Unitarie, were institutionalised by the 1993 July wage bargaining agreement).  
Fourthly, since small suppliers produce for multiple firms (Casini-Benvenuti 2002), lead 
firms are levied of the social corporate responsibility to ensure employment levels 
throughout the local area even when negative demand cycle make way. On the other hand, 
capital-skill asset pooling delivers advantages to small firms as well.  Firstly, small firms 
are allowed to access wider, international customer markets despite the smaller size. 
Secondly, the negative implications of not being able to access patient capital are curtailed 
as lead firms may directly fund small firms’ technological upgrading directly (by 
purchasing machinery). In addition the use of inspectors facilitates both quality control as 
well as technology transfer from the large to the small firm. In addition, the smaller the 
size of the firms, the likelier the probability that second tier suppliers respond to 
fluctuations in demand through fluctuations in employment because of their ability to hire 
and fire employees with greater ease. This therefore suggests that the marginal 
profitability of small entrepreneurs remains constant.   
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In sum, the introduction of capital-skill asset pooling has led to the inception of a 
hierarchically disintegrated model of production. This structure of production allows lead 
firms to benefit from the variety of skills held by its suppliers. On the other hand it enables 
small firms to access patient capital and thus meet the two preconditions for high quality 
production. In the following section firm-level evidence which add details to these 
dynamics is presented. The firms selected are cases of internationally competitive and 
uncompetitive lead firms which have engaged in capital-skill asset pooling and thus 
constructed hierarchically organised systems of production.   
 
4.3 Internationally competitive and domestically oriented firms  
 
This section shows how the international competitiveness of lead firms of the likes of 
Azimut Benetti, Pershing Yachts and Perini Navi is related to the practice of capital-skill 
asset pooling and the consequent structure of production adopted. Secondly, the section 
also presents contrasting evidence drawn from case studies on domestically oriented 
firms, which have proven unable to access internationally competitive markets. This 
negative case study shows that the absence of capital-skill asset pooling forces firms to 
pursue a high quality market strategy individually. Given that the institutional framework 
does not endow all firms with patient capital and specific skills, such an endeavour will 
fail.  In the case discussed, firms are identified as possessing the required skills but not the 
necessary capital to enter a international retail and customer market.  
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4.3.1 Mega yacht production in Italy 
 
Azimut Benetti 
 
Azimut Benetti (henceforth A|B) is born out of the acquisition of the bankrupt yacht 
builder, Benetti, by Azmut in 1985 (see section 4.2.1) and is today a family owned 
enterprise. As a consequence of the merger, Azimut increased its workforce from twenty 
to 150 employees; thus developing from being a small producer into a much larger 
company. Initially Azimut struggled to adjust to the managerial and employment 
obligations which derive from the larger size (Tosi 2004; Bruni and Carcano 2009 : 281).  
Firm-level unions were in fact novel to Azimut’s management. As a consequence, A|B 
reorganised its internal organisational structure. More importantly, it increased the 
weight of suppliers in the production process and it modified the way in which it related to 
them. In accordance with the model of production presented in Section 4.2, A|B moved 
from a traditional subcontracting model to a hierarchically structured, multi-level model 
of production. It engaged in capital-skill asset pooling with its suppliers, providing them 
with direct and indirect forms of patient capital in exchange for their skills.  
 
Today A|B employs approximately 2500 employees and specialises in the production of 
yachts of varying size.  A|B is internationally identified as one of the leading luxury yacht 
producers (see Table IV.2): Show Boat International 2009 has ranked A|B as the first 
global leader in terms of sales revenue38. Yet, despite the notable sales and financial 
performance, A|B employs a smaller number of employees relative to its competitors.  In 
comparative terms it is therefore a small firm which produces high volumes of vessels 
through a disintegrated system of development and production.   
                                                             
38 See: http://www.azimutbenetti.it/home.html#/it-group/group_base/ 
143 
 
A|B is an industrial group composed of three manufacturing units and one unit dedicated 
to customer service: the former three units, of relevance to the thesis, are: Azimut Yachts 
which produces semi-custom mega yachts in fibreglass, Benetti S.p.A. which produces 
semi-custom mega yachts in iron/aluminium and fibreglass, and Atlantis which produces 
the smallest and most standardised vessels in the group’s product range (Bruni and 
Carcano 2009 : 264-265).   
 
The organisation of production in these three divisions differ: whilst Atlantis is located in 
Piedmont, nearby Turin, and produces standardised vessels through a vertcally integrated 
production process, the other two units are sparsely located throughout the north-
western coasts of Italy, from Tuscany to Liguria. The latter two units produce goods which 
fall in the luxury mega yacht, high quality, segment; whilst Atlantis goods pertain to a 
lower added value segment39.  In this case study the focus is to explain the organisational 
arrangements which are conducive to the production of high quality goods, and the way in 
which A|B has organised its relationships with suppliers in order to produce Azimut and 
Benetti vessels.   
 
As mentioned previously, the life-cycle of a vessel is segmented in three phases: (1) 
project design; (2) manufacturing; and assembly; (3) client relationships and after-sale 
services. During the first phase, A|B design offices interact with external specialists who 
contribute to the engineering phase of an architectural design. These external firms 
possess a highly specific expertise (such as TECNAV, Natucci, Zuretti, etc.). During the 
second phase all component parts of a vessel are produced and assembled: this is a highly 
complex phase from an organisational point of view as it is characterised by the most 
extensive outsourcing and collaboration between suppliers and lead firms. The cost 
                                                             
39 Over the last year, as a consequence of a global contraction in demand, only the Atlantis unit of the group has 
suffered the most from competitive pressures of Asian produced vessels (Interview number 34, Carcano).   
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partition of these separate phases is described below (Table IV.7): the table shows that the 
most expensive phase is the manufacturing and assembly one, accounting for 67 per cent 
of total costs (Rigolini 2007).   
 
Table IV.7 Cost partition of production phases for Benetti S.p.A. 
Project 
Development 
Construction 
of body, hull 
and upper 
structure 
Painting, 
internal décor, 
cabling 
Client 
relationships 
After-sale 
services 
13% 10% 57% 10% 6% 
Source: (Rigolini 2007 : 26, calculations based on company data) 
 
As a consequence of the employee costs associated with such a labour intensive phase, A|B 
has resorted to an interesting organisational set-up. These phases are therefore 
outsourced to small firms who operate within A|B premises; because of the proximity, 
these small firms interact with A|B employees and project managers. This set-up ensures 
continuous oversight as well as significant cost containments. Accordingly, at any point in 
time the Livorno site of A|B contains up to 1000 workers, only 200 of which are A|B 
employees. Whilst the production of the building structures of a vessel are becoming 
increasingly standardised, this is not true for the cabling and painting phases.  In order to 
cable a vessel, a variety of specialists are pooled together. For example, Foruno, Tecnel and 
Raymar provide lead firms, such as A|B, with navigational support software programmes 
which can be relatively standardised. Yet the cabling and installation of such systems on 
each vessel is a customised process, based on tacit knowledge which develops over time in 
line with the needs A|B and the capabilities of its suppliers. A|B outsources this phase, 
time after time, to Cantalupi: a local process supplier with considerable expertise in 
marine electric systems.  Ten A|B vessels were cabled by Cantalupi in 2007, for example.   
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This cabling phase is followed by the painting of a vessel.  This is a crucial and costly phase 
for which firm-specific expertise is required. A|B resorts to two sub-contractors: Storm 
and Yachting Protection of the Boero Group. As with the cabling example, these sub-
contractors are process specialists which bring their own firm-specific expertise and 
know-how to the manufacturing phase, thus allowing A|B to improve its own product.  
Within its own R&D department, A|B invests in the development of new architectural 
solutions as well as in developing new material and paints. This latter research has at 
times crossed Boero Group’s own research as a 2006 joint research project on the decay of 
maritime hulls between the two suggests. Some other firms and university bodies 
participated in this research project which was to some extent financially incentivised by 
the state (MIUR 2007).   
 
Figure IV.4 Development and manufacturing of an Azimut Benetti vessel 
 
Source: Own representation based on interviews conducted with the firm and suppliers, and evidence 
collected from firm-level publications and industry reports (FSS/ISS/PSS=firm/industry/product 
specific skills) 
AZIMUT BENETTI
Cantalupi; 
Boero Group;
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TECNAV; 
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Finally, the skills necessary for the production of the furniture components of a vessel are 
also sourced from the outside.  In this case, A|B calls on furniture subcontractors to pool 
their product-specific skills in exchange for the opportunity to enlarge their customer base 
and market outlets. One furniture subcontractor, Arredomare is a family firm which 
originally produced furniture for private houses. In the nineties, the firm chose to 
specialise in the production of ship-building furniture in light of the growing demand for 
such goods.  Today, the firm furnishes six yachts a year, four of which are A|B vessels.  This 
suggests that the relationship between the two has become routinised. Yet, not all 
furniture is produced directly by Arredomare.  Arredomare itself outsources parts of its 
workload to local artisans for the finishing and assembly of pre-cut parts. This process is 
price driven as the outsourcing is performed in an effort to limit production costs. A|B also 
resorts to firms with product-specific skills for the acquisition of engines and power 
generators. Volvo Penta, Caterpillar and MTU are the most frequent suppliers of such 
goods. A|B is therefore a frequent customer of these firms and with them enacts a clear 
exchange by using their skills and offering them a means to enlarge their customer 
markets.   
 
Therefore it appears that A|B distributes the various functions of the production of a mega 
yacht to firms with firm-specific skills for various reasons. Firstly, it does so in order to tap 
into their skills which are too costly to develop internally. Secondly, to develop new 
innovative solutions through a continuous interaction with these firms that have the 
specific know-how and A|B which has the capital to invest. This allows A|B to maintain 
and further the high quality of its products (captured by the double arrow in the figure 
above). Further these firms subsequently source part of their production to other 
suppliers, which hold industry-specific skills, in order to smooth production flows and 
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reduce costs. The above figure summarises this discussion (Figure IV.4). Firms which hold 
product-specific skills come into play when skills are causally linked to one specific 
product or process:  in this case the exchange is mono-directional whereby A|B sources 
the given product directly from such firm (see the red dotted line).   
 
Pershing Yachts 
 
Whilst Azimut Benetti is a case of a lead firm who grew internationally by offering patient 
capital and an international outlet to its suppliers in exchange for their skills, Pershing 
Yachts instead represents a case of a smaller enterprise which grows internationally once 
it pools its own skills with the patient-capital of a larger firm – Ferretti Group. However, 
Pershing Yachts too produces incrementally innovative vessels by relying on pooling of its 
own firm-specific skills with product- and industry-specific skills of other, small, firms.  It is 
located in the Marche region of Italy, between Fano and Senigallia. Therefore this case 
study shows that the introduction of capital-skill asset pooling into the supply chain, 
identified previously, is not Tuscan-specific, but occurs in other parts of Italy as well.   
 
Pershing Yachts was first founded in 1981, and is historically younger than A|B. The first 
time Pershing Yachts vessels came into the international spotlight in 1984, with the 
development of the “Pershing 45”. This was an innovative vessel which combined very 
high speed with greater comfort than its competitors (Ferrero and Fraternale 2007 : 114; 
Ferrero, Arteconi et al. 2009). Yet, although Pershing Yachts was exporting roughly 70 per 
cent of its total output at the time, the firm was still small in terms of size and revenues.  In 
1996, Pershing employed less than fifty employees. The organisation of production was 
essentially artisanal, building on the close links between Pershing and local artisans and 
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small firms; yet only a handful of vessels were produced and sold per year (less than 
twenty according to: Ferrero and Fraternale 2007). 
  
In 1998 Pershing was acquired by the Ferretti Group. This merger allowed Pershing to 
pool its skill assets with Ferretti Group’s capital: in practice it enabled Pershing to tap into 
the administrative, financial, productive and marketing resources of a larger group.  
Ferretti Group consists of a holding structure for eight yacht building companies40, located 
both in Italy and abroad, and is owned by Norberto Ferretti. Following the merger, 
Pershing’s production, revenues and employees increased. The number of vessels 
produced prior to the merger was 19; subsequently, 69. Revenues increased ten-fold and 
the number of employees increased five-fold (Figure IV.8). Pershing’s annex into the 
Ferretti Group implied that it could benefit from the group’s global distribution network 
(Zeppi 2007 : 17). This implied that Pershing could avoid the investment cost required to 
set up such a network from scratch for which large amounts of patient–capital are 
required.   
 
Table IV.8 Improved performance indicators for Pershing Yachts 
 
1998 
Pre merger  
2005 
Post merger 
Vessels produced 19 69 
Revenues €11 mill. ca. €106 mill. ca. 
Employees 44 240 
Source:(Ferrero and Fraternale 2007 : 114) 
 
The annex also implied that Pershing Yachts could benefit from the technological 
innovations of Ferretti’s research centre (AYT – Advanced Yacht Technology, and Ferretti 
Lab) which specialises in the development of basic vessel building materials, such as 
                                                             
40 Ferretti Yachts, Pershing Yachts, Itama, Bertram Yachts, Riva S.p.A., Mochi Craft, CRN S.p.A., Custom Line   
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fibreglass and plastics. It also implied that Pershing Yachts would minimise marketing 
costs by sharing them with Ferretti (Ferrero and Fraternale 2007 : 120); and finally it did 
not imply that Pershing Yachts ended all relations with its own sub-contractors, with 
whom it had built interactive relationships over time (Ferrero and Fraternale 2007 : 125).  
The figure below stylistically shows the way in which Pershing Yachts and the Ferretti 
Group interacted (Figure IV.5). 
 
Figure IV.5 Development and manufacturing of a Pershing Yacht vessel 
 
Source: Own representation based on interviews conducted with the firm and suppliers, and evidence 
collected from firm-level publications and industry reports (FSS/ISS/PSS=firm/industry/product 
specific skills) 
  
De facto this merger allowed a relatively small and niche firm to access the financial and 
organisational resources of a larger company: it built on the pooling of Pershing and its 
suppliers’ skills and Ferretti’s patient capital. This enabled Pershing Yachts to transform 
its high quality goods from artisanal products to diversified quality products. It also 
implied that its international reach expanded without suffering losses in terms of its 
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organisational autonomy and its ability to preserve the supply-chain relations it had 
constructed over time. 
 
Perini Navi   
 
Perini Navi was founded in 1983 and specialises in the manufacturing of sailing mega 
yachts.  By 2002, its global market share in the production of sail powered vessels greater 
than 150 feet reached 63% (Mediobanca 2003 : 81). Perini Navi’s technological advantage 
lies in the ability to produce very long vessels, powered by extensive surfaces of sails 
which can be - at will - entirely managed by a single individual. This ability derives from 
the sophisticated technology governing the folding and movement of sails inherited from 
the know-how developed by the founder’s previous experience in the production of paper 
and paper-folding machines41. Its main competitors are Wally Yachts (legally a French 
company which manufactures its vessels in Italy), Royal Huisman and Vitters Shipyards 
(from the Netherlands), Alloy Yachts and Fitzroy Yachts (from New Zealand).   
 
Perini Navi is a case of a young firm which has reached international heights by producing 
high quality and innovation intensive sailing yachts. This section follows its development 
and shows that this result has been achieved by applying capital-skill asset pooling to its 
structure of production. This is also done by comparing Perini Navi with one of its foreign 
competitors in order to highlight the different productive structures adopted. Having 
entered a very small and slow growing niche, Perini Navi employed some time to ascertain 
its leadership in a market populated by historically established competitors (mentioned 
above). However, by 2002 it satisfied 63% of market demand for this niche and ranked 
                                                             
41 Fabio Perini used  to produce tissue converting machines.  As he developed an interest in the production of 
sailing mega yachts, he sold his primary business, the Fabio Perini S.p.A. to the German group Krober in 1983.  
The technological knowledge which derived from tissue converting was inherited by Perini Navi. 
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second in terms of the length of the vessels produced (Show Boats International 2002 in 
Mediobanca 2003 : 78). It is therefore a case of a lead Italian firm in an industry 
characterised by very recent and sudden growth. The balance between internally and 
externally produced components, and the dynamic of capital-skill asset pooling varies 
slightly when compared to the cases presented above.  Perini Navi has not outsourced the 
production of the body/hull of a vessel, despite the labour intensive characteristics of this 
production phase. The company has instead chosen to maintain this phase within its direct 
control by investing and nurturing this firm-specific skill directly. It has done so by 
purchasing a shipyard in the Turkish industrial district of Tuzla in 1987-88.  By so doing 
Perini has maintained oversight over such an important production phase and has taken 
advantage of the lower production costs available abroad.  
 
Figure IV.6 Development and manufacturing of a Perini Navi vessel 
 
Source: Own representation based on interviews conducted with the firm and suppliers, and evidence 
collected from firm-level publications and industry reports (FSS/ISS/PSS=firm/industry/product 
specific skills) 
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This off-shoring step was guided by a two-fold necessity: first, to find manufacturing sites 
which allowed the build of such long bodies and hulls as the space availability in Tuscany 
was limited.  Second, having chosen to invest in developing and nurturing this firm-specifc 
skill directly, it selected a location where containing the costs of this labour intensive 
phase was possible. The same argument applies to the production of masts, also 
manufactured in the Tuzla site –the Yildiz yard42.   
 
Yet, as our previous case studies, Perini Navi does not fail to pool its patient-capital with 
other firms holding firm-, industry-, and product-specific skills. To do so, it continued to 
adopt a vertically disintegrated structured of production by organising a supply chain 
composed by small firms engaged in the remaining productive phases. For example, Perini 
sources its sails directly from a firm which has product-specific skills, North Sails, with 
whom it has constructed research partnerships geared towards the development of 
sophisticated sails materials (Bacci 2009 : 32). It resorts to specialist technicians who aid 
Perini in the process of development and design of a vessel (see the collaborations with 
TECNAV with respect to the sound proofing of the vessel’s living spaces, already 
mentioned in the A|B case). Moreover it resorts to firms holding firm-specific skills with 
respect to the cabling, lightning and furniture production/assembly of a vessel, just as was 
discussed for A|B. Estimates suggest that in 2001 Perini Navi resorted to a total of two 
hundred heterogeneously specialised sub-contractors (Bacci 2009 : 32) and that it has at 
times contributed financially to the purchase of machinery for some of its suppliers 
(Mediobanca 2003). These subcontractors resort to second and third tier suppliers with 
industry-specific skills in order to respond to demand fluctuations and to reduce their 
production costs.  Figure IV.6 summarises this discussion.   
                                                             
42 Note that the Turkish district of Tuzla has a long tradition in ship-building, though not necessarily 
specialised in yachts.  Therefore, Perini Navi opted for such location given the availability of coastline space 
and a skilled workforce. 
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In terms of cross-country comparison, Perini’s organisational structure is contrasted to 
that of Royal Huisman, a Dutch manufacturer. Though the Netherlands is not the closest 
empirical match to an ideal type coordinated market economy, it has nonetheless been 
placed at the strategic end of the coordination spectrum (Hall and Soskice 2001; Touwen 
2008). Therefore a comparison between a Dutch firm and Perini, which are direct 
competitors, shows how similar outputs are achieved through the application of capital-
skill asset pooling, despite the different institutional starting points.   
 
Royal Huisman is a historical Dutch shipyard founded in 1884.  Of specific reference to the 
thesis’ argument, the manufacturing of a Royal Huisman vessel is entirely integrated, 
contrary to a Perini vessel instead. This means that it employs a greater amount of 
workers directly and that the production/assembly of a vessel takes place within the 
company’s legal and physical domains: there is no inter-firm interaction with respect to 
production and assembly, and no asset pooling as all assets are expected to be held 
internally.  In sum, this section has presented firm level evidence collected through a 
variety of methods which have substantiated the claim that Italian mega yacht building 
firms have gained international prominence by engaging in capital-skill asset pooling with 
their suppliers. To do so they have set up a hierarchically disintegrated model of 
production.  The fact that successful lead firms interviewed are located sparsely across the 
country suggests that the industrial restructuring described is not a local phenomenon, 
but it extends to areas of Italy where capable suppliers and lead firms are located. The 
Rodriquez Group is an example of a lead firm based in Sicily which is internationally 
successful; an explicit study of the case was not performed as the firm produces carrier 
vessels and hydrofoils. Yet, the opinion of the experts consulted is that it employs a similar 
production model to the one discussed above, it is therefore possible that it too engages in 
capital-skill asset pooling with its suppliers. Having described in detail how these three 
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firms have re-organised the manufacturing process which lead to the development of 
internationally competitive products, we now turn our attention to a case of an 
internationally non-competitive set of firms.   
 
4.3.2 Servicing domestic markets in Friuli Venezia Giulia  
 
Given the difficulties of identifying an individual firm who performs negatively in 
international markets,  this chapter instead refers to a well known study performed by the 
Friuli Venezia Giulia (FVG) region reporting on the performance of local firms producing 
yachts (Tracogna 2007; Tracogna 2010). North of Venice, close to the eastern borders, in 
Friuli Venezia Giulia, there are at least four hundred artisanal firms, employing 4.5 
employees each, for a total of 1800 workers in the area, producing an average revenue 
stream per firm of ninety thousand euro (DITENAVE(1) 2010). Yet, on the whole, these 
firms only export less than sixteen per cent of total production (Tracogna 2010 : 164), 
substantially below the country average for the industry which is close to sixty (58.93) per 
cent of total production (Bacci 2009 : 23 based on UCINA statistics). Despite the high 
degree of customisation of production and the high skills of the artisanal workforce 
employed43, these goods fail to reach international customers and have remained tied to a 
local market. 
 
The literature suggests that three factors can explain this phenomenon: (1) the absence of 
lead firms; (2) the failure of firms to invest in formal marketing strategies and related to 
that the absence of product specific distribution chains; and (3) a limited investment in 
research and innovation (DITENAVE(2) 2010 : on the underlying rationale for the creation 
                                                             
43 Each new worker performs apprentice duties of on the job training for a long period before being employed 
as a regular worker. 
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of an institutional mechanism to promote innovation, research and training; Tracogna 
2010 : 168-170). These factors have been identified through a survey based research 
strategy geared towards identifying the needs of local firms.  Crucially, these factors relate 
closely to the argument of the thesis. The thesis’ argument identifies the practice of 
capital-skill asset pooling as a mechanism through which firms endowed with different 
assets can come together in order to pursue a high quality product market strategy 
although the institutional preconditions to do so are not in place. Specifically, large and 
small pools together the patient capital and specific skills, necessary for such a strategy. 
Through the patient capital large firms detain the ability to frontload the necessary 
financial resources to set up a product distribution network and appropriate marketing 
strategies. In the Pershing Yachts’ case for example this occurred once the company was 
annexed to the Ferretti Group. The absence of larger firms, capable of accessing such 
sources of financing, translates into the lack of such distribution and marketing networks, 
necessary means to reach non-local customers.   
 
Moreover the studies performed by DITENAVE acknowledge that innovation occurs 
infrequently because of one structural feature of the organisation of production processes: 
artisanal firms from the Friuli Venezia Giulia area appear to be vertically integrated 
(Tracogna 2010 : 167). Consequently, all innovation develops internally, increasing the 
risks associated with it and decreasing its likeliness. Rather than simply promoting the 
development of inter-firm networks, capital-skill asset pooling would indirectly enable 
such risks to be pooled between small and large firms. The failure of FVG local firms to 
articulate capital-skill asset pooling within a network of firms has resulted in the 
production of artisanal goods which target a domestic market and fail to reach 
international consumers. Moreover, as neighbouring firms in the nearby Balkans area are 
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growing, the FVG firms are increasingly suffering the competition from comparable and 
less expensive vessels. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the introduction of capital-skill asset pooling as the 
mechanism driving interactions across firm networks has allowed the (luxury and mega) 
yacht segment of the Italian ship-building industry to become internationally successful. 
Capital-skill asset pooling has allowed firms faced with production problems, arising from 
the absence of the necessary input factors, to offer the available assets in exchange for the 
missing one. Specifically, this chapter shows that three internationally successful 
companies (Azimut Benetti, Pershing Yachts and Perini Navi) have altered their mode of 
production organisation to embrace a vertically disintegrated structure of production. 
This is contrary to previous practise as throughout the sixties, seventies and eighties, 
yacht manufacturing firms were much smaller in size and horizontally disintegrated. 
Components were outsourced to external suppliers for production but were internally 
reassembled.  Production assets were not pooled but purchased in a way which gave way 
to a wave of industrial failures in the eighties.  
 
As a consequence of these failures, small fragmented firms were rearranged to form a 
verticalised chain of suppliers by lead firms. This structure was pursued so as to allow the 
latter (lead firms) to exchange the patient capital asset with the (firm, industry, product)-
specific skill asset held by smaller firms. By so doing, these firms devised an alternative 
industrial structure which enabled this exchange and facilitated the pursuit of a high or 
diversified quality product market strategy. Crucially lead firms have come to rely on 
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pooling the skills of suppliers to such an extent that we witness the beginning of a process 
of formal institutionalisation of the first tier of this supply chain.  At least for one empirical 
case, Azimut Benetti, there is evidence of an A|B-led initiative to sign five-year contracts 
with its most important suppliers in order to guarantee a continuous flow of commissions 
during the recent downturn and to ensure that crucial skills do not disappear (Benetti 
2008). Yet, whilst in Italy approximately seventy per cent of total production is exported, 
some firms have retained a domestic outlook only (UCINA 2004 : 13).  These firms, as the 
ones in the Friuli Venezia Giulia district, differ from internationally competitive producers 
in two important respects: firstly, the average size of domestically oriented firms is 
smaller suggesting the production assets attained through Italy’s institutional system are 
homogeneous. Secondly the model of production organisation adopted differs: the firms of 
the Friuli Venezia Giulia district are vertically integrated and rarely resort to other firms.  
Internationally oriented firms instead have structured their system of inter-firm relations 
in such a way that final goods result from the combination of externally produced as well 
as internally developed components.    
 
This argument has been articulated in the chapter as follows: the first section provided a 
chronological bird’s eye view of the industry and empirical detail on the characteristics of 
the average firm both in Italy and abroad. The second section instead developed a stylised 
model accounting for its changed performance; translating the thesis’ argument into an 
industry specific one. The third and last section presented the empirical evidence in 
support of the argument. This case study has therefore shown that lead firms have set up a 
productive environment conducive to success in international markets. They have done so 
by orchestrating a transformation of the chain of suppliers and sub-contractors employed, 
and promoting the technological development of some – at times even financially – so as to 
construct innovative partnerships with them. 
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The next chapter presents evidence of an industry which has instead worsened its 
performance over time. In Italy, the nascent computer industry failed to retain a 
competitive international position in the mid-seventies, as had been the case in the mid-
sixties. Although attempts had been made by Olivetti management to pool its capital with 
skilled suppliers, a mismatch of skills crippled the project from the start. The computer 
industry represents a case of a well performing industry which lost international 
momentum once capital-skill asset pooling failed to be implemented.   
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V. THE FALL OF AN ITALIAN GOLIATH: FAILED CAPITAL-SKILL ASSET 
POOLING IN THE ITALIAN COMPUTER INDUSTRY 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
Little computer production or development takes place in Italy today44.  Yet, in the 1960s, 
few imagined this to be the case. In its earliest days, computer technology developed 
within large, vertically centralised, conglomerates which produced typewriters (in the 
sixties), then mainframes and minicomputers (in the seventies). Italy hosted one of the 
most important producers of such goods, Olivetti. Italy’s international performance, 
measured in terms of the RCSA, was positive up until the early seventies; the unit value of 
its electro mechanic calculators was 7.545 (Gallino 1960; Gallino 2001 : 90) and Olivetti 
ranked as high up as US giants such as IBM and Apple in terms of sales and exports; it 
employed over 60000 workers at home and abroad. Regrettably, today the outlook for the 
computer industry in Italy is completely different. The RSCA indicator has turned negative 
and Olivetti itself no longer exists as a computer manufacturer (although this chapter 
shows that there is a lag between the worsened international performance of the Italian 
computer industry abroad and Olivetti’s demise).   
 
The literature offers numerous explanations of why Olivetti failed: financial indebtedness 
(Bricco 2007; Bricco 2009), the absence of a national industrial policy (Gallino (a) 2003; 
Gallino (b) 2003), and the lack of financial support from Italy’s banks (Piluso 2005) have 
been recurrently identified as the main causes of its demise.  Yet, this literature invariably 
links the demise of Olivetti with that of the computer industry in Italy as a whole.  This 
                                                             
44Let aside few software firms which spin off the Sant’Anna University of Pisa[Biagiotti, A. and L. Burroni 
(2001). Between Cities and Districts: Local Software Systems in Italy Changing Governance of Local Economies 
Responses of European Local Production Systems. C. Crouch, P. Le Galès, C. Trigilia and H. Voelzkow, Oxford 
University Press.] 
45 Meaning that the price of a calculator amounted to the cost of production times a factor of 7.5. 
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chapter suggests that the two are not as tightly correlated as the literature contends: as a 
matter of fact the link between the two broke down in the late seventies when Olivetti 
pursued a foreign development strategy. Instead this chapter suggests that, to correctly 
place the Olivetti experience in the context of the Italian computer industry, these 
accounts should be integrated with one focusing on the actual processes of production and 
development, and their interaction with a country’s institutional framework.   
 
This chapter argues that the concept of capital-skill asset pooling is useful to understand 
the transition of this industry from success to failure. By tracing the experience of Olivetti 
over the years, the chapter shows that the industry’s deteriorated performance in Italy is 
ultimately sanctioned by the emergence of a capital skill asset mismatch between the skills 
sought by Olivetti and those provided by its suppliers. As a matter of fact, in Italy the 
combination between the necessary capital and skills needed to participate in the process 
of radical innovation, which characterised the computer industry in the eighties, fails to be 
appropriate. This is not true abroad (particularly in the US and to some extent in the UK), 
hence explaining why Olivetti’s demise is posterior to that of the Italian computer industry 
as a whole. In order to fully appreciate this argument though, it is crucial to understand 
the developments and transformations which took place in the computer industry 
throughout the 1960~1990s period.  
 
Whereas the models of capitalism literature associates the development of modern 
computer technology (ICT) with liberal market economies (Lundvall 1992; Casper 2001; 
Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001) this was not necessarily the case 
in the industry’s early years.  Initially, computer technology had a mechanical and electro-
mechanical flavour calling for a set of skills that Italy’s computer manufacturers had 
mastered.  Italian typewriters, mainframes and mini-computers were of very high quality 
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(according to the empirical methodology outlined in Ch.1). Yet, the invention of the first 
personal computer (1975) produced a shock wave throughout the industry, leading to the 
transformation of its underlying technological and organisational set-up (Langlois 1990; 
Grove 1997; Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999; Bresnahan and Malerba 1999; Malerba, 
Nelson et al. 1999).   
 
Until the eighties, all office equipment machines, including the first machines with digital 
technology, were produced within vertically integrated companies, yet the advent of 
microprocessor and of PC technology forced a decentralised structure to take root.  This 
occurred because software and hardware technology were de-bundled (Cloodt, 
Hagedoorn et al. 2006; Cloodt, Hagedoorn et al. 2010); and modularisation and 
specialisation drove the allocation of production processes throughout the industry 
(Langlois 1990; Grove 1997; Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999; Bresnahan and Malerba 
1999; Malerba, Nelson et al. 1999)46. Moreover, the technological innovation brought 
about by the microprocessor also implied that the industry’s approach to innovation 
shifted from incremental to radical - thus requiring a very different set of assets of 
production. Although the models of capitalism literature is under-theorised with respect 
to the preconditions for radical innovation, the available literature suggests that impatient 
(outsider share) capital is deemed necessary (Herrmann 2009 : 60 and 105) and (high 
and) general skills sufficient for it to take place (Hall and Soskice 2001).   
 
As discussed in depth in Chapter 2, Italy’s institutional framework is neither akin to one 
found in liberal or coordinated market economies. Simply, it endows differently sized 
firms with heterogeneous assets, the sum of which is shown to enable the production of 
high quality goods and incremental innovation (Ch. 3 and 4). Yet, in the eighties, the 
                                                             
46 Also confirmed by primary source: interview with R.Maglione. 
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invention of the micro-processor gave way to a process of radical innovation which 
required different assets of production: namely, (high and) general skills and (outsider 
share) impatient capital. Regrettably, computer manufacturers in Italy were not able to 
match these transformations as the skills offered by workers were industry specific.  
Capital-skill asset mismatch followed because although a company with impatient capital 
existed, firms with the set of skills required to perpetrate radical innovation did not.   
 
The chapter proceeds as follow: first a micro-sectoral analysis of the Italian computer 
industry over time is provided. Then, Olivetti and the standard explanations of its decline 
are briefly introduced. Section two applies the thesis’ argument to Italy’s computer 
industry and acknowledges the industry’s transformation which followed the introduction 
of personal computer technology. Section three shows how Olivetti reacted to such 
transformations and thus provides evidence for the capital-skill asset mismatch that arose 
in Italy and not abroad. The chapter concludes by arguing that the failure of the “new 
course” strategy sanctioned the end of the computer industry in Italy; managerial 
decisions to move into telecommunications account for Olivetti’s downfall as a computer 
manufacturer.   
 
5.1 A bird’s eye view of the computer industry 
 
The ICT/computer industry proceeds from the technological developments of the 
typewriting, calculating and office-equipment industry. This section looks at the industry’s 
growth trajectory over time and the role played by Italy in it.  It then provides a brief 
historical account of one the industry’s major players, Olivetti.   
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5.1.1 Italy’s computer industry over time  
 
The first indicator used to describe Italy’s international performance in the computer 
industry is the revealed symmetric comparative advantage, employed by this research as a 
proxy for international competitiveness. The two product categories analysed by this 
chapter are summarised in the following table (Table V.1, items in bold).  
  
Table V.1 SITC Rev.3 Product Classification, relevant breakdown 
751 – Office machines 
751.1 – Typewriters and word-processing machines 
751.2 – Calculating machines; accounting machines, postage-franking machines, ticket-
issuing machines and similar machines, incorporating a calculating device; cash 
registers 
751.3 – Photocopying apparatus incorporating an optical system or of the contact type, 
and thermo-copying apparatus 
751.9 – Other office machines (e.g., hectograph or stencil-duplicating machines, 
addressing machines, automatic banknote dispensers, coin-sorting machines, coin-
counting or wrapping machines, pencil-sharpening machines, perforating or stapling 
machines) 
 
752 – Automatic data-processing machines and units thereof;  
magnetic or optical readers, machines for transcribing data onto data media in 
coded form and machines for processing such data, n.e.s. 
752.1 – Analogue or hybrid (analogue-digital) data-processing machines 
752.2 – Digital automatic data-processing machines, containing in the same housing at 
least a central processing unit and an input and output unit, whether or not combined 
752.3 – Digital processing units, whether or not presented with the rest of a system, 
which may contain in the same housing one or two of the following types of unit: 
storage units, input units, output units 
752.6 – Input or output units for automatic data-processing machines, whether or not 
presented with the rest of a system and whether or not containing storage units in the 
same housing 
752.7 – Storage units, whether or not presented with the rest of a system 
752.9 – Data-processing equipment, n.e.s. 
Source: (UN Statistics Division, 2009) 
 
 The product category “751 Office Machines” is shown in 
highly positive RSCA and RSUV in the early sixties
mechanical machines to analogue data processing machines, the product category “752 
Automatic data-processing machines, and units thereof” is analysed as well.  
graphs below describe the development over time of the 
advantage indicator.  They suggest that Italy’s international performance with respect to 
the production and export of “office and automatic data processing machines” severely 
deteriorated over time
indicator for office machines exhibits a downward trend (
the early sixties capture
sold through most of Western Europe, north and South America.  
 
Figure V.1 Office machines (top)
                                                            
47 As a clarification, it is worth noting that “digital automatic data processing machines” are better understood 
as modern day computers. “Analog automatic data processing machines” were instead their fore
the by-products of mechanical and electr
Appendix 3
47.  As the industry evolves from 
revealed symmetric comparative 
, despite a peak in the early sixties and seventies
Figure V.
 the period when Italian typewriting machines were produced and 
 
; Automatic data processing machines (bottom)
 
o-mechanical technology.    
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The two 
.  The RSCA 
1).  The high values of 
 
 
-runners and 
 Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2009, Own Calculations
 
Year-to-year data suggests that the RSCA indicators for “751” and “752” swung from 
highly positive to highly negative (note that 0.5 is recognised as the benchmark for tra
success) (Figure V.1).  Moreover, though other product categories have 
in time - held larger RSCA values, what is most peculiar 
turnaround: from the sixties and seventies’ success to the failure of the following 
decades48. The second set of indicators employed to assess the performance of the 
computer industry in Italy look at numbers of firms and em
Unfortunately, statistical data which is disaggregated to such an extent which is warranted 
by this thesis is not always available and in particular when concerning macro
variables such as employment
statistical office (ISTAT) has been collecting data on firms for the national census on 
industry and services since 1951. 
years and is available up to 2001; additionally there is an extra data point for 1996.  The 
level of disaggregation though is not satisfying as it is not comparable to the statistical 
                                                            
48 As discussed in chapter 1, failure is captured by the negative value of the RSCA indicator and of the RSUV 
indicator.   
to this industry is its dramatic 
ployees for the industry.  
, unemployment, and production. 
This data collection process has been repeated every ten 
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classification methods applied by the OECD when collecting trade data, nor is 
correspondence between the two classification methods possible as ISTAT only converted 
to a NACE-based classification system in 1991 (ATECO-91). The category “3112 Electric 
and Telecommunication Machines” captures a greater scope of activities than those 
strictly correlated to the production of office machines and computers.  Yet the ISTAT 
census is the only one to report data so back in time, at such a disaggregated level.   
 
Figure V.2 3112 Electric and Telecommunication Machines (Italy) 
 
Source: ISTAT, Censimento Industria e Servizi 1951~2001, Turin province 
 
To render these statistics meaningful, only data for electric and telecommunication firms 
and workers in the province of Turin has been collected (Figure V.2). The reason for this is 
linked to the geographic location of Olivetti and its domestic suppliers in the sixties.  
Moreover this approach is justified by the fact that this industry can be quite confidently 
identified with Olivetti until the mid eighties. Nonetheless, the purpose of these statistics is 
to show the size of the increment in total employment which was registered by the 1961 
and 1971 census, roughly a 90 per cent increase. Already by the 1981 census these 
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numbers had started declining; between the 1981 and up to the 2001 census the data 
exhibits a 40 per cent collapse in total employment. With respect to the data on the 
number of local firms active in the area in this industry we observe a dramatic increase 
between the 1971 and 1981 data points of close to 150 per cent, whereas the eighties 
decade witnesses a decrease (Table V.2).    
 
Table V.2 Growth rate of number of firms in the Turin province 
1971-1981 1981-1991 1981-2001 
153% -2% 10% 
Source: ISTAT, Censimento Industria e Servizi 1951~2001, Turin province, Own Calculations 
 
Therefore, also from a macroeconomic point of view – keeping in mind the limits of the 
statistics employed – it appears that in the early seventies the level of total employment in 
this industry reached heights no longer replicated in the following years.  It also appears 
that the number of computer firms increased substantially during the 1971-1981 period, 
to then stabilise at the level reached in the early eighties. These statistics suggest that new 
firms had become smaller and smaller in size in light of the reduction in total employment. 
Moreover, the latter statistics also reinforce the claim that this industry performance 
pattern moved from highly positive to highly negative   
 
5.1.2 Olivetti: the Goliath of the Italian computer industry 
 
Olivetti was a family-owned company, located in Ivrea inspired by Taylorist production 
principles. It not only provided employment to the local population but also set up local 
welfare provision and educational systems. From 1946 to 1959, Olivetti was subjected to a 
number of radical industrial transformations. These changes were empirically accounted 
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for by Luciano Gallino (Gallino 1960) – see Table V.3 below. His studies treat 1946 as the 
base year and reveal that by 1959 there had been a substantial investment in physical 
capital, which lead to increased production, productivity and employment. Additionally, by 
1959 Olivetti owned nineteen global subsidiaries (Bricco 2009 : 8) and had founded 
production plants in Spain, Scotland, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa (Barbiellini 
Amedei, Goldstein et al. 2009) 
  
Table V.3 Olivetti firm level performance, 1946-1959 
 1946 1959 
Physical capital 100 1050 
Production (total) 100 988 
Production (per unit of lab. Per hour) 100 479 
Employees (Italy) 100 265 
Employees (globally) 100 1276 
Source: Gallino 1960 
 
In the early sixties, Olivetti was the first office equipment manufacturer to employ 
sophisticated mechanics. This allowed it to move away from the production of typing 
machines and to become a global producer of calculating machines (if we take 1949 as the 
base year and give it a value of 100, Olivetti was producing 639 typing machines and 6652 
calculating machines in 1959) - laying the foundations for analogue and electronics 
technology to develop. Consequently, Olivetti developed the Elea 9003, a digital electronic 
mainframe, used to process business data49 (Torrisi 1998 : 77) which was extraordinarily 
successful both in Italy and abroad (Bricco 2009 : 22).   
 
Yet the costs associated with the technological investment and with the foreign takeover 
of the US-based corporation, Underwood (Learned, Christensen et al. 1965), were high.  
                                                             
49 This machine was designed by Ettore Sottsass and was considered to be such a technological and design 
frontrunner that it was put on show at the MoMA, New York City.  Rumour has it that IBM was working on a 
similar product and had indeed put one on sale, yet it was found to be faulty (interview Matteo Olivetti). 
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Consequently Olivetti was recapitalised by IRI50, Mediobanca and a consortium of 
investors (Piluso 2005 : 110-112). Following, new electro-mechanic (Elea 6001, Lettera 
32) and electronic products (Olivetti Programma 101) were developed. Yet financial 
concerns re-emerged as demand slowed down in the late sixties. Olivetti’s debt rose to 
159.2 billion lira and that of the Olivetti Group to 334.6 billion lira (Bricco 2009 : 114).  
Total debt to revenue ratio increased to approximately 70 per cent (Figure V.3).   
 
Figure V.3 Total debt to revenue ratio 
   
Source: (Bricco 2009 : 180) 
 
The company experienced a second financial turmoil, worse than the previous one.  It 
faced growing pressures both from the outside, in the form of the growing cost of servicing 
its debt, as well as from the inside, in the form of a growing wage bill.  The solution sought 
involved a syndicate of banks and industry (Mediobanca, Pirelli, Banca Centrale Italiana) 
driven by Carlo De Benedetti, which took over from the Olivetti family in 1978. Once 
settled, De Benedetti was confronted with the need to address the company’s 
technological backwardness. As a matter of fact, in light of the technological upheaval 
                                                             
50 Italy’s public institute for industrial reconstruction. 
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brought about by PC technology, Olivetti technology and products had become outdated 
by the late seventies. De Benedetti attempted to restore the company’s past 
competitiveness by implementing a new productive strategy.  It focused on building R&D 
partnerships and restructuring the model of production organisation, in line with 
transformations which were taking place in the US as well.  Yet the strategy did not bare 
the desired fruits.  Although Olivetti had become the third producer of PCs globally (by 
virtue of the international partnership constructed), it was lagging far behind IBM and 
Apple (Datamation, 15 June 1986 in Colapinto 2006).   
 
5.1.3. Standard explanations of Olivetti and the Italian computer industry’s decline  
 
The question of what lies behind the fall of Olivetti and the demise of Italy’s computer 
industry has been previously addressed by the Italian literature. Financial indebtedness 
(Bricco 2007; Bricco 2009) and the lack of financial support from Italy’s banks (Piluso 
2005), or the absence of a national industrial policy able to support Italy’s strategic 
industrial sectors (Gallino (b) 2003; Gallino(a) 2003) have been offered as explanations. 
Although, these factors were indeed at play, this thesis suggests that they only magnified 
the organisational problem faced by Olivetti. Moreover, this chapter shows that these 
accounts fallaciously link the demise of Olivetti with that of the Italian computer industry 
as a whole, whereby Olivetti had instead regained a competitive advantage in the early 
nineties through a strategy of international partnering and acquisitions. In what follows, 
this section briefly explores and counters these standards explanations.  
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 Financial indebtedness and the opposition of the “salotto buono” 
 
Between the mid-sixties and early-nineties Olivetti was subject to three financial crisis as 
it struggled to repay the accumulated debt; Bricco (2007, 2009) and Piluso (2005) argue 
that the way in which these crisis were addressed laid the foundations for the company’s 
demise in later years. In 1963, Olivetti owed foreign and domestic banks 118.5 billion lira 
(Bricco 2009 : 36).  In order to relieve the financial constraints that these debts involved, 
Visentini (IRI) and Cuccia (Mediobanca), in conjunction with Italy’s industrial 
establishment51 (Agnelli, Pirelli), set up a consortium of  investors willing to recapitalise 
the company (Piluso 2005 : 110-112; Bricco 2009).  The condition set for this joint rescue 
involved the reduction of R&D investment in the nascent electronics industry: Mediobanca 
and FIAT’s management (Valletta) believed electronics was a weed which required 
removal (Bricco 2009; Gallino(a) 2003; Piluso 2005). 
 
Despite Olivetti’s first financial crisis had been resolved, in the early seventies the 
company was once more confronted with a period of financial turmoil. As demand for 
Olivetti products had waned, Olivetti’s management urged IRI to increase its share of 
capital in Olivetti so as to finance the technological renovation of its product base.  IRI’s 
refusal52 forced Olivetti to once more indebt itself significantly leading to a second 
financial crisis resolved by the arrival of a new investor, De Benedetti.  In conjunction with 
Italy’s industrial establishment (Mediobanca, Pirelli, Banca Centrale Italiana), an ailing 
Olivetti was once more recapitalised (Bricco 2009 : 163). 
 
                                                             
51 Also called by the Italian press and literature “salotto buono milanese”. 
52 This refusal was justified in part by Italy’s 1936 Banking Law (Royal decree of March 12 1936; n.375) which 
forbade banks’ ownership of industrial enterprises; in 1949 the CICR further stipulated that whereby a bank 
participated to a consortium of investors, total share ownership could not be greater than 50% of the 
company’s capital (which would have been the case for Olivetti); in part by IRI’s (with the approval of 
Mediobanca and FIAT) strategic investment in the chemical industry instead. 
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Despite the organisational restructuring which the new management pushed through and 
the international partnerships it constructed (Bricco 2007 : 328; following section for 
further details), in the late eighties Olivetti was once more confronted with the problem of 
repaying its debts (equal to 8872 billion lira in 1989). The total debt-to-revenue ratio had 
once more approached the high levels observed in the mid-seventies (Graph V.3). In the 
face of cyclical and continuous liquidity shortages, Bricco argues that Olivetti’s 
management (embodied by R. Colaninno) eventually chose to exit the computer industry 
in the mid-nineties and move into the recently privatised Italian telecommunications 
industry as the investment required to reshape Olivetti was thought to be too large (Bricco 
2007 : 329).   
 
Absent national industrial policy 
 
On the other hand, Gallino repeatedly asserts that the decline of Italy’s computer industry 
is not only linked to the company’s financial weakness, but (and more importantly) in the 
absence of an appropriate, national level, industrial policy capable of supporting strategic 
industrial sectors (Gallino(a) 2003). Contrary to other European countries, Italy lacked 
(and continues to lack) a specialised ministry for industrial policy as the Ministry of 
Finance, of Education and of productive Activities are all responsible for industrial policy.  
This combination of overlapping responsibilities resulted in a vague and ineffective policy 
(p. 97 and 100-101). Specifically, Gallino contends that Olivetti’s decline can be traced 
back to the dismissal of its electronics division in 1963. In his analysis, the decision of 
Mediobanca and Fiat to sell this division to General Electrics should have been countered 
by an industrial policy geared towards the protection of strategic industries. In line with 
other authors, Gallino argues that this move set the seed for Olivetti’s competitive 
deterioration and its subsequent decline (Soria 1979; Gallino(a) 2003). 
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 Rejecting standard accounts  
 
In sum the “financial indebtedness thesis” identifies Olivetti’s recurrent financial 
problems, and the strategic choices which the subsequent financial solutions entailed, as 
the main causes of Olivetti and Italy’s computer industry’s decline. The “absent industrial 
policy thesis” contends that Olivetti’s demise results from a strategic error on behalf of 
Italy’s policy makers who failed to appreciate the potential benefits which could be 
accrued in the electronics industry. Yet both theses fail to appreciate that foregoing a 
direct investment in electronics technology did not hinder a bottom-up technological 
upgrading which culminated in the invention of the Programma 101. This was conceived, 
in a typical Italian fashion, by a small group of engineers and technicians based in a 
rundown garage. In addition, despite Mediobanca and IRI’s instructions, Roberto Olivetti 
(son of Adriano) injected fresh funding into rebuilding this asset. Consequently, by 1973, 
43 per cent of Olivetti’s earnings originated from electronic goods.  Therefore, albeit with 
some delay, Olivetti too found its place in the electronics and nascent computer industry. 
 
Secondly, the “financial indebtedness thesis” fails to acknowledge that although 
indebtedness was a defining feature of Olivetti’s history, it did not sanction the company’s 
decline. This account fails to concede that Olivetti was again in the early nineties a 
successful international player (see Section 5.3.1). Although this was not the case for the 
Italian computer industry as a whole since Olivetti’s newfound success resulted from an 
aggressive technological upgrading strategy, pursued by means of foreign venture capital 
investments (Colapinto 2006). This suggests that moving into the telecommunications 
industry was not a forced but a conscious choice of Olivetti’s management’s will (see 
Section 5.3.1).   
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In sum, both theses do indeed highlight an important structural (financial) weakness of 
Olivetti and do draw attention to the limited governmental support it received (especially 
when compared to other industrial sectors, such as the automobile and chemical 
industries). Yet, neither constructs an argument capable of explaining the company’s 
irregular and fluctuating performance over time. Moreover, neither thesis is capable of 
explaining why the performance of the computer industry in Italy deteriorated earlier 
than Olivetti’s. These accounts do not explain why as of the early eighties the centre of 
gravity of Olivetti’s research and production activities was no longer based in Italy.   
Section 5.1.1 suggests that from a macro-economic and trade perspective, Italy’s 
performance in the computer industry had already worsened in the early seventies.  
Olivetti instead continued to be an important international actor up until the early 
nineties. The explanation of this paradox lies in the recognition that Olivetti’s performance 
became decoupled from that of the Italian computer industry in the late eighties and early 
nineties. 
 
The standard explanations presented above consistently link the performance of Olivetti 
to that of the Italian computer industry as a whole, yet the next section will prove this to 
have been an erroneous approach. It will show that the technological innovations taking 
place in the computer industry at a global level required a transformation of the model of 
production in place. The argument presented employs the concept of capital-skill asset 
pooling to explain the implications of these transformations on Olivetti’s strategy and on 
the performance decoupling which followed. 
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5.2 Using capital-skill asset pooling to understand the industry’s demise  
 
This section shows that the standard explanations of Olivetti and the computer industry’s 
decline in Italy fail to take into account (1) the developments and innovative 
transformations that took place in the industry globally, and (2) the mismatch between the 
new production organisation model that these transformations called for and the model 
compatible with Italy’s industrial institutions and landscape. 
  
5.2.1Technological innovation and industrial transformation 
 
In the fifties and early sixties, the main products manufactured by the computer industry 
were (i) mainframes (powerful computer systems used for large departmental or 
company-wide data collection and processing applications); (ii) mini-computers and (iii) 
integrated circuits. Firms were vertically integrated (Cloodt, Hagedoorn et al. 2006) 
because this structure allowed for the development of dynamic capabilities and 
technologies and because of the high sunk costs involved in the production of mainframes 
(Iansiti and Clark 1994).  The major players of the industry were American: IBM, Burrows, 
Univac Rand, NCR, Control Data, Honeywell, GE, RCA (Malerba, Nelson et al. 1999). The 
only European exception was Olivetti (Bresnahan and Malerba 1999).   
 
These firms were all Fordist in structure, large in size, and comprehensive in terms of the 
social services provided (Gallino 1960; Maglione, Michelsons et al. 1989; Bresnahan and 
Malerba 1999). Each firm independently engaged in a variety of activities, ranging from: 
sales and distribution, the development of application software and operating systems, the 
production of hardware, components and chips (Grove 1997). Most of the necessary 
176 
 
components were produced internally. Not only, the software which governed such 
machines was proprietary, implying that an IBM machine was incompatible with a 
Honeywell application (Malerba, Nelson et al. 1999 : 9). There was therefore limited scope 
for inter-firm synergies (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999) and the high degree of internal 
integration was mirrored by the low degree of R&D cooperation (Cloodt, Hagedoorn et al. 
2006).  
 
In 1975, the way in which computers were developed was dramatically transformed when 
the MITS/Altair microcomputer was first produced, in New Mexico (Langlois 1990). The 
MITS/Altair53 was the first fully capable personal computer and its introduction set off a 
process of radical innovation and production development. Whereas mainframe and 
minicomputer manufacturers had previously been highly integrated, the most important 
microcomputer manufacturers became smaller in size and narrowly specialised. These 
firms outsourced production and development to external suppliers and became simple 
product re-assemblers. Moreover, the mode of innovation within the industry shifted from 
incremental to radical: new technology displaced previous technology instead of 
improving it (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999). The MITS/Altair gave birth to a wide-
ranging and dispersed network of computer amateurs, ‘hobbyists’, which set-up start-up 
companies and conflated in networks of small firms which reinforced the wave of radical 
innovation throughout the industry54 (Saxenian 1985; Sturgeon 2003). Consequently, the 
vertically integrated structure which had characterised the initial years of the computer 
industry was deemed to be no longer useful as it slowed down the speed of adjustment to 
the new technology.   
                                                             
53 It was a box endowed with very simple capabilities which contained a microprocessor and “slots” for 
additional memory and devices.   
54 Apple II was the childbirth of this new form of networked production and innovation.  Apple’s founders had 
recognised at a very early stage that they should be more involved in “designing, educating and marketing […] 
(and) do the least amount of work that it could and that it should let […] the subcontractors have the 
problems” [Moritz, M. (1984). The Little Kingdom: The Private Story of Apple Computer. New York, William 
Morrow..]   
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Amongst the incumbents, IBM was the first to recognise the necessity of altering its system 
of production and innovation. IBM’s management therefore embarked in a strategy 
whereby all software and hardware components were “put up for competitive bidding 
from outside suppliers” (Langlois 1990 : 98). IBM at times acted as a distant buyer, at 
times as a venture capitalist, offering suppliers funding and guidance (IBM PC Project 
Director, P.D. Estridge in: Business-Week 1983). IBM invested heavily in building R&D 
partnerships with other US firms to develop new hardware and software technology 
(Cloodt, Hagedoorn et al. 2006). The pressure to channel financial resources into R&D 
required a strong effort to cut production costs. IBM thus outsourced the production of 
mature hardware components to Asian-Pacific countries through a process of sub-
contracting which contributed to the emergence of global commodity chains (Appelbaum 
and Gerefﬁ 1994; Gerefﬁ 1994; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Gerefﬁ 1995). 
 
5.2.2 Institutional foundations of capital-skill asset pooling in the computer industry 
 
As technological change dramatically altered the computer industry, international 
computer companies (such as IBM) devised strategies to remain competitive. The 
technological transformation implied that the mode of innovation shifted from 
incremental to radical (Lundvall 1992; Casper 2001 : 398; Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 
2001; Hall and Soskice 2001). Also, that the mode of production shifted from high to low 
cost, as production processes per se no longer allocated added value to a good, whereas 
research and development did. Radical product innovation became thus associated with 
low cost production (Michelsons 1989 : 433; Hobday 1995; Hobday 2001).  
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From an institutional perspective, the study of the preconditions for radical innovation in 
the computer industry is of recent derivation, especially if compared to the study of the 
preconditions for high quality production. They have been investigated by Herrmann 
(2005) who argues that specific types of skill and capital favour the development of radical 
innovation.  Outside share capital is deemed necessary as a clear preference for high-risk, 
high-return strategies must underpin firms’ ownership structure. Shareholder capital 
complies with this need as personal risks are minimised since ‘the costs of bankruptcy in 
case of total failure of high-risk strategies are divided between shareholders and creditors’ 
(Gelauff 1997: 346). Moreover, it also allows managers autonomy in their investment 
decisions leading to the rapid reallocation of resources (Herrmann 2005 : 60). Secondly, 
employees with ‘general’ (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 148) or ‘multi-tasking’ skills (Lindbeck 
and Snower 2001a: 1872–3) are deemed to be important preconditions as well.     
 
Additionally, once the mode of innovation in the computer industry was transformed by 
the advent of PC-technology, the mode of production was altered as well.  In the computer 
industry, research and product development constitute the costliest segments of a 
computer’s production chain; production costs instead have consequently been 
minimised. The production of electronic components has been standardised, modularised 
and outsourced to low cost economies where low wages and low skill (and low wage) 
levels predominate (Redding 1996; Saxenian 2002; Vind 2008). To some extent, 
innovation and production in the computer industry became separated – both 
conceptually and logistically.   
 
After 1975, impatient (outside share) capital, (high) and general skills became necessary 
to develop new computer technology; low cost suppliers became necessary to produce 
new computers. The production of a computer thus required (i) the impatient capital to 
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finance risky experiments, (ii) high and general skills to come up with new radically 
innovative technology, (iii) suppliers with low skill levels capable to produce components 
at a low cost. Facing the need to respond to these changes, computer firms extensively 
resorted to constructing R&D partnerships, via merger and acquisition or venture capital 
financing (Cloodt, Hagedoorn et al. 2006; Colapinto 2006). At the same time they 
contributed to the (direct or indirect) creation of a low cost Asian-Pacific hub of 
component manufacturers (Michelsons 1989 : 433). For example, on the one hand IBM 
invested heavily in increasing internal research and in building R&D partnerships with 
other firms, mostly US-based (Cloodt, et al. 2007).  On the other, it heavily outsourced the 
actual production of components to emerging Asian-Pacific countries – where production 
costs were still low. By relying on the input factors possessed by a domestic and an 
international external network, IBM, as well as Apple and Compaq, were capable to 
continue competing in the computer industry. 
 
This thesis contends that Olivetti too pursued such a strategy.  In line with other computer 
manufactures, Olivetti was burdened by a vertically integrated structure of production.  
Moreover, its workforce was mostly endowed with specific skills closely linked to electro-
mechanical goods and technology; its workers had been trained within Olivetti-provided 
vocational training facilities and lacked a general training background. In the 1980s, 
tertiary education in the Ivrea and Piedmont areas lay at extremely low levels: by the late 
eighties 80% of the population of Turin’s province worked in industry and less than 20% 
of these had achieved upper secondary or tertiary degrees (Stanchi 2001). Olivetti thus 
lacked access to a workforce endowed with (high and) general skills capable of breaking 
pre-established and pre-arranged work routines and fuel the radical innovation that the 
transformed computer industry required. On the other hand, Olivetti did have access to 
impatient capital. Its past financial experience (see Section 5.2.X) suggests that Olivetti’s 
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capital financing was subject to short-term constraints (hence explaining the repeated 
financial crisis). 
 
In line with the lead firms presented in Chapters 3 and 4, Olivetti pursued a strategy of 
capital-skill asset pooling in order to overcome the production constraints faced. It 
searched for the missing asset of production outside the set of institutions which 
traditionally governed its relationships with other economic actors, both at home and 
abroad. On the one hand it invested heavily in its local supply chain through what was 
known as the “new course” strategy (Maglione, Michelsons et al. 1989 : 82-83); on the 
other, it actively sought to buy or partner with (mostly) US-based start-ups and firms 
(Cloodt, Hagedoorn et al. 2006; Colapinto 2006).  
 
The outcomes of this two-sided strategy diverged: whereby abroad Olivetti was able to 
purchase the general skills needed through an active foreign acquisition strategy, it was 
not able to do so at home. It had actively pursued a strategy (the “new course” strategy, 
see below) which was aimed at nurturing a local, technologically competitive, network of 
small firms. Yet, these firms proved incapable of supplying Olivetti with radically 
innovative solutions to its problems and instead turned to supplying Fiat Auto’s 
component manufacturer which employed electromechanically skilled workers. Although 
Olivetti was capable to pursue a capital-skill asset pooling strategy abroad, capital-skill 
asset mismatch emerged at home as the skills held by local suppliers mismatched those 
required by Olivetti. The thesis contends that Olivetti regained its lost competitiveness by 
investing in the development of new software technology and innovation through the 
establishment of numerous R&D partnerships and the acquisition of international 
software companies.   
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Yet the attempt to restructure Olivetti’s local supply base led to a capital-skill asset 
mismatch which ultimately sanctioned a withdrawal of Olivetti from all computer 
activities based in Italy.  This failure determined the demise of computer manufacturing in 
Italy.  The internationalisation strategy instead allowed Olivetti to decouple itself from the 
institutional impediment associated with radical product innovation in Italy and to remain 
an important player in the international computer industry spectrum for some time. The 
following section provides evidence for this argument which not only links the 
development of Olivetti to that of the transformations which took place in the computer 
industry globally, but also (contrary to standard explanations) explains why Olivetti and 
the Italian computer industry’s performances differed over time. 
 
 5.3 Supporting evidence 
 
5.3.1 Capital-skill asset mismatch despite the “new course”  
 
In the late seventies Olivetti not only faced the problem of growing technological 
backwardness, but also of shedding a bloated workforce associated with its vertically 
integrated structure. In light of (i) the need to find either workers with (high and) general 
or low skills, (ii) the public concern associated with the dismissal of thousands of workers, 
Olivetti sought to hone the capabilities of laid off workers into a local network of suppliers.  
The ultimate objective was to move away from a vertically integrated production structure 
and engage in capital-skill asset pooling with these firms. Consequently, as mechanical and 
electro-mechanical capabilities were expelled from the firm to contain internal costs, 
Olivetti management entertained subcontracting relationships with these workers. The 
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“new course” project attempted to organise these employees into small supplier firms 
with which a radical innovation or low cost production strategy could be engaged.  
 
Mismatch in Italy: entering Fiat Auto’s supply chain 
 
 The “new course” took off in the early eighties and was in essence a manifold strategy 
geared towards upgrading know-how and promoting flexibility amongst suppliers. This 
was supposed to be achieved through a number of instruments carefully implemented 
throughout Olivetti’s component acquisition strategy. They involved: (1) establishing 
quality controls; (2) enabling direct technology exchange via the loaning of recent and 
technologically advanced machinery; (3) facilitating access channels to financial support; 
(4) limiting the number of purchases from each supplier in order to stimulate flexibility 
and inventiveness; (5) establishing cooperative innovation-enhancing partnerships with 
hardware and software producers; (6) limiting suppliers’ profit margins through 
competitive delivery time and price policies; and (7) establishing a permanent 
observatory to monitor subcontractors and subcontracting behaviour (Maglione, 
Michelsons et al. 1989 : 82-83). Yet the policy instruments introduced by the “new course” 
strategy failed to deliver the desired objectives. On the hardware side, the observatory on 
suppliers reported that in 1985 Olivetti had distributed the production of hardware goods 
to 563 subcontractors, of which only 114 were based in the local vicinities (province of 
Ivrea and the Canavese area) (Maglione, Michelsons et al. 1989 : 80). Moreover, of these 
only 27 per cent produced technologically sophisticated electronic goods whilst 73 per 
cent produced mechanical and electro-mechanical goods. All firms remained small in size - 
employing less than sixteen employees - and were highly dependent on Olivetti as their 
only buyer. More importantly, the majority of local firms which sprung-out of Olivetti 
became part of Fiat-Auto’s supply chain.    
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Table V.4 Local Firms’ Specialisation 
  1991 1996 2001 
Change 
91-01 
Mechanical 
No. of Firms 
Employees 
139 
1499 
179 
1833 
186 
2691 
+34% 
+80% 
Metalworking 
No. of Firms 
Employees 
425 
3409 
381 
3935 
425 
4041 
0 
+19% 
Total 
No. of Firms 
Employees 
564 
4908 
560 
5768 
611 
6732 
+8% 
+37% 
Source:  ISTAT Censimento Industria e Servizi 1991~2001, (Bricco 2009 : 369-371) 
 
Olivetti’s desire to establish a network of capable suppliers did indeed result in the 
creation of a disintegrated value chain. As a matter of fact, a large number of firms 
reverted to a more mechanical and metalworking specialisation tradition. Historically, 
Olivetti’s traditional and most successful products were typewriters, calculators and data 
processing machines. The skill-set involved in the production of these goods comprised 
metalworking, mechanical and electro-mechanical capabilities, which had become deeply 
rooted in the area. Once the “new course” restructuring process begun and workers were 
laid off, many set up small firms specialised in mechanical or electro-mechanical 
production. Data on the productive specialisation of local firms in the province of Ivrea 
deriving from ISTAT’s ten-yearly census on industry and services shows that a mechanical 
renaissance did indeed take place (Table V.4). The data suggests that between 1991 and 
2001, the number of workers employed in firms producing mechanical goods increased by 
a staggering 80 per cent: the actual number of firms increased by 34 per cent. This 
discrepancy therefore suggests that increases in the average size of firms must have been 
observed. The workforce employed in metalworking firms instead increased by a smaller, 
yet still positive, amount: 19 per cent.  
 
These firms therefore identified a novel market outlet in the automobile supply chain 
which spun off Fiat Auto’s production restructuring efforts of the late seventies (Enrietti 
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and Lanzetti 2002). These efforts led to the establishment of Fiat’s hierarchically 
structured supply chain as it had as well embarked on its own strategic “new course” 
(Michelsons 1989). The underlying motivation for this strategic shift shared common 
features with Olivetti: (1) a need to increase productivity; (2) reduce production costs; in 
order to (3) finance research, (4) physical capital renewal, and (5) model transformation.  
However, at the time “Fiat had strong internal competencies in mechanical industries, but 
was necessarily dependant on outside firms for electro-mechanics, plastic and rubber 
parts, and numerous services” (Volpato 1982; Whitford and Enrietti 2005 : 780).  
Coincidentally, these needs were met by the flocks of outgoing Olivetti employees who 
were competent in such technologies.   
 
Table V.5 Local Firms-Olivetti Relationship 
Regular Supplier 22.7% 
Occasional Supplier 14.4% 
Not a Supplier 62.9% 
Total 100% 
Source:  Censis report 1992, (Bricco 2009 : 343) 
 
Interview based evidence shows how both the employees which had exited Olivetti in the 
late sixties and in the late seventies became part of Fiat Auto’s supply chain.  Subsequently, 
they became part of a more internationalised automobile supply chain, as Fiat Auto 
suppliers (Enrietti and Lanzetti 2002). Yet, in both events, these firms always remained at 
the sideline of such subcontracting structures; becoming second-, if not even third-, tier 
suppliers. Often, interviewed entrepreneurs would not even be capable of pointing out 
explicitly which level of this supply chain they belonged to. Moreover, their business 
model consisted in the refinement, moulding and pressing of parts which higher tiered 
subcontractors would supply to them and then return to assembly firms (interview 
numbers 55-56, Rossi and Masciaga.).   
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Given these developments, it is therefore not surprising that of the surviving small firms 
located in the province of Ivrea and the Canavese in the nineties, only a small fraction 
declared to have been Olivetti suppliers in the past (Table V.5). Given the specialisation 
return of suppliers to a more mechanical tradition, these firms lacked the general skills 
sought out by Olivetti. Hence, there was no asset of production left to be pooled as local 
Italian firms had no potential to develop radical innovation. The reinforcement of a specific 
skill tradition, fostered through the participation in Fiat Auto’s supply chain from, implied 
that the skill asset sought by a firm seeking to pursue a radical innovation product market 
strategy.  
 
In addition, Italian suppliers did not even possess the low skill asset required for the 
manufacturing of standardised components which complement a computer good. Italian 
wage levels were (are) higher than wages in developing countries; consequently the 
average production cost of a PC in Italy had become uncompetitive (Michelsons 1989 : 
433). Thus, by the late seventies all hardware production had moved to East Asia, 
determining a strong rationalisation of Olivetti activities in Italy (interview number 46, 
Maglione). By the late eighties, only administrative and retailing functions activities were 
still located in Italy. Olivetti had actively sought the general and low skills to develop 
radical innovation and produce computers abroad. Therefore, the capital-skill asset 
mismatch which emerged acted as a trigger for the end of computer development and 
manufacturing by Olivetti in Italy. As a consequence, Italy’s relative competitive position in 
this industry, which had substantially deteriorated in the seventies, no longer recovered. 
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5.3.2 Capital-skill asset pooling via international partnerships 
 
In parallel to the “new course”, Olivetti embarked in a succession of international 
partnerships: in 1980 came its first international R&D alliance with two American 
companies: Lucky-G and Geda. Thereafter, Olivetti pursued this route to technological 
catch-up quite intensely and earned a place in the list of firms with most global R&D 
partnerships: one in 1975-79, six in 1980-84 (when IBM had seven), seven in 1985-89 
(when Apple Computer had five), and none thereafter (Cloodt, Hagedoorn et al. 2006).   
 
The partnership with the American telecommunications giant AT&T, in 1983, was the 
most successful, albeit short-lived. This partnership was dovetailed by AT&T’s purchase of 
22% of Olivetti shares, which culminated in the development of the Olivetti M-24, the only 
successful personal computer produced by Olivetti. By the late eighties the network of 
international R&D alliances had grown bigger as Olivetti established research 
partnerships with Phillips and IBM; partnerships with Bull, Kodak and Samsung had also 
been set up, although these concerned printing and photocopying technology. In addition, 
this alliance-building strategy was complemented by a research-oriented acquisition 
strategy: Olivetti purchased in 1981 the Swiss software company Hermes Precisa, the 
French company Logobax in the same year, Acorn (British, 1985), Triumph-Adler 
(German, 1986), the Bunker Ramo (US, 1986) and Scanvest Ring (Scandinavian, 1988) 
(Colapinto 2006).  
 
Besides Olivetti’s partnering and acquisition activity with established international 
computer producers, a part of Olivetti’s research acquisition strategy was driven by 
venture capital operations.  As a matter of fact, in order to foster research and 
development, Olivetti officially inaugurated a corporate venture program in 1980 
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(Colapinto 2006).  Table V.6 suggests that Olivetti’s extensively resorted to this instrument 
in 1981-1982; similar acquisition dynamism characterised the years that followed.  Most 
venture capital activities took place in the US and consisted of share acquisitions of small 
start-up companies – although a few venture capital experiences took place elsewhere as 
well: in the UK, Japan, and in Italy (although only one such instance is reported).  
Moreover, the share-acquisitions listed pertain to varying segments of the computer 
industry, allowing Olivetti to strive for technological innovation throughout the entirety of 
its diversified product portfolio. 
 
Table V.6 Olivetti venture capital acquisitions in the US (1981) 
Industry segment Company 
 Shares  
(% of total) 
Office automation   Compuscan  18.7 
  Syntrex Inc. 23.2 
  FileNet Corp.* 16.9 
  Micro Office System Tech. Inc.* 21.9 
Hardware   Applied Micro Circuit Corp.  4.2 
  IPL System Inc.   23.8 
  Ithaca Intersystems Inc.   33.5 
  Stratus Computers Inc. 9.1 
Magnetic memory disks Irwing Magnetic Systems  6.3 
  Lanx Corp.  8.8 
Software Service Systems Technology* 49 
  Shared Financial Systems* 20.6 
  Editrice Italiana Software (IT)* 20 
  Sphinx Ltd. (GB) * 25 
Data management terminals   Data Terminal Systems Inc. 12.2 
  Docutel Corporation 20.2 
  Transaction Management Inc. 16.5 
  Telxon Corp.  3.3 
  Data terminal System  12.2 
Integrated circuits Dixy Corp. (Japan)*  20 
Intranet technology  Prolink* 11.5 
  David Systems* 24 
  Intecom* 6.5 
Telecommunications  Intecom Inc.  7.5 
Source:  (Colapinto 2006, : estimations on Olivetti’s 1981 consolidated balance sheet; * 1982 data ) 
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Asset pooling and the decoupling of Italy and Olivetti’s performance 
 
By exchanging impatient capital for the necessary general skills to generate the software 
technology required, Olivetti remained internationally competitive. The foreign venture 
capital activity enabled it to become the third company worldwide by revenue in 1985, 
trailing behind IBM and Apple (Table V.7). Yet, the gap was large and despite the sizeable 
R&D investment efforts in absolute terms, Olivetti’s relative research investment was too 
small. As a result its software technology still lagged severely behind its competitors 
(Gallino 2003). In 1986 for example, Compaq introduced a new microprocessor which 
anticipated Olivetti technology by at least a year. 
 
Table V.7 Top ten ranking of global computer firms by revenues (1985) 
Ranking  Company Country 
Revenue 
1982 1983 1984 1985 
1 IBM US 500 2600 5500 5500 
2 Apple US 664 1085 1747 1603 
3 Olivetti IT --  252 497 885 
4 Tandy US 466 598 574 797 
5 Sperry Rand US --  386 503 743 
6 Commodore US 368 927 1000 600 
7 Compaq US --  111 329 504 
8 Hewlett-Packard US 258 399 500 400 
9 Convergent US  -- 163 362 395 
10 Zenith US  --   249 352 
Source:(Colapinto 2006 : on DATAMATION)  
 
In the following years, the Olivetti experience was characterised by growing financial 
constraints related to the cost of funding foreign research and innovation and of 
employing a workforce of close to 60000 (Bricco 2007 : 324). Faced with growing costs 
and negative profits in 1990, and a new management, Olivetti exited the computer 
industry and moved into the telecoms industry instead. The year 1991 thus sanctions the 
end of Olivetti’s experience in the computer industry. This delay, compared to Italy’s 
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earlier deteriorated performance is explained in light of Olivetti’s practice of pooling the 
necessary skill assets of production abroad. The failure of the “new course” cannot 
therefore be held entirely responsible for Olivetti’s shift into the telecommunications 
sector, but is instead an integrating factor explaining why Italy lost its past comparative 
advantage in producing computers. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has accounted for the developments of the computer industry in Italy over 
time. By tracking the indicator of revealed comparative advantage from the sixties 
onwards, it has clearly shown that Italy held a strong advantage in the manufacturing of 
those products which anticipated the computer industry as we know it today. Olivetti was 
in the sixties one of the biggest international players in the typewriter and mainframe 
industry. Yet just like IBM, and other major players, it struggled to keep pace with the 
industrial transformations brought about by microprocessor technology. The production 
and development of typewriters, mainframes and minicomputers took place within 
vertically integrated large companies; that of microcomputers relied instead on a 
vertically disintegrated structure. In sum, the invention of the MITS/Altair computer 
implied that larger manufacturers abandoned a vertically integrated structure for a 
disintegrated one. Within it, and through open-source platforms, inter-firm collaboration 
became the most common mode of interaction in the computer industry (Cloodt, 
Hagedoorn et al. 2006). 
 
This chapter has put forward an argument which places Olivetti’s demise in the context of 
the transformations which took place in the computer industry. Moreover, and contrary to 
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the other standard accounts (the “financial indebtedness” and the “absent industrial 
policy” theses), it shows that Olivetti and Italy’s demise are not as tightly linked as 
elsewhere contended. The chapter has argued Olivetti responded to the computer 
industry’s transformations by pursuing international partnerships and creating a local 
network of capable suppliers through the “new course” strategy. Yet the latter strategy 
was unsuccessful as the majority of firms which spun out of Olivetti were specialised in 
mechanical and metalworking activities. The implication was that capital-skill asset 
mismatch resulted instead, whereby capital-skill asset pooling was only achieved via 
international partnership and venture capital investment. The positive returns of these 
activities reinforced Olivetti’s role as an important player in the computer industry 
throughout the early nineties; on the other hand, capital-skill asset mismatch at home 
perpetrated the deterioration of Italy’s international performance in the computer 
industry. 
 
This case study has therefore substantiated the validity of the thesis’ argument.  Since 
capital-skill asset pooling is identified as necessary for an Italian firm willing to remain 
internationally competitive (see Ch.2, section 2.3.1), its absence is expected to lead to 
deteriorated international performances.  Since, Italy’s dysfunctional institutions have 
been identified as favourable to patient capital-specific skill asset pooling; the production 
of high quantities of high quality goods was possible (as suggested by the entering of ex-
Olivetti suppliers into Fiat Auto’s asset pool).  Yet, the technological innovation brought 
about by microcomputers implied that the underlying assets of production changed and 
that a mismatch occurred between the capital offered and the skills sought.  Capital-skill 
asset pooling of the kind identified in the leather goods, footwear and yacht-building 
industries was not feasible as the desired “pool of assets to share” was redefined by 
changes to the underlying technology of production. In the following chapter, the thesis 
191 
 
attempts to systematise the empirical evidence discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  It 
introduces the concept of “disintegrated hierarchy” which best captures the mode of 
production which has emerged amongst Italy’s most competitive firms. 
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VI. THE ITALIAN MODEL OF PRODUCTION: CAPITAL-SKILL ASSET POOLING 
AND DISINTEGRATED HIERARCHY 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
The study of national capitalist economies has been driven by the objective to develop an 
explanation for the persistent difference and continuous divergence of models of 
capitalism from one single best practice (Fligstein 1990; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; 
Hicks and Kenworthy 1998; Soskice 1999; Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001).  Since its 
inception, this field of study has endowed comparative scholars with the analytical 
leverage to explain variation across different capitalist formations (Schneiberg 2007 : 72) 
and, over time, it has developed a system of tools capable of accounting for the 
foundations of a country’s comparative institutional advantage (Hall and Soskice 2001).  
Scholars have classified the organisational structure of firms into typological groups: 
coordinated, liberal, network-oriented and statist categories are used to account for the 
economic model which characterises German, Anglo-Saxon and French firms (Hancké and 
Soskice 1996; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancké 2002; Schmidt 
2003).  
 
Given that these studies have been driven by notions of institutional homogeneity, 
complementarity, and coherence, the study of cases where national institutions are 
heterogeneous has been unpopular. Moreover less homogeneous and coherent 
institutional frameworks are thought of as incapable of delivering positive economic 
performances (though exceptions exist, such asHancké 2002 on France; Campbell and 
Pedersen 2007). Liberal and coordinated market economies represent pure, coherent, 
types and as such represent the only organisational structures capable of delivering good 
macroeconomic performance (Hall and Gingerich 2009). To investigate whether this 
193 
 
proposition holds true across other models of capitalism, this research has endeavoured in 
the study of an incoherent and hybrid case, Italy. This exercise responds to calls for 
analyses of “mongrel” models of capitalism (Crouch 2005) and of deviant cases (Emigh 
1997). This thesis has investigated whether, and in what way, did institutional 
heterogeneity enable Italian firms to compete internationally.   
 
By investigating individual cases of export success, this research project has shown that 
successful Italian exporters produce high quality goods although their underlying model of 
production organisation departs significantly from the German, French or Anglo-Saxon 
models. A new model of production has thus been identified, named disintegrated 
hierarchy.  Within this model, by engaging in capital-skill asset pooling, firms solve the 
production problem associated with producing high quality goods in Italy; namely that of 
having simultaneous access to specific skills and patient capital. Whereas the German, 
Anglo-Saxon and French models of production are populated by firms which source 
homogeneous production assets from each institutional framework, disintegrated 
hierarchy is instead populated by firms which only source one factor of production each.  
Consequently, the structure of production which has emerged derives from the dynamic 
pooling by heterogeneous firms of those factors necessary for the production of high 
quality goods. Disintegrated hierarchy builds on the interaction and interdependence of 
firms endowed with different factors of production.   
 
Chapter 6 thus brings together the empirical evidence collected and discussed in chapters 
3, 4 and 5. The hypothesis, initially set out in chapter 2, is hereby expanded into a 
complete theoretical framework which outlines the implications of institutional 
heterogeneity for firms. After restating the puzzle offered by Italian firms and the research 
question in section 6.1, the chapter examines the circumstances under which firms in Italy 
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fail or succeed in producing high quality goods - section 6.2. The underlying question faced 
is what happens once the distinct input assets possessed are shared or not: not doing so 
leads to an inability to produce high quality goods; doing so enables high quality 
production and leads to the formation of a disintegrated and hierarchic production 
structure. In support of the model, section 6.3 provides evidence derived from the cross-
case analysis of the leather, yacht and computer industries (Chapters 3 to 5).  The section 
systematically presents the solutions adopted by firms in each industry to solve the 
problems associated with producing high quality goods. Disintegrated hierarchy is thus 
shown to account for the unexplained performance of Italy’s export oriented 
manufacturing sector.  The last section concludes and introduces Chapter 7. 
 
6.1 Recalling the Italian puzzle: macroeconomic decline and microeconomic success 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 1, the decline of the Italian model of capitalism has been 
investigated by a vast literature. Some authors point to the absence of productivity growth 
and innovation which is linked to the product specialisation model and size of Italian firms 
(Ciocca 2003; Faini 2004; Nardozzi 2004; Toniolo, Visco et al. 2004). Others, to the lost 
competitiveness of large Italian enterprises (Becattini and Coltorti 2004; Becattini and Dei 
Ottati 2006; Colli 2009). Yet, clusters of small and medium sized firms, i.e. industrial 
districts, have flourished by specialising in so-called “Made in Italy” light manufacturing 
industries.  
 
In light of the inability of classic economic theory to explain the success of districts, the 
literature identified “informal” institutional features which enabled their success by giving 
rise to flexible specialisation (Brusco 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984; Becattini 1990; 
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Becattini, Bellandi et al. 2009; Piore 2009)55.  Over the nineties, the literature which 
continued investigating this success segmented into two major approaches: on the one 
hand distrettisti scholars started looking at economic developments through the eyes of 
the district system as a whole; aziendalisti through the eyes of the individual firm only 
(Whitford 2001). Yet, both approaches failed to appreciate the interaction between the 
two and failed to produce a set of interpretative tools capable of explaining successes 
which develop inside or outside district boundaries or which are generated by more than 
one firm. Recent research has in fact revealed that successful firms lie both inside as well 
as outside the boundaries of districts, and that not all district firms perform equally well 
(Guelpa e Micelli 2006).  In this sense a pure district or a pure firm-centred perspective 
obviates a full understanding of productive dynamics. In order to go beyond this divide, 
this study has returned to the industry as its object of analysis – although the firm remains 
its unit of observation.  Successful industries have been identified through a two-tiered 
identification strategy so as to expand the interpretative boundaries set by a district or 
single firm perspective.   
 
Table VI.1 High Quality Export Industries in Italy (reference year 2003) 
831: Travel goods, handbags 
& similar containers 
8311: Handbag, whether or not with shoulder strap 
846: Clothing accessories, of 
textile fabrics 
8461: Clothing accessories, not for babies, not knitted 
8462: Panty hose, socks & other hosiery, knitted or croch. 
611: Leather 
6115: Sheep or lamb skin leather, without wool (excluding 6118) 
6116: Goat or kid skin leather, without hair (excluding 6118) 
6118: Leather, specially dressed or finished, n.e.s. 
851: Footwear 
8515: Other footwear, with uppers of textile materials 
8517: Footwear, n.e.s. 
8519: Parts of footwear, in-soles, heel-cushions & similar 
793: Ships, boats and 
floating structures 
7931: Yachts and other vessels for pleasure or sports; rowing-
boats and canoes 
Source: Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2009, Own Calculations 
 
                                                             
55 See also section 1.2.1. 
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In the first place, the revealed comparative advantage indicator (Balassa 1965) is used to 
identify which industries are characterised by a relative specialisation advantage (where 
the RSCA is greater than 0.5). In a second stage, this indicator is mapped against a proxy 
for quality: the relative unit value which is a measure of the vertical – and not horizontal - 
differentiation between goods (refer to Ch.1, Section 1.1. for further methodological 
detail). It compares how products of the same class vary in terms of their ability to 
command a higher price, induced by consumers’ perception of the good’s higher quality.  
The combination of positive RSCA (>0.5) and a positive RSUV has enabled the 
identification of industries where high quality goods are produced and consequently drive 
exports (Table VI.1: the column on the right shows the four-digit level breakdown of the 
relevant SITC product categories – left column  - where such conditions hold, as in 
Ch.1p.25).  
 
6.1.1 Standard explanations of the empirical evidence 
 
The finding that the firms producing goods listed in table 6.1 are pursuing a high quality 
product market strategy should be theoretically qualified and contextualised. By so doing, 
it clearly emerges that not only the industrial district and flexible specialisation literature, 
but also the varieties of capitalism one cannot really explain how doing so has been 
possible.   
 
The literature on the production of high or diversified quality goods is concerned with 
determining the conditions sine qua the manufacturing of such goods is non possible 
(Sorge and Streeck 1988; Streeck 1991a; Streeck 1991b; Soskice 1999).  This literature 
identifies necessary institutional conditions which ground the ability of firms to pursue a 
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high or diversified quality product market strategy, as opposed to a low cost one. Two 
input factors are deemed necessary: a workforce endowed with industry-specific skills 
and long-term patient capital (Hall and Soskice 2001; Herrmann 2008).  The production of 
high volumes of these goods is conditional on the existence of an industrial order, social 
structure or institutional framework (Sabel, Herrigel et al. 1987; Sabel, Herrigel et al. 
1987b; Hall and Soskice 2001) where a complex mix of competition and cooperation 
regulates relations between firms (Streeck 1991a; Streeck 1991b : 34).   
 
The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 2 demonstrates how at odds the Italian case is 
with the prescriptions of the literature56. It also suggests that a clear cleavage exists 
between the institutional assets which differently sized firms are endowed with.  Whereas 
large firms have access to patient capital, they lack access to a skilled workforce.  Whereas 
small firms can access the latter, they cannot access the former. Although, the finding of 
institutional heterogeneity is not novel in itself57, what is puzzling is the fact that Italian 
firms compete internationally in the production of quality competitive goods in spite of 
the institutional failures they are confronted with.  Thus, this research questions how high 
or diversified quality production is possible in the absence of the necessary institutional 
framework to support it.   
 
A budding research strand has claimed that detrimental institutional settings, such as 
Italy’s, could be offset by companies by tapping into foreign business systems (Lange 2009 
                                                             
56 Moreover, Varieties of Capitalism in particular had only paid little attention to this deviant case, only 
recently classifying it as a mixed market economy where the state compensates for the absence of mechanisms 
to promote strategic or market coordination [Molina, O. and M. Rhodes (2007). The Political Economy of 
Adjustment in Mixed Market Economies: A Study of Spain and Italy. . Beyond Varieties of Capitalism - Conflict, 
Contradiction and Complementarities in the European Economy. B. Hancké, M. Rhodes and M. Thatcher.].   
57 Similar statements have been recently made concerning some sectors of production in the United States and 
the German Mittlestand [Schneiberg, M. (2007). "What's on the path? Path dependence, organisational diversity 
and the problem of institutional change in the US economy, 1900-1950." Socio-Economic Review 5: 47-80, Bluhm, 
K. and B. Martens (2009). "Recomposed institutions: smaller firms strategies, shareholder-value orientation and 
bank relationships in Germany." Socio-Economic Review 7: 585-604, Lange, K. (2009). "Institutional 
embeddedness and the strategic leeway of actors: the case of the German therapeutical biotech industry." Socio-
Economic Review 7: 181-207.]. 
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: 189). Empirical evidence of this hypothesis is found in the development of an 
international market for venture capital to attract foreign capital (Lerner and Gompers 
2001); or in the documented habit of Italian and German pharmaceutical firms of 
employing international workers (Herrmann 2008a) (Herrmann 2008b). Yet, neither of 
the two expectations appears to hold true in Italy as the proportion of venture capital 
financing Italian (export oriented manufacturing) companies is still small and senior 
managers within Italian companies are rarely of foreign origin (see Ch.1, Section 1.2.3).    
 
Thus the literature on flexible specialisation (local), national and international production 
regimes does not explain in what ways Italian firms have overcome the problems arising 
from the disadvantageous institutions they are faced with. This thesis has proposed an 
alternative theoretical model capable of doing so which builds on the practice of capital-
skill asset pooling by firms which has led to the emergence of a novel model of production 
termed disintegrated hierarchy. 
 
6.2 Towards a theoretical understanding of the export performance of Italian firms 
 
When an institutional framework is incoherent and holds a size-discriminating bias with 
respect to the way in which firms are governed, differently sized firms are endowed with 
different assets of production.  Yet, if the sum of an economy’s institutions does produce 
the assets required for high quality production, then the firms located in such economy 
can produce high quality goods when capital-skill asset pooling takes place. Capital-skill 
asset pooling results from firms’ sharing of the input factors possessed; when this occurs, 
the preconditions for high quality production are met. This consequently implies that 
production is structured in such a way to respond to the need of bringing together firms 
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endowed with different assets and of governing the inter-firm interdependences that stem 
from this. 
6.2.1 Capital-skill asset pooling and disintegrated hierarchy  
 
Consider a simplified model of the (Italian) economy with two firms which differ with 
respect to the number of workers employed: the large firm (LF) and the small firm (SF), 
where the LF is subject to different labour market and corporate governance rules than 
the SF. These rules imply that the LF cannot hire and fire workers at will because of the 
stringency of the employment protection legislation it is subjected to.  They also imply that 
the LF has access to patient forms of capital financing because of banks’ ability to 
appropriately price the liability which stems from lending to large firms58.   
 
On the other hand, the SF does not pay a costly employer‘s contribution bill as its workers 
are to a large extent unofficially registered or young; in addition it is not subject to 
stringent employment protection legislation (as the Art.18 of the Worker’s Statute does 
not apply) and can employ and lay off workers in line with demand fluctuations.  
Moreover, flexible workers travel across small firms of the same (local) industry in line 
with demand patterns and acquire industry specific skills. Yet, the SF does not have access 
to patient capital because of the dominant practice of resorting to multiple banks 
(multiaffidamento bancario) linked to (i) the SF’s objective to drive down the cost of 
individual loans by promoting bank competition and (ii) the unwillingness of individual 
banks to invest heavily in the SF in light of the higher uncertainty linked to doing so.  In 
                                                             
58 On the one hand, larger firms must abide by accounting and transparency standards which enable banks to 
assess and price the risks involved in lending to firms better.  On the other, the relationship between large 
firms and banks in Italy has historically been closer in light of occupational and growth concerns which have 
enthused the behaviour of public (first) and private (later) banks, at a local as well as a national level. 
200 
 
sum, the LF holds the patient capital asset: LF(PC); the SF the skilled workforce asset: 
SF(SS).  
 
Imagine an international trade shock, i.e. the emergence of low cost competitors, or 
another exogenous factor which alters the terms of trade of Italian firms, i.e. the removal 
of the GATT agreement, which induce the small and the large firm to pursue a high quality 
product market strategy. The LF(PC) and SF(SS) are confronted with two outcomes given 
that the union of patient capital and specific skills are necessary conditions to manufacture 
high or diversified quality products (DQP), sold in international markets. On the one hand, 
if they remain separate, they are unable to pursue such an objective.  This implies that the 
LF(PC) employs an unskilled worker and trains it at a cost which is equal to a fraction of 
the patient capital initially obtained to develop the DQP and distribute it internationally.  If 
the LF is willing to invest in the training of workers, it must also accept the financial 
liability that as demand fluctuates or as required skill profiles change with technology, it 
cannot lay off workers cheaply. The SF(SS) instead produces goods for export, albeit in 
smaller quantities.  In addition, such a product will be artisanal in nature and will 
gradually be displaced by technologically advanced substitutes because of the SF(SS)’s 
limited financial capacity to invest in product development. Moreover, the international 
reach of its distribution channels will be limited and its ability to retail its products 
impaired.  
 
On the other hand, by interacting, the LF(PC) and the SF(SS) are able to pursue a high 
quality product market strategy.  This implies that the LF(PC) and the SF(SS) focus on 
specific activities of the production chain which delivers DQP together, thus pooling the 
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production assets individually held59. The LF(PC) relinquishes most manufacturing 
functions, except those concerning product research and development, to the SF(SS) 
which acts as supplier. As the LF(PC) concentrates on the product development and 
distribution phases of a good’s value chain and the SF(SS) on the actual manufacturing of 
such a good, capital-skill asset pooling occurs.  The large and the small firm come together 
to produce HQ goods because each lacks the input factors to do so separately.  Specifically 
the large firm obtains the skilled workforce needed to produce DQP goods; the small firm 
the patient capital needed to develop DQP goods and to distribute them internationally. 
 
A further specification is added to this stylised model by allowing the small firm to be 
further divided into three groups determined by the specific skill profile held. The small 
firm holds either firm specific, industry specific or component specific skills: SF(FSS), 
SF(ISS) and SF(CSS). Whereas workers with a firm (process) specific skill grasp all 
production mechanisms which contribute to the final product of a specific LF(PC); 
workers with a product specific skill profile are able to produce single intermediate 
components, independent of the final good manufactured. Workers with an industry 
specific profile are not specialised in either of the two profiles, and are thus flexibly 
abused by all other firms to enable adjustments to demand fluctuations. 
 
When the large and the small firms interact, we observe the emergence of disintegrated 
hierarchy. This structure of production entails the coalescing of heterogeneous firms into 
a multi-level chain of production. At the helm of this structure lies a lead firm: a large firm 
which holds the patient capital asset - LF(PC) - and, through it, exercises a leadership 
function over the whole structure.  Holding patient capital warrants the large firm the 
                                                             
59 This is in line with the literature on global commodity chains, global production networks and global value 
chains. 
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power to make decisions over the (i) pursuit of a given product strategy and the (ii) set up 
of distribution channels and networks.   
 
Figure VI.1 Disintegrated hierarchy 
 
Source: Own representation 
 
Lead firms relate directly to first-tier suppliers which are small firms with firm-specific 
skills in demand from lead firms – SF(FSS). First-tier and lead firms develop close 
collaborative exchanges conducive to the achievement of joint-product innovation and 
high quality production. As incremental innovation is linked to a product itself as well as 
the process of production; once lead firms relinquish production functions, process 
innovation is likely to develop within supplier firms. First-tier suppliers thus become 
partners to the innovation strategy of the lead firm as incremental (process) innovation 
proceeds from spontaneous instances of developing by doing. Additionally, because most of 
the knowledge that travels between the players is tacit and non-codified: local proximity is 
a crucial element in allowing this transfer. In addition, because of the skill profile held 
which enables an overview of production processes, first-tier suppliers coordinate a 
supply chain which de facto produces the goods developed and sold by lead firms.   
Second 
& Third Tier
Suppliers which 
hold industry or
product-specific 
skills 
First Tier
Suppliers which hold
firm-specific skills
Lead Firm which 
holds the patient 
capital
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First-tier suppliers are followed by second60-tier suppliers: SF(CSS) and SF(ISS). Small 
firms, with a component specific profile, SF(CSS), are product specialists which maintain a 
monopolistic power over a given technology. Consequently lead firms or first tier 
suppliers purchase a given component from them, engaging in a purely market based and 
contractual relationship. Small firms with an industry specific profile instead, SF(ISS), 
represent the lead firm’s flexible workforce.   
 
Disintegrated hierarchy can be formally be described by: ∑[LF(PC), SF(SS)], where 
∑[LF(PC), SF(FSS)] leads to process upgrading and incremental innovation, and 
∑[SF(FSS), SF(CSS), SF(ISS)] leads to the actual manufacturing of the product designs 
developed.  Picture 6.1 captures this interaction: in particular it conveys the message that 
different firms occupy different levels of the production chain. On the one hand, lead firms 
divert resources away from production to product development and distribution 
functions. Then, by building collaborative relations with first-tier suppliers, they pursue a 
strategy of incremental innovation which is grounded on product and process upgrading.  
On the other, first-tier and second-tier suppliers gain access to international distribution 
chains which are not accessible independently of lead firms. Thus, disintegrated hierarchy 
is a model of production organisation which enables heterogeneous firms to enact the 
capital-skill asset pooling required to produce DQP goods in Italy. Yet, by resorting to 
inter-firm networks within which capital-skill asset pooling takes place, the regulation of 
relational risks becomes a priority as complete control over production is no longer 
possible (Williamson 1975). To limit the problem, lead firms, as well as first- and second-
tier suppliers, are expected to develop new and unconventional governance solutions. 
                                                             
60 This supply chain may extend for multiple layers.   For simplicity I only distinguish between a first and a 
second tier.  Yet within this second-tier group I include the subcontracting that takes place between second 
and third tier suppliers, between third and fourth tier suppliers, and so forth.  The relationship between lead 
firms and first-tier suppliers is governed by non-market strategic mechanisms.  That between first and second-
tier suppliers by price based mechanisms, to a large extent.  With this caveat in mind, I group both non-
specialised suppliers and component specialists in the second-tier supplier group because in both cases the 
price mechanism is governing the exchange with lead firms. 
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6.2.2 Inter-firm governance within disintegrated hierarchy  
 
The term inter-firm governance refers to the formal and informal rules of behaviour which 
govern the interdependent relationships between firms which make up disintegrated 
hierarchy’s multi-level production structure.  In the literature on global commodity chains, 
global value chains, global production networks and varieties of vertical disintegration the 
term has been applied to the respond to the absence of complete contracting in light of the 
heightened fragmentation of production61 (Kogut 1985; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; 
Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001 : 1-6; Sturgeon 2002; Dicken 2003; Herrigel and Wittke 
2005). As uncertainty and relational risks have come to dominate the exchange which 
takes place between firms (Noteboom 2004), especially when producing final goods 
composed of varying value-intensive components (Herrigel and Wittke 2005 : 320) and 
when product architectures are neither purely integral nor purely modular (Ulrich 1995), 
the interaction between producing units becomes increasingly complex and 
heterogeneous62. To deal with these developments, inter-firm relationships are governed 
by a multitude of governance mechanisms. Gereffi, Humphreys et al. (2005) have 
identified five governance mechanisms which govern the different varieties of vertical 
disintegration which can emerge (see Table VI.2): market, modular, network, captive and 
hierarchic governance.  
 
In the case of disintegrated hierarchy, lead firms which interact with first-tier suppliers 
and first-tier suppliers which interact with second-tier suppliers are confronted with a 
                                                             
61 Fragmentation of production is defined as the physical separation of different stages of a production process 
and their allocation along a value chain. 
62 Moreover a multiplicity of factors which range from the complexity of information exchanged, to the nature 
and degree of interdependence between firms, the structure of interests [Grandori, A. (1997). "An 
Organizational Assessment of Inter-firm Coordination Modes." Organization Studies 18(6): 897-925.], the ability 
to codify transactions, and the capabilities of the supply base [Gereffi, G. A., J. Humphrey, et al. (2005). "The 
governance of global value chains." Review of International Political Economy 12(1): 78-104.] have exacerbated 
this variation.   
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number of risks:  the risk of (i) financial and (ii) technological default on an agreement, 
and the risk of (iii) unwarranted technological transfer.   
 
Table VI.2 The Governance of Global Value Chains 
Market 
Governance 
Modular 
Governance 
Network 
Governance 
Captive 
Governance 
Hierarchic 
Governance 
Source: (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005) 
 
Lead firms govern the relational risks involved with first-tier suppliers in the following 
ways.  The risks of opportunism and financial default are managed by resorting to the 
group or holding corporate governance structure, (formal) hierarchical governance. Yet 
this is not the only solution, as first-tier suppliers can remain legally independent from a 
lead firm. Under such circumstances the lead firm solves the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour by means of reputational considerations, (informal) network governance. This 
informal method to rein in opportunistic behaviour is paired with very clear contractual 
obligations regarding the unwarranted sale of new designs or projects: (formal) market 
governance.   
 
The risk of technological default instead is diminished by a number of governance 
solutions that span from the cooperative to the hierarchical: often technological 
innovation is a joint-pursuit, where co-specific development becomes self-reinforcing, 
(informal) network governance in the form of sustained contingent collaborations 
(Herrigel and Wittke 2005). Alternatively lead firms ensure suppliers are on technological-
par by purchasing on their behalf the appropriate machinery and attributing it to them via 
a comodato d’uso. Furthermore lead firms employ ispettori, technical experts who travel 
across supplier firms and check their capacity to produce goods according to quality 
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standards: (formal) hierarchical governance.  Lastly, lead firms fine suppliers whenever a 
specified proportion of their work is found to be faulty, (formal) market governance.    
 
Both lead and first tier suppliers rely on second tier suppliers – SF(ISS) to manufacture 
parts of final products. These relationships are governed by price-based mechanisms 
which are not of a pure spot market type; rather are closer to the definition of (formal) 
modular governance, where know-how is extensively, though never completely, codified.  
The parties to this exchange face different relational risks: first-tier suppliers need to 
ensure that commissioned parts are delivered on time and satisfy quality requirements; 
suppliers need to hedge themselves from the possibility of an abrupt termination of the 
mandate. The price mechanism alone does not ensure that either of the two risks are 
regulated, both market and non-market coordination mechanisms are therefore employed 
to prop up the agreement.    
 
First-tier suppliers apply to second-tier suppliers the same financial penalties on 
produced goods as previously discussed, (formal) market governance. On the other, they 
rely on the reputational effect deriving from being located within a spatially closed 
network ensuring that suppliers perform well to avoid negative repercussions on other 
business relationships, (informal) network governance. This informal mechanism is 
supported by formal rules of conduct which lead firms impose on first tier suppliers which 
curtail price dumping on second tier suppliers and allow lead firms to control the quality 
and location of intermediate components. Finally, the relationship between lead firms and 
product specialists – SF(CSS) – is clearly codified and contractual, and therefore governed 
by market mechanisms alone. 
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Table VI.3 Governance mechanisms within disintegrated hierarchy 
Governance  Mechanism / 
Relational Risk 
Hierarchy Network Market 
Lead - First tier suppliers interaction 
Opportunism 
Holding 
Structure 
Reputation 
Complete Contracts 
re. Exclusivity Rights 
Technological Failure 
Direct 
Oversight 
Joint Innovation Financial Penalties 
Poaching 
Holding 
Structure 
Reputation 
Individualised Wage 
Bargaining 
Interaction with 2nd tier suppliers 
Technological Failure 
Codes of 
Conduct 
Reputation Financial Penalties 
 
Therefore, whereas Gereffi et al. (2005) suggested that any one firm can set up a value 
chain governed by different coordinating mechanisms at separate production nodes (315), 
lead firms resort to multiple governance solutions at each production node. This confirms 
their intuition that different coordinating modes do indeed govern separate yet 
interrelated production nodes of a value chain (section 6.2), but adds onto that the notion 
that each node can be governed by a simultaneous combination of governance 
mechanisms.   
 
6.3 Evidence 
 
To support the claim that detrimental institutional frameworks can be overcome by means 
of capital-skill asset pooling between firms, this research has pursued an in depth 
qualitative analysis of three industries. Quantitative analysis was deemed impossible as 
satisfactory datasets which compile information on the interaction between firms, 
specifying the size of firms and the nature of the interdependency do not yet exist. The 
case selection was driven by the objective to infer from these cases which causes lead to 
the successful export performance (today) of given Italian industries. Therefore, three 
industries have been identified by comparing their trade performance today and over 
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time: one where the revealed comparative (symmetric) advantage indicator holds a value 
greater than 0.5, one where the RSCA value increased to >0.5 and one where it decreased 
to <0.5 (i.e. the counterfactual). The case selection allows extrapolating what factor 
contributed to an industry’s continued success, incipient success, or failed success in its 
absence. It shows that the introduction of capital-skill asset pooling was crucial for solving 
the problem of skill provision faced by large firms – LF(PC) – and that of capital 
acquisition faced by small firms – SF(SS). 
  
6.3.1 Case selection 
 
The leather goods and footwear industry has resiliently proven to represent one of Italy’s 
export champion (see Ch.3 for details).  Although the trade performance of the textile 
industry as a whole has deteriorated, the two subsections investigated have exhibited 
constant or improving values of the RSCA indicator. These subsections make up for 67 per 
cent of total hand bags, 20 per cent of total footwear and of total leather exported from 
Italy (OECD ITCS 2010). The leather goods and footwear industry has over time 
undergone a constant structural evolution: moving from its early vertically integrated, to 
district-network, and to a hierarchically disintegrated form.  A similar change in the 
organisational paradigm of production appears to have taken place in the yacht-building 
industry which makes up for 52 per cent of total Italian trade in ships (OECD ITCS 2010). 
Although this was not the case fifteen years ago, today the yacht building industry exhibits 
an outstanding export performance (see Ch.4 for details). The shift from a network 
production model to disintegrated hierarchy has been identified as enabling yacht-
producers to achieve such performance.  The computer (office-equipment) industry is the 
counterfactual.  In the past this industry had come to represent one of Italy’s export 
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champions but has since the late eighties failed to replicate its earlier performance. The 
evidence shows that the inability to execute capital-skill asset pooling because of a 
mismatch in the skills required caused the industry’s downfall.  In addition, the evidence 
collected through this case study also shows that capital-skill asset pooling fails to reap 
results when capital and skills are not aligned with respect to the product market strategy 
pursued. 63 
 
6.3.2 Solutions to the problem of skill provision 
 
For all industries, small firms detain an advantage in responding to the problem of skill 
acquisition. Small artisanal firms employ young workers which receive lower salaries in 
exchange for continuous on-the-job training. Only after years of practice they are 
recognised, in terms of the salary paid, as detaining industry-specific skills: training 
qualifications are thus a function of tenure. Since a full time worker earns on average 
26,000 euro as opposed to the 11,000 euro of a young or fixed term worker (ISTAT 2006), 
since social security contributions for small firms are lower than those for large firms, the 
labour cost bill of a small firm is significantly reduced.  Although large firms also have the 
option of employing unskilled apprentices, the legal difficulty encountered in firing 
workers in the event of a future demand downturn prevents them from doing so. Stringent 
employment protection legislation and expensive social security contributions (which 
apply to large and not to small firms) act as disincentives for large firms to take on and 
train unskilled workers.   
 
                                                             
63 Evidence collected in the machine tool and packaging industry is used to reinforce the claims made.  
Although an individual chapter on this industry has not been presented, the industry was subject to in depth 
study throughout the period of investigation. 
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Italy’s institutional mix per se does not generate a pool of workers endowed with industry 
specific skills. Yet, although small and large firms in Italy suffer from the absence of a 
functioning vocational training system64, small firms have been able to bypass the 
problem. Since this is not the case for large firms, how have they been able to address this 
problem: how have large Italian firms been able to find skilled workers for the production 
of high quality goods?   
 
The model presented here suggests that large firms download to small firms most 
production functions. By so doing, they sidestep the problem of forming a skilled 
workforce by using the skills of workers employed in smaller firms directly.  The evidence 
collected suggests that, as expected, in the leather goods and footwear industry, skill 
acquisition in small artisanal firms occurs indeed via learning-by-doing.  Young workers 
are taken in and assigned to more expert workers and trained; this is particular true for 
leather-cutting and footwear shaping activities. Numbers on this phenomenon are hard to 
retrieve, but the widespread opinion of experts suggests that this is the case in the 
majority of small firms.   
 
Consequently, large firms in the leather goods and footwear industry have reduced at a 
minimum the proportion of manufacturing performed and the number of blue collar 
workers employed.  The remaining craft-workers are highly skilled and employed in style 
labs or research departments. Importantly, these have not been trained internally but 
poached from small firms. This is a common practice as large firms refrain from employing 
unskilled workers to train but rely on poaching from small firms as a mechanism to satisfy 
their own skill needs to such an extent that this practice has been termed by experts 
cannibalismo imprenditoriale.   
                                                             
64 In the opinion of experts initial vocational training system is ineffective; continuous vocational training is 
instead available to workers with significant variation across industrial sectors (see Ch.2, Table II.4). 
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Large firms in the leather goods and footwear industry de facto have persuasive 
instruments to attract workers from smaller firms: in the first place large firm workers are 
subject to the national industrial wage agreement which is renegotiated regularly whilst 
small firm workers are subject to the artisanal wage agreement which instead is 
renegotiated with substantial delays (CNEL consulted 05/2010).  Moreover, large firm 
workers may obtain productivity wage increases where previously established profit 
objectives are met by the firm (premio di maggioranza).  In the second place, the non-wage 
benefits deriving from large firm employment are preferable in terms of unemployment 
security and employment protection legislation.   
 
Nonetheless, small firms retain instruments to refrain skilled workers from leaving.  
Individualised bargaining is very common for highly skilled workers, although the actual 
numbers of the size of additional wage prizes is unknown. Moreover, although possible, 
poaching is not as common as expected as large firms refrain from most production in this 
industry and rely on quasi-complete subcontracting instead. By so doing, large firms 
bypass the problem deriving from not being able to recruit employees who are endowed 
with industry-specific skills. Therefore, large firms require the pooling of the skills held by 
small firms to produce high quality goods. 
 
In the machine tool industry the situation faced by large firms is similar.  Some istituti 
tecnici, for initial vocational training, of recognised value do exist, especially in Emilia 
Romagna – where a large proportion of machine tool exports are produced. Yet, the Aldini 
Valeriani school (Bologna) is more of an exception than the rule. Firms employing new 
workers still face the issue of forming new recruits. Again, the most common (initial and 
continuous) training mechanism is through learning by doing, both in large and smaller 
firms. Compared to the textile and leather industry, proportionately more manufacturing 
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is performed within large firms. Yet the overall disaggregation still holds, workers are 
trained in small artisanal firms and subsequently employed in larger firms at better salary 
and non-salary conditions. Large firms rely on the ability of small firms to train unskilled 
workers, and thus also benefit from the pooling of the skill asset in order to produce high 
quality goods. 
 
Drawing a comprehensive picture for the yacht-building industry though is less advisable 
because of the nature of the industry. Yacht-building is a by-product of a variety of 
specialisations and therefore of a variety of systems of skill production. Experts claim that 
the national characteristics of the vocational training system hold within each sub-
industrial activity (Casini-Benvenuti 2002 : 26; CNA-Liguria 2002; ISMERI-EUROPA 2006 : 
23-31), consequently small firms resort to training workers on the job. In the ship-
building environment, this is the case for furniture producers as well as for hull, engine 
and cable manufacturers. The large firm is, particularly in this industry, simply an 
assembly overseer. Very little manufacturing is performed by it.  In this sense it obviates 
the issue arising from the inability of obtaining a trained workforce directly by 
subcontracting production to smaller firms which continuously train their workers on the 
job – it thus requires the pooling of skills in order to produce its desired outputs.   
 
In the office-equipment (computer) industry, the largest firm, Olivetti, attempted to train 
workers employed in small local firms in order to access the skills necessary for the 
pursuit of radical innovation or of low cost production. Its strategy involved mechanisms 
which enabled direct technology exchanges and established innovation-enhancing 
partnerships (see Section 5.3.1 for details). Essentially, and differently from the other 
industries discussed, this large firm chose to invest in the training of workers beyond its 
legal boundaries. Yet the local training effort proved to be costly and ineffective. Small 
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firms did not deliver the desired skill-set required by the technological changes which 
were taking place in the computer industry. Therefore, the large firm, Olivetti, could only 
find a functional substitute to the lacking national system of skill provision by resorting to 
international R&D partnerships and venture capital investment.   
 
6.3.3 Solutions to the problem of capital acquisition 
 
In relation to the problem of capital acquisition, Italy’s institutional mix does not provide 
access to patient capital to all firms. On the one hand the ownership of both large and 
small firms is concentrated (Bianchi, Bianco et al. 2005) and the system is characterised by 
the widespread use of pyramidal ownership structures (Bianco and Casavola 1999; 
Bianchi, Bianco et al. 2005; Culpepper 2005; Deeg 2005).   
 
These mechanisms allow firms to access large sources of patient capital (Culpepper 2005).  
Yet, whilst this is true for medium, large and listed firms, it is instead a distorted image of 
the financing capacity of small firms. Thus, on the other hand, small enterprises can only 
finance themselves through short term bank lending and the reinvestment of cash flows 
(discussed in Ch.2, Section 2.2.2). Italy’s banking regulation, set up after the financial crisis 
of the late twenties, implied that banks could not hold ownership shares in firms.  
Consequently, banks could not develop a knowledge and understanding of firms’ 
manufacturing strategies: this problem was particularly acute the smaller the firm.  
Despite the fact that Italy’s banking regulation was reformed in the nineties, in particular 
restrictions on the ownership of shares by banks, the attitude of banks towards lending to 
small firms was not affected. Moreover, the introduction of new international banking 
standards (Basel I, II and recently III) has made banks more averse to lending to small 
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firms because it is difficult to accurately price and value the risk which derives from this 
lending. In order to meet their capital needs small firms would in the past resort to the 
sourcing of short term loans from multiple banks. 
 
 Therefore, whilst large firms are capable of raising patient capital through internal capital 
markets, small firms are not. How do they then overcome the problems accruing from 
inadequate financing? The evidence on how medium to large firms have acquired patient 
capital in the industries analysed is organised around large and small firms. First the 
evidence shows that large firms rely on internal sources of funding or closer relations with 
banks/investors in order to satisfy their funding requirements. Small firms instead rely on 
large firms who directly or indirectly provide capital:  in order to overcome the problem of 
financing, small firms resort to capital asset pooling with large firms. 
 
In the leather goods and footwear industry two financing scenarios have emerged: some 
established brands have over the last ten years been purchased by international luxury 
holding companies such as Pinault-Printemps-Redoute or Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy.  
The former for example owns important large historical Italian firms such as Gucci, Sergio 
Rossi, Bottega Veneta etc. The latter owns firms of the likes of Fendi and Berluti. This 
scenario is confronted by one where historical Italian firms have instead constructed 
groups of national and non-national companies: exemplary cases are Ferragamo, Tod’s, 
Prada and Diesel. Both scenarios have delivered to the parent as well as the controlled 
firm relatively unlimited sources of internal financing at beneficial terms, therefore 
limiting the need to access external sources of finance. Large firms in the machine tool 
industry too have over time performed acquisitions of suppliers or competitors such that 
today the group holding form is most common (although Tod’s has recently become a 
listed company in 2000, control is securely held within the founding family).   
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In the packaging industry located in Bologna, this is clearly the case where the most 
important manufacturers stand at the helm of groups of four to two-digit numbers of 
firms. The packaging leader GD over time set up a group of complementary companies 
called COESA which today includes ACMA, CIMA, GD, GDM, HAPA, LAETUS, SIRIUS 
MACHINERY (which includes NORDEN, KALIX, ADMV, SACMO, CITUS) and VOLPAK.  
Lastly, this appears to be the case also in the yacht-building industry where both Benetti 
and Ferretti have set up group structures which include a minimum of four other 
companies. In the computer industry, Olivetti instead relied on external sources of 
funding. Throughout its existence, Swiss banks, Mediobanca and other Italian banks 
provided the company with liquidity. Although a fraction of its shares were held by family 
members and employees, this block-holding group was too small to overcome the 
influence exerted by short-term credit providers.   
 
On the other, small firms cannot recur to such possibilities65. The ownership structure of 
small firms is concentrated, but small firms are not arranged in groups or holding 
structures. Thus, beyond the financing-by-cash-flow and multiaffidamento mechanisms 
discussed they do not have access to other internal means of financing. In order to 
overcome this problem small firms rely on indirect forms of securing stable cash flows.  
Throughout the industries, small firms negotiate better credit conditions from banks 
because of the reputational benefits they accrue from supplying established larger firms.  
In this light, CariFirenze66 recently officially launched a new loan instrument (contratto di 
rete) for small firms which are known to supply larger firms. The large firm thus provides 
the bank with enough reputational assurance that the small firm will comply with its 
repayment obligations. Alternatively large and small firms agree (formally or informally) 
                                                             
65 Since small firms in each industry are characterised by similar features, they are treated jointly. 
66 CariFirenze is one of the largest Tuscan banks (the other being Monte dei Paschi di Siena), and has recently 
been acquired by Intesa San Paolo as part of the wave of mergers and acquisitions which has characterised 
Italy’s banks. 
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on long term supplying agreements which ensure cash-flows for the period agreed. Yet, 
these agreements – especially where informally negotiated – are always open to the 
possibility of waiver on behalf of large firms.  The last capital pooling mechanism does not 
carry this risk.  Large firms can purchase directly the new equipment or machinery needed 
by small firms and grant small firms the machines’ right of use (this legal formula is 
termed comodato d’uso). Capital asset pooling therefore emerges as the solution through 
which small firms find patient capital to finance themselves. 
 
In the office-equipment (computer) industry instead, part of the “new course” strategy 
involved setting predefined limits to the number of purchases from each supplier. Whilst 
this policy was conceived to increase small firms’ flexibility and inventiveness, it actually 
crippled their ability to raise the necessary large sums of impatient capital necessary for 
the pursuit of radical innovation.  In the Italian office equipment industry, small firms did 
not find a large firm willing to pool the capital asset with them in order to bypass Italy’s 
banking institutions and its under-developed market for venture capital.   
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
Building on the empirical question offered by the performance of Italy’s export oriented 
manufacturing firms, the first part of this chapter has introduced a model of production 
which explains how firms set in a dysfunctional institutional system, which endows them 
with different production assets, produce high or diversified quality goods. The model, in 
its simplest version, is made of two firms: a large firm endowed with the patient capital 
asset and a small firm endowed with the specific skill: LF(PC) and SF(SS). Once the 
population of small firms is accepted to be less cohesive than initially assumed, small firms 
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are found to differ in line with the different skill profiles held: SF(FSS), SF(ISS), SF(CSS).  
Given that firms differ in line with the asset possessed, the model suggests that the 
interaction of the large and small firms ensures that the necessary preconditions for the 
production of high quality goods are met by all firms.  Capital-skill asset pooling allows 
firms to obtain the necessary assets of production even when they are not owned by all 
firms at the same time.   
 
This chapter has shown that as a consequence of capital-skill asset pooling, a hybrid 
system of production emerges which incorporates both features of hierarchic and of 
disintegrated production. This system is neither completely hierarchical nor horizontal as 
vertical integration does not take place and as relationships between firms are not 
symmetric. Disintegrated hierarchy is instead a form of production organisation distinct 
from the simple triad of hierarchy, network and markets. Crucial to disintegrated 
hierarchy is the notion that firms become interdependent because of a need to use each 
other’s production assets. Hence, as firms no longer maintain full control over production, 
innovation and financing processes via complete contracts, relational risks arise which 
must be addressed. Since disintegrated hierarchy’s organisational form results from the 
combination of elements of hierarchy, networks and markets, firms use both formal and 
informal mechanisms to govern this interdependency. Yet, neither governance mechanism 
alone is binding or capable of assuring the minimisation of opportunism, technological 
failure and poaching risks; rather the combination of the three ensures that they are 
minimised.  Consequently, as relational risks are tackled, disintegrated hierarchy operates 
as an extended production chain which is populated by heterogeneously endowed firms.  
 
In the second part, this chapter has presented evidence showing that this production 
model is capable of accounting for the performance of Italy’s strong export industries.  
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Capital-skill asset pooling appears to have provided an answer to the problem of skill 
provision faced by large firms. Since large firms are confronted with an inefficient 
vocational training system, they fail to resort to a pool of skilled workers easily.  By 
downloading most production phases to small firms, the large firm has obviated its skill 
problem. Moreover, since small firms face a difficulty in accessing the patient capital to 
innovate and to set up extensive distribution networks, they rely instead on the mediating 
role of large firms. Large firms, either directly (comodato d’uso) or indirectly (reputational 
guarantees), have supported small firms in meeting their financing requirements. In sum, 
the evidence has shown that large and small firms in Italy have set up an organisational 
structure which generates functional substitutes to a classic coordinated market economy 
system.  
 
The identification of disintegrated hierarchy as a yet another model of production 
organisation calls for an interpretation of firm behaviour which differs from that put 
forward by Hall and Soskice. In disintegrated hierarchy, firms are not only institutional 
takers, rather they are strategic actors capable of overcoming structural and institutional 
constraints. Within disintegrated hierarchy, firms overcome institutionally derived 
constraints (i.e. the problem of skewed skill provision and capital acquisition system) via 
inter-firm networks, strategically set up so as to bring together firms with different 
production assets. Thus firms are recognised as being first empowered by the institutional 
set-up that nurtures them and, where necessary, as being capable of identifying solutions 
to the problems caused by the very institutions that had first empowered them. To further 
tease out these differences, the first part of the following chapter juxtaposes disintegrated 
hierarchy to the German, French and Anglo-Saxon models of capitalism. Specifically, each 
model of production organisation is investigated in terms of its ability to provide skills and 
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capital to firms, and in terms of the large-small firm nexus. In a second part, the chapter 
also discusses the limitations and extensions of disintegrated hierarchy.  
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VII. COMPARATIVE MODELS OF PRODUCTION: CONTEXTUALISING 
DISINTEGRATED HIERARCHY 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
The main finding of this thesis contends that internationally competitive Italian firms have 
come to organise their production structure in such a way which takes advantage of the 
dysfunctionalities of Italy’s institutional framework.  Italian firms have in fact developed 
substitutive mechanisms for the production of high quality goods which avert the 
prescriptions of the literature.  This thesis has shown that although Italy’s institutional 
framework does not endow firms with patient capital and industry specific skills, Italian 
firms have been able to produce and export high quality goods by developing functional 
substitutes to access the necessary input factors.  By supporting inter-firm networks 
which bring together differently endowed firms, disintegrated hierarchy has allowed firms 
to pool the factor endowments required to produce high quality goods and to bridge the 
institutional divide which characterises small and large firms. 
 
Italy’s institutional framework has been identified as carrying a size discriminating bias 
which affects the institutional assets accessed by differently sized firms.  Whereas large 
firms are capable of funding themselves by means of patient capital, small firms can only 
resort to personal financing or short-term bank lending.  Whereas large firms fail to have 
access to a pool of redundant capacities, small firms form their workers by means of on 
the job training.  Yet, by resorting to capital-skill asset pooling, large and small firms have 
been able to pool together the factor endowments required to produce high quality goods 
(Streeck 1991b; Herrigel 1996; Soskice 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; Herrmann 2008a). 
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In order to move beyond the single case study, this conclusion contextualises the thesis’ 
finding.  First, it shows why disintegrated hierarchy departs from other models of 
production organisation.  Crucially, it shows that capital-skill asset pooling does not 
inform the relationship between large and small firms in other economies.  Secondly, the 
chapter highlights why the thesis’ approach differs from the relevant literature and 
investigates the implications of disintegrated hierarchy on the study of institutions and 
models of capitalism.  Lastly, the conclusion discusses the main limitations of the 
argument and the avenues of future research which depart from it.  Since disintegrated 
hierarchy is defined in a static perspective, questions of dynamics and change remain 
unanswered. 
 
7.1 Disintegrated hierarchy in comparative perspective 
 
The main finding of this thesis is that high quality production can take place even when 
the pre-conditions for its successful implementation do not exist.  In practice, lead firms 
have employed the patient capital asset to invest in product development and distribution 
and have then downloaded the production of goods to small firms; therefore treating small 
firm employees as a pool of redundant capacities.  The model of production which results 
includes defining characteristics of both vertically disintegrated and hierarchical 
production and is called disintegrated hierarchy.   
 
On the other hand, the dominant categories used to classify advanced industrial 
economies in the literature have been liberal, coordinated and statist.  These typologies, 
enthused by Anglo-Saxon German and French examples, depart from disintegrated 
hierarchy in a variety of ways which are summarised in the following section. 
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7.1.1 Liberal capitalism in Anglo-Saxon economies 
 
The United Kingdom and the United States are prime examples of liberal market 
economies as they share an important characteristic: namely the dominant use of market 
mechanisms for the governance and control of labour, financial, product and inter-firm 
markets67.    
  
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance markets lean heavily in favour of management’s 
unilateral control of the firm, where employees and their representatives have a very 
limited ability to influence strategy and employment-related decision-making.  Except few 
industrial areas, where firm-level unionism is still strongly rooted (aerospace for 
example), the representation of workers’ rights or the collective negotiation of wages are 
not functions taken up by trade unions.  Management is therefore endowed with unilateral 
power inside as well as outside the firm. The Anglo-Saxon market for corporate control 
encourages firms to treat current earnings and share prices as informative of a company’s 
strength (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001 : 28-29).   
 
Within this system, firms can neither access patient capital nor a workforce endowed with 
industry-specific skills.  This ultimately implies that the product market strategy pursued 
by firms lies at the opposite spectrum of high quality production and is not characterised 
by incremental innovation. In detail: financing is market-based and a concentrated 
financial sector avoids close interaction with firms (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1997).  
Therefore whilst larger firms search financing through stock markets and venture capital, 
                                                             
67 Of the two economies, only the latter has kept a significant manufacturing sector.  Though mostly directed to 
a domestic market, the US exhibits a comparative advantage in high technology industries; producing military 
equipment, electronic goods, and pharmaceuticals [Dore, R. P., W. Lazonick, et al. (1999). "Varieties of 
Capitalism in the Twentieth Century." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15(4): 102-120, Allen, M., L. Funk, et al. 
(2006). "Can Variation in Public Policies Account for Differences in Comparative Advantage?" Journal of Public 
Policy 26: 1-9.]. 
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smaller firms encounter difficulties in financing themselves in equity and stock markets 
and rely on short-term bank financing (Bluhm and Martens 2009).  Moreover, a market-
based financial sector crucially shies away from building strategic and continuous 
interactions with firms, thus limiting the industry’s role in mediating and disseminating 
information across firms: this implies that patient capital is not accessible to firms (though 
this is not necessarily the most relevant implication, see Hall and Soskice 2001 : 29, 
footnote 26). The structure of Anglo-Saxon labour markets facilitate employer’s use of 
numerical flexibility: employees are thus easily hired and fired, and fail to develop specific 
skills (Dore, Lazonick et al. 1999; Howell 2005).  Additionally, a system for vocational 
training in not at all in place in the US (OECD 2004; OECD 2008).  One was instead set up 
in the UK in the early sixties, though never delivering on its objectives68. Given these 
preconditions, British and US workers are endowed with general skills, easily transferable 
across companies and industries. Because the system is prone towards the provision non-
specific skills, some firms have resorted to providing in-house training to their workers.  
Yet, even in such cases, emphasis is placed on the ability to transfer the internally acquired 
skills elsewhere.   
 
The model of capitalism in place in the UK and the US is therefore termed liberal since 
individuals and firms address the relational problems involved in the delivery of 
productive input factors via price-based, free market, interaction (Hall and Soskice 2001 : 
27). Institutions are homogeneous to the extent that firms of different sizes are equally 
subject to the same constraints and endowed with the same assets. Contrarily to the 
Italian case, market based interaction permeates exchanges across all actors. 
Consequently, inter-firm interaction is characterised by the possibility of hostile take-over, 
                                                             
68 Many explanations  have been set forth to explain the failure of the British vocational training system: (1) 
responsibility for training was laid on the individual and not on the system of firms as a whole, (2) training 
was only offered part-time, (3) and only to youths [ Layard, R., K. Mayhew, et al. (1993). "The Training Reform 
Act of 1994." International Journal of Manpower 14(5): 5-16, Stevens, M. (1999). "Human capital theory and UK 
vocational training policy " Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15: 16-32.].  
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mergers and acquisition, legitimated by a market-oriented regulatory system.  Aggressive 
inter-firm relations limit the possibility of collaborative and strategic relations to develop.  
Technology does not travel easily across firms, but through specialist workers who 
migrate across them. This is facilitated by Anglo-Saxon labour market legislation which 
facilitates numerical flexibility by limiting employment protection legislation and by 
allowing individualised wage bargaining to become widespread (Wood 2001; Driffill 
2006).  In addition, firms do not set collective standards, but allow the market to 
competitively select the standards worth licensing (Hall and Soskice 2001 : 31). 
 
The large-small firm nexus is also infused by this market logic and has not been altered by 
the inception of turn-key modular productive systems in the US (Sturgeon 1997; Sturgeon 
2002). The likelihood of dependency between two firms is limited because the exchange 
between a buyer and a turn-key supplier does not exceed 20 per cent of the latter’s total 
production. In addition, the degree of interdependence between firms is low (medium to 
low) as knowledge is codified and easily accessible to potential entrants. Lastly, the 
dominant mode of exchange is price-based (Sturgeon 1997 : 39-41). Indeed, a few 
instances of collaborative relationships have been identified in the US, yet they appear to 
be experimental and piecemeal (Herrigel and Wittke 2005 : 345).   
 
7.1.2 Coordinated capitalism and decentralised production in Germany 
 
The German productive landscape today follows from the evolution of the decentralised 
industrial order. Whereas autarkic and decentralised industrial orders had co-existed until 
the late seventies, the autarkic-mass production system reached its final stages once 
product markets became increasingly volatile in the late seventies. Consequently, as the 
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influence of the autarkic system declined, the institutional equilibrium that had 
characterised the production structure of Germany’s small and medium enterprises came 
to dominate the country’s entire system of industrial production (Herrigel 1996 : 238).  
Subcontracting amongst small firms dominated manufacturing extensively as firms would 
only customise products sourced from the outside: production itself was viewed 
expediently (Herrigel 1996 : 183).   
 
During the late seventies, the decentralised industrial order was transformed by 
surrounding market pressures.  In the eighties, production processes were reorganised 
and subcontracting became characterised by intensive and collaborative exchanges - not 
just a simple buy-sell relationship (Streeck 1992; Soskice 1994; Soskice 1999).  As a result, 
the costs of innovation were shifted away from individual producers and onto the 
collectivity of regional producers and institutions (Streeck 1991a; Herrigel 1996 : 184; 
Soskice 1999). This shift was enabled by the mediating presence of an exoskeleton of 
support which socialised the cost of adjustment.  The institutions which composed such 
exoskeleton were the: (i) educational institutions, universities, Fachhochschule, and 
Berufsschule; (ii) trade associations and chambers of commerce (VDMA Verein Deutscher 
Maschinen und Anlagenbau, ZVEI Zentral Verband Deutscher Elektro-Industrie) which 
provided small firms with market information, information on technology development 
programs, and coordinated relations among firms in the important activity of standard 
setting; (iii) Volksbanken, regional banks, which facilitated the flow of credit to local firms 
and took on a care-taking and mediating role between firms; and (iv) the regional 
government which pursued aggressive technology policies (Streeck 1991a; Herrigel 1996 : 
186-188; Soskice 1999). Small firms therefore endorsed practices of collaborative sub-
contracting, and relations of a hierarchical nature remained absent.  Big firms partook of 
this industrial readjustment by building relationships of collaborative sub-contracting 
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with external specialists.  By encouraging long term relations with subcontractors, large 
firms built an external portfolio of technological possibilities for themselves (Herrigel 
1996 : 190). 
 
Through this system, firms addressed the problems of raising patient capital and accessing 
a pool of industry skilled workers (Hall and Soskice 2001).  The financial and corporate 
ownership system partook to these changes by becoming actively involved in clients’ 
businesses (Hall and Soskice 2001). This involvement allowed banks the necessary 
internal knowledge to borrow long term, patient, capital; to act as brokers between firms; 
and to participate directly in firms by buying up equity through the institution of capital 
participation corporations (KBGs) (Herrigel 1996 : 186; Hall and Soskice 2001 : 23).  
Patience in borrowing was also reinforced by the practice of socialised decision-making 
within the firm  (Spiro 1954; Jackson 2005).   
 
With reference to skills, a skilled workforce was the outcome of the interaction of an 
industrial relations and a social protection system biased towards employment protection 
and worker participation within the firm(Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001).  Today, initial 
and continuous vocational training is co-managed by employer associations, trade unions 
and regional governments (Streeck, Hilbert et al. 1987; Hall and Soskice 2001 : 24-25; 
Thelen 2004): training is organised by unions and employers, and the cost of in-firm 
training is bourn by employers (Estevez-Abe, Iversen et al. 2001).  Moreover unions and 
employer associations pressure firms into taking on apprentices and participating to such 
training schemes (Culpepper 2001). The regional state provides the infrastructural facility 
for the general training to take place.  By so doing free-riding on the training investment of 
others is limited and an external pool of workers endowed with industry specific skills is 
created (Hall and Soskice 2001 : 25).   
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The model of capitalism in place in Germany is therefore termed coordinated since 
individuals and firms solve the relational problems involved in the delivery of these input 
factors via strategic, and coordinated, interaction (Hall and Soskice 2001 : 22). The 
institutions which operate in such a framework are homogeneous as they are governed by 
the same coordination mechanism and endow firms with equal assets of production. 
Consequently, the relation between large and small firms is mostly cooperative and non-
hierarchical  (Herrigel and Wittke 2005). Some variation exists as is captured, for example, 
by the different relations entertained between Audi and BMW and their respective 
suppliers (Casper 1995). Nonetheless, the dominant trend is for large and small firms to 
engage in sustained collaborative relations, with a particular attention towards 
maintaining independence status on both sides. Exclusive subcontracting relations are 
confined to at most 10-30 per cent of a company’s output (Herrigel 1996 : 185). This 
landscape is, largely, still reproduced despite the increasing cost pressures that large firms 
impose on suppliers (Herrigel and Wittke 2005 : 328).   
 
This is at odds with disintegrated hierarchy whereby large and small firms are endowed 
with heterogeneous assets of production and where large and small firms’ relationships 
are informed by the need to engage in capital-skill asset pooling.  Although the German 
model is subject to pressures to reform (Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2011), the 
difference between the two is continuously reproduced.  For example, German firms have 
constructed comparable subcontracting partnerships abroad: ‘even within […] a highly 
globalised industry […] the configuration of the (German) value chain is still influenced by 
the social institutional context of […] firms’ home country’ (Lane and Probert 2009 : 18-19).   
 
German subcontracting relationships between large and small firms are thus 
characterised by sustained collaborative exchanges. These are neither hierarchical nor 
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monopolistic and depart from the Italian model of capitalism whereby both coordination 
and markets mechanisms inform the relationship between large and small firms.    
 
7.1.3 From etatist to large-firm capitalism in France 
 
In France, the state was the dominant coordinating actor; hence the etatist typology 
(Schmidt 2003).  Over the last decade or so, the statist mode of coordination has been 
eroded by a combination of market and firm-driven pressures (Goyer 2006; Hall, Palier et 
al. 2006).  Although large firms have gained extensive control and redefined institutions to 
their use (Hancké 2002), they did not develop the “capacity to convert their individual 
positions of power into a consistent means of control over the economy” (Culpepper 2006).  
Indeed decentralised private action has curtailed the ability of the French state to affect 
the direction of change and adjustment of the economy, without replacing it entirely.   
 
Whilst in the trente glorieuses the state exercised substantial control in the area of 
corporate governance and finance, this is no longer the case today.  Previously, by holding 
large ownership stakes in the economy, through industrial planning and direct credit 
allocation, the state exercised control over the economy (Hall 1986).  Since the 
privatisations of Chirac’s rightist government, the stake of the state in the economy has 
shrunk; employment in the public sector has fallen (Schmidt 2002); and foreign 
institutional investors have replaced the French noyaux durs69 thus crippling the level of 
mutual cross-shareholding (Culpepper 2006; Goyer 2006).   
 
Whilst the French state was the stronger of the three industrial relations players - by 
virtue of its being a significant employer and its capacity to influence wage levels - this 
                                                             
69 Hard core owners. 
229 
 
status altered in the nineties. Firm-level wage flexibility became ever more widespread as 
employers increasingly resorted to firm-level exemptions from state imposed salary and 
normative agreements. Yet the vacuum left by the state as a coordinating agent in the 
industrial relations system was not filled neither by unions nor employer association. The 
(already limited) ability of unions to influence firm level negotiations was further curtailed 
by the introduction of working-time reforms (the Robien Law and the two Aubry Laws) - 
which by-passed the position of unions as negotiators (Culpepper 2006).  Employers too 
were extremely fragmented and incapable of allowing information to flow to and from 
each other.  
 
In terms of skill profiles, the training system of Fordist-France aimed at producing a 
meritocratically selected elite and relegated less worthy students to a, largely ineffective, 
vocational training track. The skill weakness of workers was balanced by the formation of 
a highly selected, interconnected and state-controlled elite (Culpepper 2006). Yet, in order 
to respond to the increased need of a skilled workforce in post-Fordist industry, the state 
downloaded responsibility for organising vocational training to the regional level through 
the Five Year Law of 1993. Whilst the region was even less capable than the state in 
facilitating information flows across firms and workers, this policy shift enabled – in some 
regions – large firms to take over the planning and coordinating role which had once been 
the remit of the state (Hancké 2002).  The power of these large firms overshadowed the 
limited collective capacities of employer associations, thus enabling regional training 
policies to meet their skill needs. Large firms thus capably replaced the state’s 
coordinating role within specific areas by deploying pre-existing policies in such a way 
that met their own demands (Hancké 2001 : 326).  
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Within this system, how did firms solve the relational problems involved in accessing 
patient capital and an industry-skilled workforce? Firstly a necessary caveat must be 
made: French production is based on rapid model cycles, where OEMs invest in fast 
product development, machinery and market (Hancké 2001 : 330). Moreover, the 
innovation strategy of French firms is closer to an Anglo-Saxon radical innovation strategy 
rather than a German incremental one (Goyer 2001). In this sense, large French firms 
require less patient capital, but more capital in absolute terms. Today firms increasingly 
access these resources through capital markets and partially through the reinvestment of 
retained earnings. The ability to finance themselves through such mechanisms is a direct 
implication of the reduced influence of the state and the noyaux durs on controlling the 
capital structure of firms (Hancké 2001 : 331). In this sense, the changes which took place 
in the French corporate governance system over the last 10-15 years, have dove-tailed the 
shift from a Fordist to radically innovative and niche product market strategy.   
 
The pursuit of a radically innovative manufacturing strategy relies on the ability of firms 
to access skilled workers. Within the large firm regional productive networks, large firms 
have indeed developed a system to bend the dysfunctions of the general education system.  
Large firms have thus used regional industrial and training policies to redefine the skill 
profiles of local workers, consequently upgrading their productive capacity as well as that 
of the local suppliers they would resort to (Hancké 2001 : 327). The changes to the 
structure of production in France, which have sanctioned the importance of large firms, 
are dovetailed by the type of relationship which characterises the large-small firm nexus. 
In France, large firms have indeed invested in suppliers in order to coordinate their 
technological upgrading. Nonetheless, there is no close involvement between the two in 
product development, design and innovation. These functions remain strongly 
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circumscribed to the large firm, which subsequently subcontracts the production of 
standardised and modularised components to capable suppliers (Hancké 2001: 327).  
 
In sum this discussion has shown that disintegrated hierarchy is at odds with previously 
acknowledged models of production. Specifically, when compared to liberal and 
coordinated models, disintegrated hierarchy lacks their institutional coherence. When 
compared to a French large-firm dominated model, disintegrated hierarchy is fuzzier as 
the dividing line between large and small firms is less clear.  This discussion therefore 
suggests that disintegrated hierarchy emerges as a stand-alone production model which 
builds on the recognition that institutions cater firms heterogeneously and segmentally.   
 
7.2 Limitations of disintegrated hierarchy 
 
Disintegrated hierarchy facilitates a better understanding of how some Italian firms have 
been capable of competing in international markets despite dysfunctional institutions 
whereas both liberal and coordinated models had been unable to do so. Contra to such 
models, this research has shown that capital-skill asset pooling within disintegrated 
hierarchy solves the production problems faced by Italian firms. Moreover, the thesis has 
shown that both capital-skill asset pooling and disintegrated hierarchy hinge on the co-
presence of capable suppliers and lead firms. Yet, the preconditions for each to emerge are 
not defined. Additionally, on the basis of the research performed, a systematically tested 
account of these preconditions is not possible. Yet an informed attempt to identify them 
can be made instead, which is vital for any possible policy conclusions to be drawn. 
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7.2.1 On the political determinants of lead firm emergence 
 
Lead firms have been defined as large mass producers or medium sized companies, 
“benefiting from access to long term capital70” (Bianco and Casavola 1999; Barca and 
Becht 2002; Bianchi, Bianco et al. 2005; Culpepper 2005; Deeg 2005).  Moreover, it is clear 
why a large firm may decide to become a lead firm: “the (medium-to-) large firm wants to 
pursue a product market strategy which delivers high or diversified quality goods in order 
to survive in increasingly price-competitive markets. To do so it plans to upgrade the 
quality of the goods sold” (page 17, Ch.2). Yet although the incentives for a large firm to 
become a lead firm are clear, the thesis has only provided structural descriptive 
characteristics without explaining what causal mechanisms transform a large firm into a 
lead firm.  This is a clear limitation of the research strategy pursued which classifies 
successful firms as lead firms based on the position occupied in the productive filierè, 
without investigating the process which brought them there.  
    
A historical analysis of the lead firms studied in this research may enable a clarification of 
which critical junctures or preconditions allowed their establishment.  A superficial 
investigation suggests that managerial capacity as well as time contingent events 
interacted in transforming simple firms into leaders of a disintegrated, yet hierarchical, 
supply chain.  Such time contingent events (also called “enabling conditions” by Strang and 
Sine 2001) for example comprise the combination of a public auction for the failed Cantieri 
Benetti and Azimut’s capacity to make a successful offer in 1985; or Norberto Ferretti’s 
ability to take up the opportunity to move from the automotive retailing to the yacht 
producing industry in 1971.  Yet, time contingent events together with managerial 
capacity may have been necessary but not sufficient conditions for such a transformation. 
                                                             
70 Whilst large firms develop privileged relationships with financial intermediaries, medium sized companies 
can often be part of larger holding structures, and have access to internal capital markets. 
233 
 
One common thread that appears to run through all these firms is their ability to set up 
extensive retail networks conducive to international saleability and thus success.  
Furthermore, lead firms possess the necessary know-how and informal linkages which 
enable the identification of capable suppliers, and more importantly of first tier suppliers.  
In this sense, lead firms must either establish an information clearing mechanism or build 
close relationships with whomever takes on this role (be it the local state, the local trade 
union or employer association). 
 
Table VII.1 Comparison of lead firm features 
 
Leather goods 
and footwear 
Machine tool 
and packaging 
Yacht 
building 
Office-equipment  / 
computer 
Distribution network Yes Yes Yes 
Yes  
(though had shrunk 
in the 90s) 
Connection to information 
clearing actor 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Political connection Yes Yes Partial No 
Trade union connection Yes Yes No No 
Employer ass. connection Partial No Yes No 
 
Thus, one could suggest that necessary preconditions entail the ability of firms to establish 
international distribution networks; possess a portfolio of tacit knowledge on the 
capacities and possibilities of suppliers; or access a preferential information channel to the 
information clearing agent in place (the relevant political authority, trade union or 
employer association). Based on this discussion, Table VII.1 lists the presence and absence 
of certain conditions by industry: it summarises these combinations and suggests that the 
empirical material accumulated so far is not yet conclusive.  It nonetheless provides an 
insightful starting point upon which a forthcoming research strategy can be built geared 
towards identifying which preconditions are necessary and sufficient for lead firms to 
develop. 
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7.2.2 On the political determinants of capable supplier emergence 
 
Parallel to this is the question of establishing what preconditions lead to the emergence of 
a capable supply base. Although the small firm training mechanism allows for the 
reproduction of pre-existing skills, the thesis has not developed an argument as to how 
such skills emerged in the first place. The majority of scholars71 on Italian local 
development refer to the notion of diffuse knowledge and external economies of scale 
arising from industrial concentration and local proximity to explain why such capabilities 
exist.  Yet it is hard to translate such statements into testable hypotheses.  There is thus a 
need to identify what conditions and mechanisms allow for the development of a capable 
supply base. This need is reinforced by the objective to articulate effective policy 
prescriptions which may enable disintegrated hierarchy to root itself in other Italian 
industries or other countries.  Also in this case, the field research has provided additional 
insights to develop tentative hypotheses as to what conditions lead to the formation of 
diffuse knowledge (Table VII.2).    
 
Firstly, there is evidence of pre-dating forms of industrial concentration across all local 
areas where successful industries emerged.  Azimut-Benetti for example is located in the 
proximity of the Fratelli Orlando shipyard, a very important ship-building company in the 
early 1900.  Similarly, war-related machine industries were spread across Emilia Romagna 
in the forties and fifties.  In this sense, the successful firms studied are located in areas 
where a primary industrial system had lost ground and a secondary system replaced it by 
specialising in adjunct industrial activities (Bellandi 2001).  Secondly, it appears that in the 
vicinities of the successful firms studied, industry-specific vocational training high-schools 
had been in place and continue to exist today.  Based on the widespread opinion of 
                                                             
71 As well as all the interviewees contacted. 
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experts, one can plausibly assume that the training received was not technically advanced, 
but that such environment allowed for relationships of trust and reciprocal awareness to 
develop (Farrell and Holten 2001). Thirdly, local authorities appear to have performed 
important regulatory functions in all industries except the office-equipment one.  When 
Olivetti introduced its “new course” strategy, no local authority endorsed it72.  No local, or 
national, authority intervened to facilitate the industry’s transition from a vertically 
integrated to a disintegrated structure.  The first public intervention dates back to the 
early nineties with a territorial pact signed by local administrations to address the 
employment crisis which followed Olivetti’s switch into the telecoms sector (Michelsons 
1997; Schmidt, Hoss et al. 2002, with reference to the interviews conducted by 
A.Michelsons).  Yet, this is a very controversial terrain as the effect of local institutions on 
local development is unclear: whereas there is plenty of evidence in support of a positive 
effect  (Leonardi, Putnam et al. 1987; Leonardi, Nanetti et al. 1991; Bellandi and Russo 
1994; Burroni 2001; Crouch 2001; Rodríguez-Pose and Refolo 2003); there is also plenty 
that is not (Marelli 1997; Rinaldi 2002; Guelpa and Micelli 2007; Milio 2007 on the 
heterogeneous effect of local institutions). 
 
Table VII.2 Comparison of local markets and institutional backgrounds 
 
Leather 
goods and 
footwear 
Machine tool 
and packaging 
Yacht-
building 
Office-
equipment  / 
computer 
Pre-dating industries Yes Yes Yes No 
Local training school Yes Yes Yes No 
Active local authorities Yes Yes Later No 
 
 
                                                             
72 Public authorities did play a role in bailing out Olivetti in the sixties first and in the mid seventies through 
IRI, the government’s industrial policy arm.  Yet this aid purely consisted in reallocating Olivetti’s ownership 
shares from the founding family to Italy’s banking and industrial families (the so-called Milanese salotti buoni) 
[Bricco, P. (2009). Olivetti, prima e dopo Adriano.  Industria cultura estetica. Bracigliano (Sa), L'Ancora del 
Mediterraneo.].  
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Based on this discussion, Table VII.2 suggests that the three factors appear to play a role in 
supporting the development of a capable supply-base, yet the research strategy adopted 
cannot establish necessity or sufficiency. Another, future, research avenue is outlined by 
comparing local production systems with and without capable suppliers. Such a 
comparison could also explain why disintegrated hierarchy has not, for example, 
developed in Spain where the structural composition of the size of firms in the economy, 
as well as the institutionally-informed size-discrimination, is very similar to Italy’s.   
 
7.3 Departures and extensions 
 
Although a clear assessment of the preconditions which led to the emergence of 
disintegrated hierarchy is not yet possible, its inception nonetheless welcomes a 
reassessment of the importance of firm size in structuring models of production. 
Additionally its inception calls for a reinterpretation of the dichotomous relation between 
coherence and complementarity as disintegrated hierarchy allows incoherent institutions 
to become complementary, although complementarity was assumed to be grounded on 
principles of coherence and homogeneity (Hall and Soskice 2001; Boyer 2005; Crouch 
2005; Crouch, Streeck et al. 2005).  These extensions to the thesis’ argument speak to the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature to the extent that its main premises had consisted of an 
understanding of firms as homogeneous and of similarity as a proxy for complementarity 
– in what follows, this section expands on these themes.  
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7.3.1Departing from the varieties of Capitalism literature and its offspring 
 
Contrary to the Varieties of Capitalism literature, which refers to national institutions as 
determinants of a firm’s competitive advantage (Hall and Soskice 2001), this thesis has 
contended that the Italian economy is too institutionally heterogeneous and fragmented to 
be analysed with only national institutions in mind.  A classical varieties of Capitalism 
approach is concerned with national level institutions: “our premiss is that many of the 
most important institutional structures – notably systems of labour market regulation, of 
education and training, and of corporate governance – depend on the presence of regulatory 
regimes that are the preserve of the nation-state” (Hall and Soskice 2001 : 4).  Yet this fails 
to hold in Italy where for example training and education is to a large extent the remit of 
regional authorities and social partners; and where labour market regulations can be 
amended through sectoral level agreements (see,  Johnston, Kornelakis et al. forthcoming).   
 
At the same time, contrary to more recent theories which foresee models of trans-national 
capitalism developing (Lane 2001; Lane and Probert 2009), the argument presented in 
this thesis suggests that there are important arguments in favour of maintaining 
manufacturing within national, and even local, borders.  A trans-national approach 
contends that national level institutions can be reproduced abroad, thus suggesting that 
national institutional frameworks simply gain more and more extensive coverage as 
manufacturing moves from west to east.  This allows firms to access the same institutional 
assets elsewhere as price and cost balances vary across countries.  The thesis’ hypothesis 
instead suggests that there are important reasons to keep production at home.  Local 
vicinity enables firms to develop strategic relationships which build on the continuous 
exchange of tacit information on products and processes, and not on the ownership 
structures of firms or the setting of common standards (Hall and Soskice 2001 : 23-25).  
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More importantly, the theory of capital-skill asset pooling is amongst few in political 
economy to stress that differently – institutionally – endowed firms can overcome 
institutional problems by bridging such divide through inter-firm networks. Whereas the 
industrial district literature did indeed highlight the importance of networks, these were 
formed by homogeneous and symmetrical firms (Piore and Sabel 1984).  In Italy, the firms 
which participate in high quality-conducive inter-firm network are different in terms of 
size, institutional endowments and scope.  
 
Nonetheless, inter-firm networks are not a novel concept per se. They are a 
complementary institutional node in the Varieties of Capitalism literature as well and they 
are pivotal to the literature on global commodity and value chains (Sturgeon 2002; Gereffi, 
Humphrey et al. 2005). Yet, whilst the Varieties of Capitalism literature understands 
network-firms to be equivalently endowed by institutions, Italian network-firms are not 
and resort to the network because of the institutions they are confronted with. Moreover, 
whereas the global commodity (and value) chain literature understands firms as building 
inter-firm relationships to take advantage of different assets (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 
2005), it does not develop instruments capable of predicting why two firms would 
coalesce besides purely contextual needs. On the other hand, capital-skill asset pooling 
allows us to predict, given the institutional endowments of a firm, with whom and in what 
role a firm is expected to develop a productive network. 
 
7.3.2 Size matters! 
 
Crucially, capital-skill asset pooling hinges on heterogeneous firm endowments which 
proceed from the size-discrimination of Italy’s institutions. Whether varying firm size is an 
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advantage or disadvantage has been a debated issue in the industrial economics, industrial 
organisation and development literature: notions of internal economies of scale have often 
been contrasted to notions of external and local economies of scale (Marshall 1890; 
Krugman 1980; Porter 2000). Yet firms have been treated by the Hall and Soskice 
approach as being homogeneous (Boyer 2005), despite this assumption appears to be 
often contradicted by the evidence. Different countries have offered examples of how the 
varying outcome in terms of the balance of power between large and small firms alters or 
affects the shape and impact of institutions in the wage bargaining, industrial relations, 
and vocational training system (Herrigel 1996; Silvia 1997; Mares 2003; Thelen and Van 
Wijnbergen 2003; Culpepper 2007). Large and small firms are acknowledged to maintain 
clear and divergent preferences over any institutional arrangement. Nonetheless, the 
possibility that a preference struggle between firms leads to disagreement over 
institutional arrangements has not been considered. Yet, if the conditions for a social 
compromise (Amable in Crouch, Streeck et al. 2005 : 371), shared or imposed, are not met, 
economies could move towards dual institutional arrangements. Therefore, one would be 
confronted with domestic, therefore internal, varieties of capitalism. 
 
The study of Italy’s political economy is of relevance to this question: it shows that 
multiple institutional frameworks can coexist with each other. What emerges from the 
interaction between small and large firms is an institutional arrangement which spurs 
from the dual applicability of rules - according to firm size - in the social policy, wage 
bargaining, corporate governance, financing and vocational training realms (see Ch.2).  In 
Italy the two institutional conformations which cater large and small firms are re-
integrated through disintegrated hierarchy. By pooling together the variable assets, firms 
develop different forms of institutional complementarities which enable them to pursue a 
high quality product market strategy.   
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Italy is a case where internal heterogeneity becomes the defining element for the 
achievement of a coherent end-structure. Alternatively, scholars of comparative 
institutional advantages must consider the possibility that dual (or even plural) 
institutional frameworks develop in divergent, possibly conflicting, ways.  The different 
logics which dovetail variable preferences may conflict over established arrangements.  An 
example of such dynamic is offered by the tension which emerged between Swedish 
export and sheltered sector actors causing the overhaul of the EFO wage bargaining model 
(Lundberg 1985). In Germany, not only divergences over collectively negotiated wage 
agreements are increasingly developing between small and large employers (Thelen and 
Van Wijnbergen 2003), but also between public and private sector unions (Johnston and 
Rodriguez d'Acri January 2009). The effects of these conflicts on the sustainability of 
collective wage bargaining institutions and institutional equilibria are unclear but may 
lead to the development of entirely new models of capitalism (see Hassel 2011 on recent 
German developments). The majority of studies cited in this thesis, implicitly suggest that 
one particular economic interest – private or public sector worker, large or small firm, the 
state –prevailed in the struggle over defining a country’s institutions.  This thesis shows 
that the assumption of homogeneity between firms does not hold consistently, and that it 
should be first tested and only subsequently deployed in the definition of models of 
capitalist production.    
 
7.2.3 Coherence and complementarities 
 
Size considerations also feed into the discussion on institutional coherence and 
complementarities (Crouch, Streeck et al. 2005; Kenworthy 2006), as complementarities 
are expected to develop when institutions govern the behaviour of firms through the same 
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mode of coordination, strategic or market oriented. The majority of studies on 
‘comparative institutional advantages’ have used the term complementarity in the sense of 
similarity (Crouch, Streeck et al. 2005 : 360-362), where “the presence (or efficiency) of 
one [institution] increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other” (Hall and Soskice 
2001 : 1)73.   
 
The inception of disintegrated hierarchy within certain Italian industries shows that 
institutional incoherence is instead a constitutive part of pragmatic solutions to the 
problem of acquiring patient capital and specific skills encountered by Italian firms. What 
the evidence collected by the thesis implies is that the notion of “complementarity as 
similarity” is not relevant as complementarities themselves do not hinge on the similarity 
of behavioural logics across institutions and firms74. Crucially, high or diversified quality 
production is grounded on the interaction of production sub-systems governed by 
heterogeneous logics and incentives: the large firm-first tier supplier system where 
relational and reputational-based behaviour prevails; the second tier supplier system 
where price-based interaction does instead. This suggests that within each market 
economy, opposite modes of coordination and interaction not only coexist but 
complement each other as well.  In Italy, extended supply chains of production allow firms, 
which operate according to different rules of behaviour, to come together and form a 
cohesive yet disintegrate production system. For the study of institutions and models of 
                                                             
73 Although institutional isomorphism and homology can be limited by country-specific political and historical 
processes [Hall, P. A. and D. W. Soskice (2001). Varieties of capitalism : the institutional foundations of 
comparative advantage. Oxford, Oxford University Press, Crouch, C., W. Streeck, et al. (2005). "Dialogue on 
'Institutional complementarity and political economy'." Socio-Economic Review 3: 359-382..] 
74 Granted that lead firms do find capable suppliers, the effect of a shift towards higher general (and social) 
skills, acquired through the state-funded secondary and tertiary education system, has allowed lead firms to 
develop more extensive retail and distribution networks and better customer care services.  These skills have 
allowed lead firms to pursue expansionary strategies in international consumer markets and are 
complementary to the specific skills retrieved in external suppliers.  Thus the non-regulatory regime which 
governs the small-firm institutional framework is complementary to an ineffective vocational training system 
which forces young workers into either acquiring general skills through forms of formal education or specific 
skills through forms of on the job training.   
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capitalism this implies that institutional coherence should not be assessed ex ante but ex 
post. As capital-skill asset pooling brings together firms with different assets, Italian 
institutions are remodelled in new complementary combinations. These 
complementarities are not functional but second-best forms of surrogate coordinated 
market economy-style complementarities.   
 
Beyond disintegrated hierarchy 
 
This thesis has shown that large firms in Italy have become leaders of a process of 
industrial restructuring by recombining independent institutional configurations. This 
restructuring has allowed Italian firms to overcome the structural and institutional 
constraints faced when pursuing a high or diversified quality product market strategy. By 
resorting to the workforce formed and employed in small firms, large firms have obviated 
the problems and costs associated with a failed vocational training system. By relying on 
informal means of financing, small firms have overcome the difficulties associated with a 
dysfunctional and biased funding system in Italy. Although questions are still open as to 
the underlying conditions which lead to the establishment of lead firms or capable 
suppliers, theoretically the emergence of capital-skill asset pooling has confirmed that 
segmentation across institutional spheres can become beneficial when strategically 
recombined75. It shows that different rules of behaviour and modes of interaction are not 
mutually exclusive, but coexist and become complementary in the pursuit of product 
market strategies by firms set in hybrid institutional systems.  
 
                                                             
75 On a similar line of argument see also Crouch (2005). 
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While acknowledging the crucial importance of institutions in shaping the economic 
development path undertaken by countries, building on the results of this thesis, future 
research should accept that institutions do not always cater firms homogeneously, 
especially within national confines. Whereas this thesis has investigated a country case 
where institutional, territorial and political, fragmentation are clearly identifiable, the 
research agenda should be geared towards investigating whether homogeneity still 
characterises the effect of institutions on firms and actors elsewhere. This chapter has 
shown that disintegrated hierarchy is at odds with older analyses of the firm-institutional 
framework nexus in France, Germany, the US and the UK because of the very recognition 
that institutions cater Italian firms differently by discriminating in terms of firm size. Yet, 
very recent work has already shown that dualisation and sectoral differentiation is taking 
place within certain countries with respect to the beneficial effects of institutions on firms 
and actors (Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2011; Johnston and Rodriguez d'Acri January 
2009). In this sense, further firm level case studies are required to investigated to what 
extent this process of within-country differentiation is capable of altering those models of 
production organisation previously identified under the false assumption of firm and 
institutional homogeneity.   
 
Berger and Piore (1980) had rightly noted that societies are divided segmentally and not 
continuously.  They suggested that segments within societies organise around different 
rules, processes, and institutions which produce different systems of incentives and 
disincentives to which individuals respond (Piore and Berger 1980 : 2).  Boyer (2005) too 
had argued that  “complementarities […] also exist where different ‘logics; operate in 
different institutional areas” (Boyer in Crouch, Streeck et al. 2005 : 372).  The Varieties of 
Capitalism literature instead dismissed these intuitions by building frameworks of 
analysis on the premiss that coherent modes of behaviour underpin complementary 
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institutions.  Contra to this approach, this thesis has shown that investigating instances of 
institutional segmentation and divide provides us with useful insights for the analysis of 
(hybrid) models of capitalism in evolution.  
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VIII. APPENDIX 
A.1 Country selection based on OECD ITCS data availability 
 
Table VIII.1 Countries employed for the construction of the indicators 
  Revision 3 Revision 2 
Australia 1 1988-2006 1 1963-2009 
Austria 2 1988-2005 2 1961-2009 
Belgium Luxembourg Union dropped 1988-1993 3 1961-1993 
Belgium 3 1993-2006 dropped 1993-2009 
Canada 4 1988-2007 4 1961-2009 
China 5 1994-2004 n.a. n.a. 
China Taipei 6 1990-2006 dropped 1990-2009 
Czech Republic 7 1993-2006 n.a. n.a. 
Denmark 8 1988-2006 5 1961-2009 
Finland 9 1988-2006 6 1964-2009 
France 10 1988-2007 7 1961-2009 
Germany 11 1988-2007 8 1961-2010 
Greece 12 1988-2005 9 1961-2011 
Hong Kong dropped 1994-2004 n.a. n.a. 
Hungary 13 1992-2005 dropped 1992-2009 
Ireland 14 1988-2006 10 1961-2009 
Italy 15 1988-2006 11 1961-2009 
Japan 16 1988-2007 12 1962-2009 
Korea 17 1994-2006 dropped 1994-2009 
Luxembourg dropped 1999-2006 dropped 1999-2009 
Mexico 18 1990-2006 dropped 1990-2009 
Netherlands 19 1988-2006 13 1961-2009 
New Zealand 20 1988-2006 14 1964-2009 
Norway 21 1988-2006 15 1961-2009 
Poland 22 1992-2006 dropped 1992-2009 
Portugal 23 1988-2006 16 1961-2009 
Slovak republic dropped 1997-2006 dropped 1997-2009 
Spain 24 1988-2006 17 1961-2009 
Sweden 25 1988-2006 18 1961-2009 
Switzerland 26 1988-2007 19 1961-2009 
Turkey 27 1989-2006 20 1964-2009 
UK 28 1988-2007 21 1961-2009 
US 29 1989-2007 22 1961-2009 
 
The main empirical database is constructed on OECD ITCS Revision 3 series.  It includes 
the following 29 countries.  On grounds of completeness the OECD ITCS Revision 3 is 
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preferred to the Revision 2 version of the dataset as 29 instead of 22 countries are 
available in the former dataset, crucially including China and Eastern Europe.  
 
Yet for the study of pre-1988 trade flows, Revision 2 series were used to construct the 
same indicators, although the product classification break-down differs slightly.  Countries 
were dropped from either of the two revisions on grounds of insufficient data.  The year 
2003 is chosen as the end year of the analysis because it is the most recent year for which 
complete trade data measured in value and quantity terms is available.  Quantity data is 
required for the calculation of relative (symmetric) unit values needed for the assessment 
of the quality of a good. 
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A.2 Revealed Comparative Advantage and Relative Unit Value 
 
The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) is obtained by comparing the relative export 
performance of a country to the relative export performance of a group of countries.  The 
results will show in which sectors country “i” has a comparative advantage, as it exports 
comparatively more than the bundle of countries it is compared against (World, EU - see  
A.1 for actual basket of comparison used by this research).  Export data measured in value 
terms is obtained from the OECD ICTS database and used for the calculations. 
 
RCA = 
(Exports of Country i in Sector j/ Total Exports of Country i) 
(World Exports in Sector j/ Total World Exports) 
 
The Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) is obtained via the simple 
transformation of the RCA and ranges between (-1 : 1):  
 
RSCA = (RCA - 1) / (RCA + 1) 
 
The Relative Unit Value (RUV) instead is calculated by comparing the unit prices of a 
country’s sector to unit prices of the comparison basket in the same sector.  Unit prices are 
calculated by dividing exports measured in value terms of country “i” in sector “j” over 
exports measured in volume terms of country “i” in sector “j”.  Export data measured both 
in value and volume terms is also obtained from the OECD ICTS database and used for the 
calculations: 
 
RUV = 
Country i[Value of Exports in Sector j/ Quantity of Exports in Sector j] 
World[Value of Exports in Sector i/ Quantity of Exports in Sector j] 
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The Relative Symmetric Unit Value (RSUV) is obtained via the simple transformation of 
the RUV and ranges between (-1 : 1):  
 
RSUV = (RSU - 1) / (RSU + 1) 
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A.3 Case selection 
The case selection briefly discussed in Section 1.3.1 is hereby extensively presented.  The 
Italian product categories which are exhibiting a revealed comparative advantage vis-à-vis 
other OECD countries (as of 2003 data) are located in the north-western and south-
western quadrants (see Figure I.4).  Yet in order to evaluate which of those product 
categories have preserved such an advantage over an extended period of time, the goods’ 
performance in 2003 and 1988 are compared.  The starting date of the empirical 
investigation, has been chosen to be 1988 due data availability (see Annex 2).  Mapping 
the RSCA indicator over the two periods, delivers the following matrix (Figure VIII.1). 
 
Figure VIII.1 Commodity trade performance (1988 and 2003) 
 
Source: Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Own Calculations 
 
By analysing the location of each product category, two important findings emerge: first 
that the goods located in the upper right hand side quadrant have preserved the high 
RSCA value developed in earlier years (1988): second that the goods located in the bottom 
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right hand side quadrant have developed a comparative advantage where it was in fact not 
the case in the late eighties, as the RSCA value for 1988 is negative. 
 
Specifically, this exercise reveals that good “793: Ships, boats & floating structures” 
improved its trade position over time, as it is the most south-eastern commodity of the 
lower right hand side quadrant76: capturing a shift from a highly negative to a positive 
value on the RSCA indicator.  It also reveals that of the sixteen goods presenting a 
RSCA>0.5 in 2003 (Figure I.4), only five were in such a position in 1988 as well (Table 1.6).  
Yet, of these five, only three commodities hold a positive RSUV, and two hold a negative 
one - although by a very small amount (Table VIII.2).  Moreover, this also suggests that 
Italy’s trade specialisation has not been characterised by inertia, as contended elsewhere 
(De Benedictis 2005).  
Table VIII.2 Commodities with RSCA>0.5, with positive and negative RSUV 
Positive RSUV 
654: Other textile fabrics, woven 
831: Travel goods, handbags & similar containers 
846: Clothing accessories, of textile fabrics 
Negative RSUV 
611: Leather 
851: Footwear 
Source: Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2009, Own Calculations 
 
Yet, in order to reproduce these results at a lower level of disaggregation which would 
facilitate the correspondence with firms producing the identified good, the same RSCA 
indicators has been constructed on data broken down to the four-digit level of the SITC 
international good classification system. This exercise, performed for those goods which 
hold a positive RSUV in 2003 when disaggregated to the three-digit level, reveals that not 
                                                             
76  The other good category which present a comparable absolute improvement is “613: Furskins, tanned or 
dressed, excluding those of 8483”.  Because of the difficulty to link this product category with an industry, the 
“793: Ships, boats & floating structures” good category was chosen instead. 
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all product sub-categories hold a positive value on both the RSCA and RSUV indicators 
(Table VIII.3). Moreover, because the negative sign on both “Leather” and “Footwear” good 
categories is negligible and the categories of goods which preserved their comparative 
advantage since the rise of low cost competitor economies are few (five), the lower level of 
aggregation for these good categories as well. This exercise reveals that not all sub-
segments of the “Leather” and “Footwear” industries hold a negative RSUV but only some, 
as listed in Table VIII.3.  
 
Table VIII.3 Four-digit disaggregation of goods with positive RSCA in 1988 and 2003 
 Positive RSUV Negative RSUV 
831: Travel 
goods, handbags 
& similar 
containers 
8311: Handbag, whether or not 
with shoulder strap 
8312: Trunks, suit-cases, satchels & 
similar 
8313: Travel sets for personal 
toilet, sewing, shoe, 
8319: Holsters & similar cases,; 
container, n.e.s. 
846: Clothing 
accessories, of 
textile fabrics 
8461: Clothing accessories, not for 
babies, not knitted 
8469: Other made-up clothing 
accessories; parts 
8462: Panty hose, socks & other 
hosiery, knitted or croch.   
 
 Positive RSUV Negative RSUV 
611: Leather 
6115: Sheep or lamb skin leather, 
without wool (excluding6118) 
6113: Whole bovine skin leather, 
surface <2, 6m2, excluding6118 
6116: Goat or kid skin leather, 
without hair (excluding 6118) 
6114: Other bovine, equ. leathers, 
without hair (excluding6118) 
6118: Leather, specially dressed or 
finished, n.e.s. 
  
6112: Composition leather, basis of 
leather, slabs, sheets 
  
851: Footwear 
8515: Other footwear, with uppers of 
textile materials 
8511: Footwear with protective 
metal toe-cap, excluding sport 
8517: Footwear, n.e.s. 8512: Sports footwear 
8519: Parts of footwear, in-soles, 
heel-cushions & similar 
8513: Footwear, n.e.s. outer soles & 
uppers of rubber. 
  
8514: Other footwear with uppers of 
leather 
Source: Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Own Calculations 
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Thus the product categories, disaggregated at the four digit level of the SITC international 
classification system, listed in the middle column of Table VIII.4– under the title Positive 
RSUV, appear to capture industries where high quality goods are produced.  Since this 
performance is consistent with that held at the beginning of the empirical investigation 
period (1988), these industries will represent the first case study investigated. Once a 
similar breakdown is performed on the product category “793: Ships, boats & floating 
structures”, it emerges that only one sub-segment of the industry fits the success criteria 
set: “7931: Yachts and other vessels for pleasure or sports; rowing-boats and canoes”.  
This industry is thus selected as the second case study capturing an industry which 
improved its performance over the last fifteen years.  
 
Lastly, in order to identify a product category which strikingly worsened its trade 
performance overtime, the OECD ITCS Rev.2 database was employed (see Appendix 1 for a 
list of countries included in this database).  No meaningful industry appeared to meet the 
desired criteria by using the OECD ITCS Rev.3 database as the RSUV for those goods with a 
low RSCA value today and a high one in the past was negative.  The Revision 2 version of 
the database collects data from the early sixties.  Mapping the trade performance of 
commodities in 1961 and 2003 reveals that there are indeed two good categories which 
significantly worsened their trade performance (Figure VIII.2).  In order to select one case 
study, the trade performance of these two goods was compared to the corresponding 
value measuring quality performance.  This ensured that the same approach used to 
identify success cases in current years is replicated in past years as well.   
 
This last comparison revealed that although “783 Road motor vehicles, n.e.s.” exhibited a 
higher RSCA value in 1961, the corresponding quality indicator was low.  On the other 
hand, the good category “751 Office machines” exhibited a value of trade only decimals 
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smaller than the 0.5 success benchmark but a value of quality approaching one, underlying 
a clear quality advantage (Table VIII.4).  For this reason, “751 Office machines” was 
selected as the counterfactual case study – an industry which had exported high quality 
goods in the past but that had failed to perform as successfully in recent years. 
 
Figure VIII.2 Commodity trade performance (1961 and 2003) 
 
Source: Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Own Calculations 
    
Table VIII.4 Industry selection based on RSCA performance 
 RSCA 1961 RSCA 2003 RSUV 1961 
751 Office machines .47842821 -0.56758 0.846218 
783 Road motor vehicles, n.e.s. .68310821 -0.83254 0.229135 
Source: Source: OECD International Trade and Commodity Statistics 2010, Own Calculations 
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A.4 List of interviewees arranged by chapter and topic 
Chapter 2  
Italian Industry Composition 
1. Bugamelli, Matteo: Centro Studi BANKITALIA, 12/03/08, (phone interview). 
2. D’Aloia, Giuseppe: CISS, 29/03/08 Rome. 
3. Gennari, Angelo: CNEL, 01/08 Rome. 
4. Regalia, Ida: Department of Political Sciences, Università degli Studi Di Milano, 01/08 
Milan. 
 
Specific Skill Provision in Italy 
5. Bellandi, Marco: Department of Economics, University of Florence, 01/09/09 Florence. 
6. Burroni, Luigi: Department of Political Sciences, University of Teramo, 10/07/09 
Teramo. 
7. Dei Ottati, Gabi: Department of Economics, University of Florence, 06/08 Florence.  
8. Mati, Giampaolo: FILTEA-CGIL Formazione, 03/04/08 (phone interview).  
9. Zanni, Lorenzo: Department of Economics and Business Studies, University of Siena, 
31/08/09 Siena. 
 
Patient Capital Acquisition in Italy 
10. Benedetti, Aureliano: CariFirenze CEO, 06/10/2011 Firenze.  
11. Berlingorio, Corsello: Corporate Bank, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 03/09/09 Siena. 
12. Nebbia, Luciano: Direttore Generale, Banca CR Firenze, 18/02/09 Florence. 
13. Sera, Rolando: Ufficio Supporto Commerciale, Banca CR Firenze, 18/02/09 Florence.  
 
Chapter 3 – Leather Goods and Footwear Industry 
Industry Level Experts 
14. Apolito, Agostino and Angelo Arcuri: Internazionalizzazione, Confindustria Firenze, 
20/02/09 Florence. 
15. Augurusa, Giuseppe: Segretario Generale FILTEA-CGIL Milano, 23/02/09 Milano.     
16. Bolis, Fulvio: Segretario FILCEM e FILTEA Bergamo, 06/04/09 Bergamo. 
17. Cartocci, Giorgio: Segretario Camera del Lavoro di Arezzo, CGIL, 19/01/09 Arezzo. 
18. Ceruti, Giorgio: Segretario Organizzativo FILTEA-CGIL Milano, 08/05/09 Milano. 
19. Cesareo, Antonietta: FILTEA-CGIL, CdL Cinisello Balsamo, 02/04/09 Cinisello Balsamo. 
20. Di Salvo, Francesco: Segretario FILTEA-CGIL Como, 03/04/09 Como. 
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21. Fedeli, Valeria: Secretary Nazionale, FILTEA-CGIL, 02/04/08 phone and 16/01/09 
Rome. 
22. Mati, Giampaolo: FILTEA-CGIL Formazione, 03/04/08 (phone interview).  
23. Roverato, Giorgio: Department of Political Sciences and Economics, University of 
Padova, 05/08 (email exchange).  
24. Santarelli, Giuseppe: Segretario FILCTEM Fermo, 30/11/2010 (phone interview and 
written exchange). 
25. Sarti, Piero: FILTEA-CGIL, CdL Sesto Fiorentino, 18/02/09 Sesto Fiorentino. 
26. Tartaglione, Clemente: FILTEA-CGIL Centro Studi, 16/01/09 Rome. 
27. Tunisini, Annalisa: Urbino University 06/12/2010 (email exchange). 
 
Firm Level Interviews 
28. Bianchi, Davide: CEO EURLAST s.r.l, 13/01/09 (phone interview and written 
exchange). 
29. Calistri, Andrea: Proprietario SAPAF, 18/02/09 Scandicci. 
30. Ciucchi, Sofia: Assistente di Ferruccio Ferragamo, Riorganizzazione Catena Fornitori, 
15/02/10, Firenze, Via Tornabuoni 2. 
31. Settimelli, Cristina: Segretario Generale FILTEA-CGIL, CdL Firenze, 20/01/09 and 
19/02/09 Florence (Gucci expert). 
 
Chapter 4 – Yacht Industry 
Industry Level Experts 
32. Bianchi, Sandro: FIOM-CGIL Nautica da Diporto, 24/04/09 (phone interview). 
33. Bossi, Carlo: Segretario Regionale CGIL Lombardia, 27/04/09 (phone interview). 
34. Carcano, Luana: SdA Bocconi, 27/04/2010 (phone interview). 
35. Corti, Marcello: Segretario Generale FIOM-CGIL, CdL Firenze, 20/01/09 Florence. 
36. Garibotto, Paolo: Segretario Fillea Genova, 12/04/10 (phone interview). 
37. Mandanici, Pietro: Assessorato Cooperazione Commercio Artgianato e Pesca, Ufficio di 
Gabinetto, Regione Siciliana, 04/10/09 Milazzo. 
38. Sgro’, Enzo: Camera del Lavoro di Milazzo, 05/10/09 Milazzo. 
39. Strazzullo, Maurizio: Segretario Provinciale CGIL Livorno, 24/08/09 Livorno. 
40. Tracogna, Andrea: Universita` di Trieste, 07/04/2010 (phone interview). 
 
Firm Level Interviews 
41. Caslini, Isabella: Benetti Yachts, 04/09/09 Livorno. 
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42. Marchiori, Carlo: DMA s.p.a., 29/04/09 Rome. 
43. Vergara, Roberto: TECNAV, Noise and Vibration Consultant, 25/04/2010, Roma. 
 
Chapter 5 – Computer Industry 
Industry Level Experts 
44. Spezia, Laura: segreteria Nazionale FIOM, Informatica, Elttronica ed Informazioni, 
previously: Segretaria CdL di Ivrea. 11/02/10 (phone interview). 
45. Michelson, Angelo, Olivetti Expert, PhD in Sociology Cambridge, 03/2010 to 09/2011 
(repeated email exchanges). 
 
Of which, kindly provided by Angelo Michelsons: 
46. Billia, Paolo: Associazioni Industriali Canavese, 26/02/03. 
47. Gori, Franco: CNA Ivrea, 13/03/03. 
48.  Mauro, Loris: Director of the Distretto Tecnologico Canavese, 09/04/03 
 
Firm Level Interviews 
49. Bricco, Paolo: Il Sole 24Ore, Redazione Economia e Imprese, 10/03/2010, Milano. 
50. Maglione, Roberto: Head of Human Resources at Finmeccanica (and ex-Olivetti), 
London, 10/07/2010  
51. Olivetti, Matteo: 09/03/2010, Ivrea. 
52. Pacetti, Pietro:Ex Dirigente Olivetti, 03/03/2010 (phone interview). 
53. Salvetti, Laura: Fondazione Natale Cappellaro, 09/03/2010, Ivrea. 
 
Of which, kindly provided by Angelo Michelsons: 
54. Capirone, Enrico: CEO and founder of RIBES, software company, 13/03/03. 
55. Rossi, Ing.: Owner of Pegaso, electro-mechanic small firm, FIAT supplier, 10/12/02 
56. Masciaga, Luigi: Owner of Sapi s.r.l., 09/04/03. 
 
Chapter 6 – Machine Tool Industry 
Industry Level Experts 
57. Ferrante, Gianni: Ufficio Economico FIOM-CGIL, 02/04/08 and 23/04/09 Rome. 
58. Mordeglia, Francesco: Centro Studi e Cultura d’Impresa, UCIMU, 07/05/09 Cinisello 
Balsamo. 
59. Papignani, Bruno: Segretario Generale FIOM-CGIL Bologna, 06/05/09 Bologna. 
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60. Rinaldi, Alberto: Universita di Modena, 07/12/09 (email exchange). 
61. Scaltriti, Gianni: Segretario Regionale Emilia Romagna CGIL, 29/04/09 Rome.  
62. Zanni, Giampaolo: Segretario Generale FIOM-CGIL Vicenza, 07/05/09 Vicenza and 
18/10/09 (phone interview). 
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